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Almost all critical studies of Southern literature 
have been quick to point out the acute historical conscious­
ness -which informs the work of most Southern writers. This 
study is an attempt to explore some of the implications of 
a particular kind of historical consciousness— which I will 
call "Christian”— in the fictional art of William Faulkner 
and Flannery O'Connor, to see what dimensions and values it 
adds to their work. It is based upon the premise that the 
historical sense plays a crucial role in the artist’s deci­
sion making process at every stage in his work.
My initial concern in this study will be to discuss 
certain themes which I beli.eve are at the core of a Christian 
conception of history, and which I feel are present typo- 
logically in the work of these two Southern writers. It is 
generally acknowledged that the Christian tradition plays a 
central part in the work of both Faulkner and O'Connor. My 
first particular point of focus will be to try to show how 
both writers accept a Christian interpretation of the his­
torical process at work around them, a process which goes
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back through Southern and American history into Biblical 
revelation of the history of the race itself. Secondly,
I vant to explore how their acceptance of this particular 
interpretation of history makes itself felt in the creative 
act itself; that is, what impact this historical sense has 
on the way their fiction actually is shaped. It is not 
jus a matter of calling them "Christian" writers, and then 
ignoring what such a term can actually mean. The accept­
ance of that particular interpretation of history will, it 
seems to me, greatly determine how history is actually 
"realized" in their fiction from an artistic standpoint.
Many valuable studies have already been done on the 
Christian influence upon both these writers— critical treat­
ments which show the thematic links between their various 
works and the Christian as well as non-Christian sources.
In fact, it has become almost a critical cliché to identify 
the South as the Bible Belt, and then claim this as the 
essential part of the writer's inherited tradition which 
then crops up automatically in his fiction. Or in more 
academic terms, the Christian tradition is frequently 
described as a "mythic background" which functions as a theo­
logical and moral framework of values for the action repre­
sented in the particular story. This is undoubtedly true, 
and critical studies which show these thematic links are 
of the highest importance. Yet often such studies, it seems
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to me, do not fully pursue the problem of ho-w this material 
from tradition actually "works" to create value and meaning 
in the story; critics accept the material and proceed as 
though somehow the formal aspect of the work were separable 
from the thematic. Thus for example, one can show the 
thematic ties between the Christ story as it is evoked in a 
Faulkner tale, and the same material as it is present in a 
story by Carson McCullers. But the material is obviously 
not "present" in the same way in both works. One is tempted
to dismiss the problem by saying that one is a greater
writer than the other, but this merely begs the question.
The true complexity of the issue lies in the fact that the
way in which the material is rendered will not only affect
the aesthetic value of the work. It also affects the onto­
logical truth of the history itself being presented in the 
work, to which it is organically linked both within and out­
side the fiction.
The complicated nature of this problem shows one 
limitation of the strictly thematic approach. Writers have 
complex and varying attitudes toward the "history" they 
evoke in fiction— realistic, sentimental, ironic, nostalgic, 
comic, and so on. The purely thematic approach often slights 
the question of how it is rendered dramatic and made "to live" 
through the artistic decisions of the writer. Since the 
historical sense is intrinsically part of the creative act, 
it makes a crucial difference how precisely the material is 
"there."
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In the case of many writers, Southern and otherwise, 
the "history" is present in their work in a kind of residual 
way, part of the cultural milieu they have inherited and 
transmitted in their fiction. We have all read Southern fic­
tion of this type. Usually it presents a romantic and ideal­
ized "Past," sometimes ante-bellum and nominally invoking 
"Christian" values, and more often than not suffused with 
an aura of nostalgia for the pre-lapsarian state. Such works, 
I believe, tend to be dishonest not only because of the dis­
tortions of history they usually contain, but also because 
from an artistic standpoint they show us a writer who has 
abnegated the tough decision-making processes in art in 
favor of letting a particular "historical" or "religious" 
view do the seeing and evaluating for him. The result is 
almost always a partially dead and repetitive work; the his­
torical sense has somehow become detached from the creative 
faculty, and though such works are popularly called "his­
torical," they are I believe quite the opposite. For if we 
conceive of the historical sense, as I believe Eliot correct­
ly does, as an act of genuine "self-awareness" of history 
functioning within the creative act, then such works are 
guilty of an "unconscious" or dissociated use of history 
which is not dynamic and generative of the work's values— and 
there only in a passive, inert, and artistically unrealized 
manner.
Faulkner himself did not help the cause of clarity 
by statements he sometimes made to the effect that the 
Christian tradition was a framework he just happened to in­
herit and therefore used in his fiction. Such statements 
tended to slight the focal point where "history" becomes 
operative in art, that is, in the particularized creative 
act where the writer must first of all make a choice about 
the possible validity of a particular view of history, and 
then continually incarnate that choice in a series of dra­
matic artistic options. This seems to me a more accurate 
way of describing how Faulkner experienced Christian history 
in the act of writing (as opposed to talking about "mythic 
background" or "usable past"), and equally important, a 
more accurate way of describing how the reader experiences 
that material when he reads the work. In fact, Faulkner’s 
statement that the writer tries to "write the whole history 
of the human heart on the head of a pin" is more to the 
point, because it is metaphysically true, if we conceive 
of the head of the pin as the relatively few moments of time 
in the individual work, Faulkner, like Eliot, saw the 
problem of the historical sense in art in the widest meta­
physical context when he stated that history was not "was" 
but "is"— a dynamic organism and ongoing process in which 
past is present and continually altering and being altered 
by the created work.
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Ho-w then, in the case of Faulkner and O'Connor, can 
■we attack the problem of hoiv history becomes dramatically 
"alive" and generative of value in the work? How is it pos­
sible to describe the particular creative act which embodies 
a Christian interpretation of history in a living way— which 
in a single creative movement brings to life several layers 
of "historical" meaning as though they were one and indivisible 
in the present, experienced simultaneously by the reader?
The most meaningful approach, it seems to me, is to see the 
operation of the historical sense in terms of the metaphysical 
doctrine of analogy, and call the "history" evoked in the 
work an analogical dimension of the action being presented, 
rather than using the vague historicism of terms like "mythic 
background" and "traditional Christianity." In Chapter 
Three of this study, where the historical sense will be dis­
cussed in relation to formal problems, I shall try to explore 
this doctrine of analogy more fully. For the moment, let 
me simply note that the doctrine of analogy is a metaphysical 
answer to the problem of how being can be both everywhere 
alike and different at the same time in existence. It states 
that each existing thing receives existence in proportion 
to (ana-lagon— according to the measure) the possibility 
of being possessed by that thing. The principle of propor­
tionality of being is alike in all things, yet each is
different in the proportionality of being they possess.^
In his brilliant study of the literary imagination, 
Christ and Apollo, Fr, William F. Lynch has demonstrated 
convincingly the relation between the doctrine of analogy 
and the creative act, showing how the analogical view of 
being gave foundation to the medieval practice of four-fold 
meanings in scriptural exegesis. My own emphasis in this 
study will be upon the historical vision of Faulkner and 
O'Connor as an analogical dimension in their fiction, and 
it is greatly indebted to Fr. Lynch's work. However, I have 
also repeated stressed in this introduction the inextricably 
organic relationship between the thematic elements of a 
particular view of history— in this case a Christian view—  
and the formal manner of presenting that view fictionally, 
so that it is interpenetratively dramatic and evaluative of 
the action. This leads to a final problem for speculation 
in this study: namely, whether the Christian view of history 
incarnated in their fiction is rooted in both manner and 
form in a historical incarnation which, as Fr. Lynch suggests, 
can be conceived of as the prototype of completely realized 
analogical action, something which writers like Faulkner and 
0'Connor attempt to approximate humanly in their art. In 
conclusion, I wish to assert my belief that the creative act
Gerald B. Phelan, S t . Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 19^8), 15-22. See also William
F . Lynch, Christ and Apollo (New York: Sheed and Ward, I960), 
VI.
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is finally mysterious, but also that its mysteries can be 
reflected upon meaningfully in such a way that we can bring 
ourselves closer into step with the creative motions of the 
artist's mind.
CHAPTER ONE
Before attempting to characterize the major themes 
in a Christian conception of history--which is the object 
of this chapter— I wish to stress one point which seems to 
me fundamental to this entire study. That is, the absolutely 
central importance of the particular decisions which the 
writer makes in the act of writing concerning the "history" 
he evokes typologically. How he chooses to render the mate­
rial creates its validity and value, as was noted in the 
introduction. The philosopher Michael Novak has illustrated 
in another context how a man's philosophical "horizon" is 
largely defined by his initial starting point, what he will 
or will not choose to allow as possible truth concerning the 
matter under consideration.^ This does not seem to me to 
imply a rigid dogmatism. Rather, the willingness to accept 
and explore "possibility"— to remain open and flexible 
before the facts--is a necessary ingredient in deciding how 
a certain perspective can be regarded as meaningful. It 
seems to me that in a broad sense Christianity is present in 
Faulkner and O'Connor's works in precisely this way— as a
^Michae] Novak, Belief and Unbelief (Now York: 
McMillan Co., 1965)1 Chapter III.
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"possibility," an option which may often be rejected by 
characters but which is nevertheless made vitally and viably 
real in the work by the authors. Given experience as it is, 
this is all that can justifiably be demanded of the writer. 
To evoke Christianity in this way, as "possibility," does 
not contradict the assertion made that these writers choose 
and manifest a Christian interpretation of history. Later 
in this chapter, I shall try to show that the very essence 
of the Christian viewpoint of the historical process is 
openness and possibility, free and truly creative human 
action. The claim which some critics make that the writer's 
choice of a particular interpretation of events is somehow 
a limitation or barrier to truth seems unfounded if the 
core of that interpretation rests upon an absolute doctrine 
of freedom to explore as many dimensions of the real as can 
be conceived.
This initial historical "horizon" chosen operates 
in the particular artistic decisions of the writer, of 
course, in a continuing way, though not automatically. If 
the historical sense is vital to the act, the horizon is not 
one that he can accept and then ignore, but one which must 
be incarnated again and again creatively. It need not be 
conscious to the writer at each moment; Faulkner is right 
here in pleading a certain "unawareness" of artistic strate- 
gems, and indeed his art would not be free and vital other­
wise. However, this does not imply that the historical
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view comes into the creative act passively. Perhaps the 
best explanation is that the writer develops what Maritain 
called the "habit of art," which in regard to history means 
a habit of seeing it actively typological. Miss O'Connor 
once stressed that young writers needed most to learn to 
"read" events in the manner of the medieval exegetes--with 
four levels of meaning. This is the kind of active, crea­
tive historical sense which gave added dimension to her and 
Faulkner's writing.
In the works of these two writers, the three dominant 
strains in this added dimension to which the literal action 
is linked are classical mythology. Old Testament and New 
Testament revelation. For example, in Faulkner's "The Bear," 
there are evocations of classical myth--reference to Priam, 
to pagan rituals and primitive forces of Fate, and the Greek 
gesture of Boon Hoggenback killing old Sam Fathers. There 
are also evocations of Old Testament myth--the story of 
Abraham and Isaac— as well as the New Testament analogue—
Ike the carpenter making his act of atonement. These three 
strains are, of course, transmuted through a history of the 
South which germinates from the literal level of the story.
We know that the "history" evoked as corresponding thematic 
parallels serves as an evaluative norm for the action pre­
sented. But these added questions arise: What, if any,
typological relationship exists between the various levels 
of "history" for the action of the story? The thematic
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question is inseparable from the formal, but for the moment 
we shall view the problem strictly from the standpoint of 
historical vision. For example, is there significance in 
the fact that as the history of Ike's maturation develops 
he moves from the primitive arena of Force and Fate to the 
more Christianized one involving growing self-consciousness 
of his place in history, of the actual dimensions of his 
freedom, and a knowledge of his own redemption? It seems 
clear that there is a definite plan, a strategy of historical 
interpretation, being presented typologically by Faulkner 
in "The Bear." Another example is Miss O'Connor's story 
"Greenleaf," where the central character Mrs. May, a Southern 
farm woman, is associated symbolically with Hera. The stray 
bull in the story is associated with Zeus in his seduction 
of Europa, only to have the typology transformed later in 
the action so that Mrs. May's death by goring becomes a 
violent encounter with Christ. Again, the typological 
levels suggest a particular historical interpretation, so 
much so that both stories seem to be experienced-by the 
reader as prophetic "continuing revelations"--dramatizations 
of the historical-ontological links that exist between these 
evoked parallels and the particular literal action being 
presented, which "realizes" the typology.
There is the possibility, of course, that these 
writers may be randomly drawing symbolic parallels to the 
action, but the particularly strong historical sense that
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seems to be operating would argue otherwise. And if a con­
tinuous and patterned historical vision is being rendered, 
then an attempt to briefly characterize the three strains-- 
classical, Old Testament, and New Testament--would seem 
fruitful for investigating the nature and dimensions of the 
themes they encompass.
First of all, the classical world, has been charac­
terized as one in which man saw the universe as a circum­
scribed, limited whole that contained all of reality.
Even the workings of the gods or fate, however inscrutable 
to man, were nevertheless a part of that self-enclosed 
world. The effects of this vision have been described by 
Romano Guardini as follows:
From his religious convictions he knew of a 'highest 
father of the gods and men,' but this father belonged 
to his own world just as did the vaults of heaven; in 
truth he was their very spirit. Classical man knew 
the power of a Fate which commanded his world; he knew 
of a governing justice and a reasonable order for all 
things. These forces, all powerful though they were, 
did not stand beyond the world but formed within its 
ultimate order.^
Classical man knew nothing of a being existing 
beyond the world; as a result he was neither able to 
view or shape his world from a vantage point which 
transcended it. With his feelings and imagination, in 
his actions and all his endeavors, he lived within his 
cosmos. Every project that he undertook, even when he 
dared to go to the farthest bounds, ran its course 
within the arc of his world.^
2Romano Guardini, The End of the Modern World (New 
York: Sheed & Ward, 1956), p. Ï?.
^Ibid. , p. 19.
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One project which he undertook, of course, was 
mythologizing the spiritual mysteries he encountered in 
his experience. But even here, he was limited (imagina­
tively) to natural mystery, circumscribed within the knowl­
edge of his own world. Consequently, classical myth and a 
classical view of history is "limited," not just in the sense 
of being outdated by the advances of learning and tech­
nology, but limited ontologically in the very possibilities 
of being, and of the dimensions of human freedom it could 
conceptualize and actuate. It will take a breakthrough of 
a new and higher kind of knowledge, that of divine revelation, 
to make possible man's knowing participation in supernatural 
mystery. This does not suggest, however, that classical 
mythology is false, or that a necessary antagonism exists 
between it and revelation. Christian scholars of the Middle 
Ages viewed classical literature as expressions of natural 
truth, whose content was further developed and amplified 
by Christianity. Revelation added a deeper layer of meaning 
to the action; one reason why Christian writers like Dante 
or Milton or O'Connor found it possible to develop an imagi­
native situation with both classical and Christian parallels 
operating in a thematically meaningful way.
4Miss O'Connor strongly insisted upon this distinc­
tion. In reply to a friend who saw parallels between 
Oedipus at Colonus and Christ, she said that the words of 
Oedipus involve natural mystery, whereas Christ's were of 
a different order entirely--supernatural mystery--and hence 
not fully knowable by man.
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Given the self-enclosed, limited classical position, 
one can see the totally revolutionary character of the 
Christian revelation. First, the notion of a completely 
transcendent God, creator and sustainer of the universe but 
completely separate from it, radically redefined man's posi­
tion in the world. Now he was free to conceptualize him­
self from a standpoint outside his world, to see his eternal
destiny, and to direct or refuse to direct his energies in 
the light of that special knowledge. No longer was he bound 
within the notion of time and the simplistic idea of eternity- 
as-timelessness which characterized the classical view; eter­
nity in revelation was revealed as "here" and "now," a dimen­
sion of the present which gives it its true meaning. Sec­
ondly, revelation as voiced by the prophets was God's desig­
nated plan for the race of mankind in totality, one which 
gave clear direction and aim to the whole historical process. 
Human history has a definite beginning in time (the Creation), 
a factual point of transforming apothesis (Christ's Incarna­
tion), and a fixed end (the Final Judgment). Third, in 
sharp contrast to the relatively static classical view of 
creation, existence, and man's relation to the divine-- 
theories of "imitation," of Platonic participation in the 
One, or creation by dispersion into multiplicity--revelation 
insisted that creation was a positive, ongoing act of genesis 
in time, in which reality is in the process of being created 
throughout all of history. Thus St. Augustine spoke of the
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various "stages" of history in the drive toward final real­
ization, the last stage beginning with the Incarnation, 
which nullified the effects of the Fall and introduced a 
new freedom, a new potentiality of being into human experi­
ence. Twentieth century apologists like Teilhard de Chardin 
found evidence of this intuition of ongoing genesis in the 
modern phenomena of biological and psychological evolution, 
seeing it as a universal drive toward union directed by 
love. Fourth, Christian revelation introduced the idea of 
one, universal, corporate and transcendent destiny for man- 
kind--spiritual salvation. This salvific destiny was mani­
fested in Old Testament revelation in God's personal dialogue 
with man, in words and actions interpreted prophetically and 
typologically, so that each event really and symbolically 
prefigured its consummation in Christ's ministry, death, and 
resurrection, which itself points toward the apocalypse at 
the end of history.
Christ's coming begins a new stage in universal 
history, distinct from the classical and Old Testament 
epochs, more revolutionary. The new era brought the ful­
fillment of Old Testament prophecy, and the mysterious and 
irrevocable linking of time and eternity in the Incarnation 
by complete submission of the Word to human limitation in 
order to finally transcend it. This process of Christ's 
Incarnation is revealed as "the way" of historical process 
toward final transcendence, for paradoxically, as Fr. William
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Lynch has shown, Christ took time itself as His instrument 
and, rather than averting it. He explored it to the fullest 
limits of potentiality, and more.^ Thus in the New Testa­
ment, human history becomes the history of Christ's pene­
tration of the world of fact, time, and space--in a process 
of genesis moved forward by humanity's willing participa­
tion. At the core of this process is the new freedom 
generated by the Redemption, which nurtures the divine life 
of man. This freedom is inconceivable outside the corporate 
destiny of man and the race, a fact which accounts for the 
"scandal" of Christ's ministry, for against the classical 
and secular tendency to view freedom as a mode of transcend­
ing the limited physical plane of existence, the factual and 
the concrete, Christ constantly upends these visionary expec­
tations by naming the humble, the temporal, the mundane and 
the unspectacular as the free road to salvation.
In later chapters we shall have to look closely at 
the work of Faulkner and O'Connor to see if their treatment 
of history reveals a patterned relationship between the 
classical, Old Testament and New Testament strains. The 
point which should be stressed at this stage, nonetheless, 
is that, whether either writer is fully aware of it or not, 
the facts and effects of revelation exist as part of their 
historical consciousness, present as an option of vision 
and action. Even without being formally acknowledged, this
^William F. Lynch, Christ and Apollo (New York:
Sheed & Ward, i960). See especially Chapters II and VIII.
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revelation is part of the writer's awareness by a process 
of historical absorption, and it decisively influences the 
creative act. Such is, I think, the case in Faulkner's 
"Barn Burning," where distinct "stages" in the level of 
consciousness can be observed operating as possibilities 
of human freedom within the action, and this "rising" 
consciousness is cast in the universal terms of a struggle 
between different historical epochs.
In a narrow sense this is an initiation story, in 
which the boy Sarty chooses to break the paternal bond with 
his barn-burning father and follow the truer dictates of 
his conscience. It is a difficult choice, one which severs 
him irrevocably from the family and sets him alone on the 
road to independent manhood. At the same time, however, the 
story's action and the boy's final choice for freedom is set 
by Faulkner within a larger universal framework. Everything 
about Sarty's father and home (mental and physical) point 
to a primitive mode of life: the nomadic existence of the
family, the unquestioned authority of the tribal leader,
the code of blood loyalty, the torpid, bovine sister and
;
older brother, Abner's primordial worship of fire and horses, 
his ruthless anti-social independence, and the primitive 
moral code by which Abner lives— an eye for an eye. Against 
this is set a higher, more civilized life: communal society
with an ethos of mutual responsibility, with appeals to 
conscience and reason to settle differences (the courts
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Abner scorns), rather than by brute force; the respect for 
human rights, at least nominally, and the general sense of 
"civilization" symbolized by Major deSpain's mansion, the 
valuable rug Abner deliberately stains, and the law courts, 
which view actions from the standpoint of a community larger 
than the family and its narrow blood loyalties. In this 
context, Sarty's choice of freedom appears as almost a kind 
of universal human and racial option, as he elects to follow 
the "higher" mode of life based on reason and conscience 
rather than the more primitive, which would have obliterated 
his identity as a free person as much as it already has his 
older brother, who has become his father's stooge. Signifi­
cantly, Sarty is only able to do this after witnessing that 
higher life concretized in Major deSpain's mansion, which 
gave him an awareness of life beyond the nomadic existence 
that made him despair until that time. Faulkner's univer­
salizing of the boy's choice is made possible by the writer's 
vital historical consciousness working in the creative act, 
so that there is a dramatic ontological progression within 
the story based upon a vision of human freedom unable to be 
contained in the primitive mode. It should be added that, 
how Sarty actually finds his identity and freedom is revealed 
by Faulkner to be a mystery in the story.
In an ontological sense, then, classical myth pre­
figured revelation, and the Old Testament typologically pre­
figured the history of man fulfilled in the New Testament.
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Since creation is seen as an ongoing process, still incom­
plete, the historiographic role of the artist is the pro­
phetic one of revealing the significance of events in the 
light of ultimate transcendent destiny. The question now 
arises: what crucial themes germinate from this Christian
historical vision, and how do they affect the artist both 
in his way of seeing experience and his creative practice? 
Such an expansive question can be dealt with only partially 
here. For purposes of discussion in this study, a few cen­
tral themes that derive from this historical vision must be 
characterized. They are: (1) the belief in mystery; (2) the 
international view of spirit and matter, the word and the 
act; (3) the theme of time and qternity; (4) the theme of 
grace--"spiritual motion"; (5) the concept of place ; and 
(6) the theme of "community."
The life and dimensions of man's being are an onto­
logical mystery, rooted in the mystery of Christ's Incarna­
tion and Redemption. Mystery, here, is used not in the sense 
of "unkno\m," but of "unknowable" by human means. The source 
of the mystery of human identity is therefore supernatural, 
a fact assured by Christ's hypostatic union with the race. 
Acceptance of such a profoundly fundamental view has a cru­
cial impact on the writer's creative acts. Paradoxically, 
it does not limit his field of observation because experience 
is mysterious; rather, it opens the writer to further and 
further possibilities of exploration by guaranteeing the
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supernatural dimension of reality in such a way that he is 
not given to rest in simplistic, reductive explanations, 
but able to push his fiction toward the invisible frontiers 
of mystery. Hawthorne, an avowed enemy of reductionists, 
staunchly believed in this principle, and it is a position 
that Miss O'Connor frequently espoused. Faulkner also con­
curred in this belief, stating that the "worst sin" he could 
think of was "violation of the human heart." From the 
Christian standpoint, this doctrine of the inviolability of 
human being-ness stems from the mystery embodied perfectly 
in the Incarnation, imperfectly in man--the mysterious union 
of spirit and matter.
In a general philosophical sense, the incarnational 
view of spirit and matter holds that the two are not sepa­
rable or separate existing entities, but rather are incar­
nated in such a way that each being possesses its unique 
act of existence. A contrary view is some form of dualism 
or dissociation of spirit and matter (usually the manichean 
form which relegates matter to inferiority or perversity), 
a position which is theologically impossible from the stand­
point of the Incarnation, and which also is philosophically 
antagonistic to the doctrine of analogy as an explanation of 
being. The exact relationship between spirit and matter 
remains a mystery because, as has been pointed out, the 
Incarnation broadened immeasurably the possible dimensions 
of human existence— the potential New Man is radically
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different from his classical and Old Testament forefathers.
As Fr. Lynch notes: "The form of a mouse can receive only
so much. No one yet knows how much the form of a man can 
hold."^ Nor is the relationship between spirit and matter 
static; it is linked to time, genesis and change, growth 
and decay, and most importantly, human freedom. Looking at 
the theme of spirit and matter from an evolutionary stand­
point, Teilhard de Chardin saw the historical process as one 
of a gradual spiritualization of matter, of "Christianiza­
tion" of the material world. The key to the mystery of 
freedom in the incarnational view of spirit and matter seems 
to be bound up with the mystery of suffering, not neces­
sarily in the sense of undergoing intense, unremitting 
anguish because of the fallen condition, but rather of 
accepting the meaning of suffering and loss offered in the 
Incarnation, an acknowledgment which then paradoxically 
acts as a liberating force upon reality by lifting the bur­
den of guilt. This, of course, is the essence of the Redemp­
tion, that the debt which man could not pay has already been 
paid. With freedom, rejection is always a possibility, and 
as will be shown later, in Faulkner and O'Connor such a 
refusal (which is essentially a refusal of the concrete, 
limited demands of love) frequently takes the form of a 
retreat into some spiritual and psychological dualism--spirit
^Christ and Apollo, p . 174.
23
disembodied from matter. A poignant example is the case of 
Quentin Compson, who cannot accept the blemished concrete 
factuality of his historical situation since it does not 
match the ideological spiritual principles of behavior he 
holds, principles which in fact betoken a state of innocence 
whose immunity he thinks to achieve by suicide. Quentin's 
anguished dualism is a matter of degree, however; since 
there was only one absolutely perfect incarnation of spirit 
and matter--Christ--all humanity suffers from "incompletion" 
in this respect. Thus grotesque, violent, and bizarre mani­
festations in fiction are, as Miss O'Connor noted, only 
dramatically heightened examples of the grotesque in every­
one. Nevertheless, in the Christian view "incompletion" is 
not taken as a norm or absolute condition; the drive is 
toward some interpenetrating reconciliation based on love, 
perhaps best exemplified by Dilsey, who seems to be whole 
and at one with herself.
The verbal equivalent of the incarnational view of 
spirit and matter is, of course, the theme of the Word and 
the Act. Here, the Son of Man is the Word, God's most per­
fect communication of Himself, and Christ's own words are 
the most perfectly concretized incarnation of mystery--the 
Spirit descending into creation analogically, and trans­
forming it by its divine character. This perfect union of 
word and act occurs in Christ because He is the Word which 
is Act; that is, his message incarnates Truth in a single
2k
i%ovement (in what the Christian would call a motion of grace). 
This of course is what the writer tries to approximate in 
his struggle to create dramatic, spiritual "motion" with 
language in sequential time. In the incarnational view of 
creativity the concept of verbal motion in time is thus 
lined with the theological idea of grace, "spiritual motion," 
because grace illuminates the creative faculty to see and 
bring to life essential truths incarnated in reality, not 
by escapist tactics of romantic transcendence outside time, 
but by the writer committing,himself to the spirit-in- 
factuality of existence. Eudora Welty described her task 
as trying to show the "spirit" of concrete things, that which 
makes them dramatically moving; in a similar vein Miss 
O'Connor once described the act of fiction writing as an 
attempt to "draw the lines which create spiritual motion."
It seems to me that Faulkner's judgment that his works were 
all "failures" should be read in exactly this light, the 
artist's humble recognition that any human verbal creation 
was doomed to fall short of his consciousness of a perfectly 
realized union.
What then, would constitute artistic fidelity to the 
incarnational view of spirit and matter, the word and the 
act, when the writer sees around him a "broken world"-- 
spirit unrealized in matter, the word separated from the act, 
yet a world also in genesis? In the light of his own spiri­
tual vision and the world he sees, his particular redemptive- 
creative act is to "name" that which is, as truly and
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movingly as possible. True creative freedom here involves 
avoiding the blurring, vague extremes of dualism--of spirit 
disembodied; one dualistic extreme results in the false 
effect of didacticism, redeeming experience quickly and 
abstractly, while the other imparts evil to creation in 
the manner of Manicheanism. In short, this creative freedom 
consists in revealing the "essence" of the thing or action 
being rendered through the physical, to free it from its 
"brokenness" through language and show that it is simul­
taneously fallen but redeemed, limited but possessed of 
absolute integrity. This type of imagination attempts to 
show the thing's utter uniqueness, its inviolable spiritual 
wholeness , that which makes it essentially what it is and 
no other thing. St. Thomas Aquinas perceived the intrinsic 
relationship between such an imagination and the aesthetic 
sense when he set three conditions for beauty: wholeness,
harmony, and radiance. The first (intégrités) demands that 
the aesthetic image be a discreet object, apprehended in 
time and space but separated from everything around it; the 
second (consonantia) perceives the object in its complex and 
variant harmony of relationship between parts and whole; 
and the third (quidditas), as Joyce perceived, presents the 
object "so that you see that thing which it is and no other
7thing." It is not, therefore, some vague chimera of essence 
which is shown, but the real thing itself. Jacques Maritain,
7James Joyce, _A Portrait of the Artist as â Young 
Man (New York: The Viking Press, 1956), p. 213.
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in his discourse on Aquinian aesthetics, has explained the
precise relationship between the beauty of form of a work,
its intelligibility, and mystery as follows:
By ’radiance of the form’ must be understood an onto­
logical splendor which is in one way or other revealed 
to our mind, not a conceptual clarity. We must avoid 
all misunderstanding here: the words clarity, intelli­
gibility , light which we use to characterize the role 
of 'form' at the heart of things, do not necessarily 
designate something clear and intelligible for u s , but 
rather something clear and luminous in itself, intelli­
gible itself, and which often remains obscure to our 
eyes, either because the matter in which the form in 
question is buried, or because of the transcendence of 
the form itself in the things of the spirit. The more 
substantial and the more profound this secret sense is, 
the more hidden it is from us ; so that, in truth, to 
say with the Schoolmen that the form is in things the 
proper principle of intelligibility, is to say at the 
same time that it is the proper principle of mystery.
(There is in fact no mystery where there is nothing to
know : mystery exists where there is more to be known
than is given for our comprehension.) To define the 
beauty by the radiance of the form is in reality to
define it by the radiance of a mystery.°
A fourth vital theme effected by the Christian his­
torical vision is the mysterious relationship between time 
and eternity, part of the writer's internal sense which is 
reflected thematically in fiction. Briefly, the Christian 
perspective holds that man exists and acts both in time and 
in an eternal "present," a dimension outside time which 
gives it its essential meaning. Human actions derive their 
deepest spiritual meaning from this immutable "now"; the sub 
species aeternitatis in which every act is irrevocable, 
objective, and absolute. If the notion of time is cut off
^Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism (New York: 
Charles Scribners Sons, I962) , p. 2EI
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from the eternal dimension, then the present loses its ulti­
mate significance. The historical fact of Christ's Redemp­
tion is the mystery of time and the eternal, since in this 
mystery, for man, both the fact of the fallen condition and 
redemptive freedom exist simultaneously in the present. To 
accept this mystery fully is to accept time, the Christie 
paradox that the way to eternal transcendence is Christ's 
way of exploring all the modes of a free being acting in 
and through time. As we shall see later, a familiar spiri­
tual malaise in Faulkner and O'Connor's work is man's unwill­
ingness to accept this mystery, particularly the fact of the 
fallen condition (which implicitly witnesses to the need 
for redemption) , so that much violent enei-gy is expended 
trying to achieve some mock state of personal innocence and 
immunity. The effect of the Fall was to place man completely 
within time and subject to it--subject to corruption and 
death; not simply physical death, but spiritual, eternal 
death. The Incarnation reunited the dimensions of time and 
the eternal, and the Resurrection overcame the effects of 
time mysteriously, not by Christ's abandoning time, but by 
fulfilling it in the light of the eternal. Yet the mystery 
of the relationship between the Fall and Redemption remains 
partially hidden in the veil of time, to be lived through 
concretely. This precludes any notion of Platonic dualism, 
or of escape into the mock ethereal realms of infinity.
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How does this theme of time and eternity relate to 
the historical sense and the creative faculty? Fr. Claude 
Tresmontant has pointed out that Biblical metaphysics held 
that God created gratuitously in one act which is still 
going on--creation is still in the process of being made, 
in time, Man participates in this process of genesis cre­
atively, especially the prophetic artist, whose historical 
sense generates intuitive perceptions or revelations of the 
direction and meaning of history. To quote Tresmontant;
"Time denotes the act of creation. Eternity is the point
oof view of the creator." Fr. Tresmontant shows how funda­
mental is this historical sense in the Judeo-Christian 
heritage.
In Platonism the sensible participates in the Idea 
by a degradation....In the Biblical universe, the 
sensible participates in the intelligible by creation 
...it is at one time being and sign....The Platonic 
symbol for representing and signifying a metaphysical 
or theological reality appeals to a myth, to the unreal. 
The symbol is disincarnated. The sensible, the concrete, 
is not suitable to carry the message. It is necessary 
to construct a chimera.
On the contrary, the Hebrew uses daily things, com­
munal reality, history, to signify and teach the mys­
teries which are the proper nourishment of the spirit 
....The advantage of the Hebrew method of teaching meta­
physics and theology by the niaschal and the parable of 
concrete fact is its capacity for universality. The 
maschal grows from the concrete, the most common, the 
most universally human....In the Biblical mode of expres­
sion, it is enough to be human to understand that which 
is proposed. The Biblical parable is as intelligible 
for the Galilean peasant as for the Corinthian docker
9Claude Tresmontant, Essai sur la Pensee Biblique, 
quoted in Christ and Apollo, pp. 211-12.
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in the time of St. Paul, as it is for the worker in the 
factories of Paris in our time. A Greco-Latin culture 
is often an impediment to an understanding of these 
parables, which imply a sense of the real and of work, 
and such a love of the concrete element as seems a 
defect to the Platonic mentality; the latter is more or 
less unconsciou"_y dualist, and too aristocratic to 
prove the depth and richness of the mystical content of 
these daily realities of working with the elemental.... 
The particular is the existant. Hebrew thought springs 
from the particular existant; the particular in the 
Biblical universe is neither negligible nor insignifi­
cant. It is a vehicle of sense.
Thus from the artist's standpoint, the consciousness of an 
eternal dimension, paradoxically "working" in and through 
the sensible concrete particular, allows him to reveal his­
tory is a truly creative way. It is not just a matter of 
revealing a history which unravels in time according to some 
pre-existing plan; this would be Platonic imitation rather 
than creation. The Christian idea of time is synonymous 
with the concept of human (and thus artistic) freedom, of 
authentically creating the universe in all its material fac­
tuality and the spiritual reality at the heart of it.
Fr. Tresmontant raises a question which seems to me to 
epitomize the artist's sense of this mystery. "Isn't it 
precisely the tension of duration of a knowing being that 
measures his power to act, the quantity of free and creative 
activity that he is able to introduce into the world?
The paradoxical biblical view of the artist's 
stance--measuring experience from an eternal fixed
l°Ibid., p. 211. 
l^Ibid., p. 210.
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standpoint, yet conscious of genesis going on--seems akin
to Faulkner's own conception. Tresmontant points out that
the biblical notion of intelligence is "a dynamic intuition
of Being in genesis”; Faulkner frequently stated that "life
is change, motion," and that being must adapt or die. He
has also stated that the artist's task is to arrest motion
when he creates, and this views the genesis from the fixed
point of eternity. On the other hand, the actual experience
of the work for the writer and reader is not one of stasis,
but of dramatic movement in time. Faulkner's "arrested
motion" seems more accurately a description of the absolute
concrete image which struck in an eternal flash the chord
of creative vision; as for example, the image of a young
girl with muddy drawers climbing on a tree, which germinated
12The Sound and the Fury. Yet Faulkner grappled to embody 
that image in a dramatic and sequential continuum of language 
and action, and this is the "time" which writer and reader 
proceed through experientially.
When we look within fiction itself, there are fre­
quently "signs"--actions--denoting the Christian mystery of
12 In an interview with Cynthia Grenier, Faulkner 
verified this sense: "There's always a moment in experience
--a thought— an incident--that's there. Then all I do is 
work up to that moment. I figure what must have happened 
before to lead people to that particular point, and I work 
away from it, finding out how people act after that moment. 
That's how all my books and stories come." Quoted in The 
Lion in the Garden, James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate, 
ed. (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 220.
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time and eternity, of supernatural grace operating in nature 
and through time. These are what can be called acts of 
"spiritual motion"; that is, some crucial act or insight 
achieved by a character which witnesses to the existence of 
the eternal and the character's ontological relationship to 
it. It has nothing especial to do with physical motion in 
time and space, or with any romantic idea of transcendence 
of the limited world. Frequently it comes in the form of 
a mental recognition by the character, who is "moved" by 
the action of grace to see and accept it. Mysteriously, 
he sees himself in the light of dimension beyond time, and 
consequently, sees his own meaning and destiny incarnated 
in this particular situation and in this "place"--which in 
the Christian view constitutes a truly historical insight.
For example, the grandmother in Miss O'Connor's "A Good Man
Is Hard To Find" travels a long way, physically, to meet
4" .■
death at the hands of the Misfit. But the essential "spiri­
tual motion" occurs in a small gesture--touching the Misfit's 
arm--a movement of grace which acknowledges her essential 
relation to him: "Why, you're one of my own babies!" In
this motion of grace she accepts her true place in relation 
to him, and there is no story without this free act. Similar 
"spiritual motions" of recognition occur in "The Displaced 
Person," when before her death Mrs. Shortley perceives the 
"true country," eternal and invisible, from which she comes, 
and in "The Artificial Nigger," "Revelation," and in fact
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every other major story by O'Connor. In Faulkner, the con­
cept is best exemplified in Dilsey in The Sound and the 
Fury, a character who seems to live and move always in the 
light of the eternal, yet completely immersed in time. In 
Part IV, she makes a spiritual movement during Rev. Shegog's 
sermon, a historical insight that connects and reveals the 
mysterious union between Christ and the thirty-three year 
old idiot Benjy standing next to her in the pew.
None of these "motions" indicate spatial movement 
especially, a change of place, in the popular sense. In 
fact, spatial movement frequently betokens an attempt to 
escape the judgment and "presence" of the eternal. In Wise 
Blood Hazel Motes only truly sees himself sub species 
aeternitatis after his means of physical locomotion--his 
rat-colored car— is destroyed. Joe Christmas is another 
notable example of a character who is existentially "lost," 
without a place, and therefore driven on an anguished journey 
to escape himself. Thus "spiritual motion" is connected to 
time and an acceptance of the eternal, and this acceptance 
is an act of historical-ontological consciousness which 
involves accepting one's place in the immediate situation 
(temporally and spatially), and in relation to the total 
human community and its single spiritual destiny, as the 
Grandmother does with the Misfit, or Dilsey with Benjy. It 
is an awareness of "place" which begins in the immediate 
and the physical and then stretches outward to the invisible
33
and mysterious roots of being. Some characters carry "place" 
within them as an interior condition, like Lena Grove, who 
fits into any community and seems to act as a catalyst for 
the possibilities of grace no matter where she is. Viewed 
in this light, Faulkner's description of Joe Christmas' self­
eviction from the human race as "the worst tragedy that can 
happen to a man" seems to point— not to the fact that he 
can't fit in society (as the sociologists might claim), 
since obviously he can--but to the kind of existential loss 
of place that seems particularly prevalent in contemporary 
American experience.
"Place," then, metaphysically felt, is the intersec­
tion of time and the eternal, and the Christian central 
place is the Crucifixion. Materially it is rooted in the 
concrete location and time; ontologically it stretches into 
the invisible and the infinite. In her essay "Place in 
Modern Fiction," Eudora Welty expertly defined this con­
cept's significance in fiction as the ground root of value, 
and the disastrous effects of its loss. Perhaps because of 
their unique cultural position, Southern writers seem to 
intuit this more profoundly than others. Viewing the matter 
ontologically, Romano Guardini has pointed out that medieval 
man possessed a rather firmly defined sense of place--in 
society, in his cosmological sense of God ruling from the 
Empyreum, and in his sense of the "other place" of perdition 
--albeit a finite view, but one which found support in the
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structure of life everywhere. In addition, there was the 
sense of "inner finiteness," a sense within man of a fron­
tier beyond which lay the mystery of his being, known com­
pletely only by God. This guaranteed a respect for indi­
vidual inviolability and the mystery of personality, a 
concept, needless to say, which is antinomous to modern 
reductive and rationalistic explorations of the psyche—  
"violations of the heart"--the inner place.
The security of the medieval framework passed with 
the Renaissance, with the revolutionary new cosmology sup­
ported by new scientific discoveries, with critical reap­
praisal and rejection of biblical revelation, and with the 
social and psychological revolution. These phenomena sundered 
Western man from his old secure place, with profound psychic 
repercussions on the fundamental matter of man's attempt to 
locate his identity in being. Since the Renaissance we have 
witnessed, historically, an increasingly intense sense of 
rootlessness, exhibited positively in the quest for dis­
covery in intellectual life, in scientific and geographic 
explorations, and in the area of human freedom. But these 
have been coupled with negative effects as well--the in­
creasing sense of alienation from self, of wandering, and
13of the extreme fragility of man's position in the universe.
The concern of much modern writing with this problem shows
^^The End of the Modern Wor1d , pp. 6I-67.
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the writer's sense of this loss, partly because he shares 
it, but also, if he is a truly significant writer, because 
he stands in a definite place metaphysically which assures 
his own identity in being. I do not mean to suggest that 
writers like O'Connor and Faulkner share the medieval view 
of a fixed cosmology from which to judge contemporary experi­
ence. Miss O'Connor once remarked that the modern writer's 
landscape was no longer fairly evenly divided between heaven, 
hell, and purgatory, as Dante's was, but that he had to seek 
for "balance" in confronting modern experience by searching 
within himself for a position from which to truly see the 
distortions of contemporary life. Curiously, that found 
balance is often reflected in fiction by the willingness to 
use surface distortion--the grotesque--to dramatize the depth 
of modern value disorientation. For the writer who shares 
the Christian historical vision, the felt place of axio- 
logical balance is the Redemption, the point of hope in the 
writer's basic commitment against futility and despair.
Another theme which is closely related to that of 
"place" is the concept of community. In the Christian his­
torical vision the "community" is the total, universal mass 
of humanity, since the aim of the Redemption in historical 
terms is the single corporate salvation of the race. This 
includes the dead as well as those living and yet unborn—  
the "mystical body" of humanity linked by Christ's entrance 
into and transformation of history. The dead also have
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their place in existence--a point worth considering in 
relation to As Lay Dying or The Violent Bear It Away.
The drive of the Redemption is toward union by love, on the 
human level within the community of men; a community char­
acterized ideally by freedom and openness. The redemptive 
process is slow, painful, but inexorable. Still, the option 
of withdrawal implies a fate which is worse: it may tem­
porarily soothe the anguish of commitment and change, but it 
also cuts the individual off from the concrete sources of 
growth— human love in mutuality. Cases of this are repeat­
edly evident in Faulkner’s work, and in each case he makes 
it clear that, because of the inescapable bond of humanity, 
disaffection only incurs spiritual sterility, a n d , a retreat 
from history--usually into the false immunity of a romanti­
cized past. We need only think of Reverend Hightower and 
Quentin Compson to see this tragic option at work, each 
curiously "outside" history out of some desperate urge to 
dissociate themselves from its evil forces. Each is reluc­
tant to accept "place" in relation to the community around 
them, and each can rarely manage to accept the grace of the 
moment, to "move" by acknowledging a link with the human 
community. Hightower does, of course, manage this on occa­
sion (notably in helping Lena Grove in childbirth), but then 
he finally disengages himself from involvement. In contrast, 
Byron Bunch makes his commitment to "move," acting out of 
love in spite of risk. Dilsey, of course, is the best
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example: a center of love and union who is perfectly at
home with her spiritual self in the broken, obsession- 
ridden world around her, a world held together inwardly 
and outwardly by her sense of responsibility to a "community."
There is another view of "community" which is ob­
noxious to the Christian concept, yet also depicted in 
Faulkner and O'Connor. It is characterized by a sense of 
enclosure rather than openness, of fixity rather than spiri­
tual growth, and of a rigid provincialism based on exclusion 
and moralism, such as the "town" reaction to Joe Christmas 
and Joanna Burden in Light in August. It is familiar in 
fiction as the over-simplified stereotype of Southern 
society, and with many ostensible Christian members. Yet 
it must be judged in the light of the invisible, universal 
community within which the writer measures it by the typo­
logical action of the novel. This is not to say judged in 
the light of the universal contemporary community in America 
or the West, for one complicating factor in Southern fiction 
is that the "true" community may be enclosing to defend 
itself against more pernicious intrusions from a largely 
secular culture. As Miss O'Connor once noted, anguish in 
the South was not due to the fact that it is different from 
the rest of America, but because it is not different enough.
38
II.
There is a vision of history which is antinomous to 
the Christian view also represented in Faulkner and O'Connor's 
works, which both see as very operative universally and 
increasingly within the South. This view can be labeled the 
secular modernist or progressivist, though neither writer 
is especially anti-progressive. The differences between the 
two views are fundamental and irreconcilable--concerning 
the nature and direction of the universe, the essential 
character of man and his relation to a Divine Being, and a 
responsible use of freedom and power. The secular modernist 
is the dominant sensibility of contemporary American culture; 
and both writers see it making significant headway within 
the South, even though the biblical tradition still persists 
with more evident tenacity than elsewhere. The South today, 
as Miss O'Connor observed, may not be "Christ-centered," 
but it is nevertheless still "Christ-haunted." Southern 
fiction has provided a dramatic battleground for the clash 
of these opposing views of history's "progress" for the past 
hundred years.
As historians of culture have noted, the modernist 
secular viewpoint emerged from the dissolution of the Church- 
centered medieval world and the concomitant revolution in 
all areas of life which has proceeded since the Renaissance. 
The complex view of God, man, and human destiny propounded 
by Christian revelation suffered attrition under the wave
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of enlightenment brought by new freedom in every dimension 
of life— intellectual, social, political, religious, and 
psychological. Most importantly, the recognition of the 
person of Christ as the focal point of history became blunted 
and obscured; the prevailing sense came to be that human 
destiny, individual and collective, could fulfill itself by 
human means alone--by intelligence, by mutual understanding, 
and by power. The sense of the supernatural diminished; the 
problem of evil seemed humanly soluble, or as Eliot noted, 
a sense of the supernatural power of evil became diluted in 
this rising new sensibility. This assumption of "solu­
bility" was based upon a secularized view of man's potential 
as being unlimited; in direct contradiction of the biblical 
emphasis on human limitation and the need for divine grace 
and direction. In short, very little need for a Redemption 
was acknowledged; one could after all be "self-redeemed."
It is possible, of course, to elaborate endlessly 
upon the different manifestations of the secular progressive 
spirit in the past four centuries. What I wish to call atten­
tion to here are those central themes which run counter to 
the Christian historical vision under discussion. These are 
the negative counterparts reflected dramatically in Faulkner 
and O'Connor's fiction.
The first primary difference which should be noted
is the view of man simply as a being. Christian revelation
posits the basic unknowable mystery of existence and experi­
ence, centered in the Incarnation. In contrast, secular
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modernism rejects this belief wholeheartedly; man and his 
experience are regarded as capable of being conformed to 
human intellectual understanding. Prime examples of this 
impulse are the various forms of rationalism which try to 
eliminate mystery by formulaic analysis, a temper of mind 
that invades all areas of life. Perhaps its most destruc­
tive effect is that by trying to reduce supernatural mystery 
in personality and "solve" human limitation, it invariably 
cuts down the potentiality of growth and good as well.
Miss O'Connor remarked that the "Aylmers in our society 
have multiplied since Hawthorne's day," and her fiction 
offers ample evidence of this widespread sensibility at 
work: Rayber, Shephard, old Mr. Fortune, Mrs. Cope and
Mrs. McIntyre. Another form of this reductive sensibility 
manifests itself in the ruthless pragmatic materialism by 
which characters try to enforce their will upon experience. 
Faulkner's works abound with these types: Jason Compson,
insanely obsessed with order and logic, yet irrational in 
all his responses; the "mechanical" men like Abner Snopes, 
Popeye, and Thomas Sutpen; and the religious rationalists 
like Mr. McEachern and Doc Hines--all driven by a simplistic 
view of experience, and all, I should add, finally defeated 
by the mysterious flow of history they rebel against. Under­
standably, none of these characters can come to terms with 
time or place, or accept "the moment" gracefully; eternity 
and the supernatural having been discarded, they are driven
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by some obsessive quest for salvation through self-redemption 
that inevitably ends in despair or destruction.
As we have seen, in the Christian perspective, a valid 
historical sense involves a sense of the ontological rela­
tionship between past and present , which implies an aware­
ness of the relationship between time and eternity. The 
loss or fragmentation of this sense is evident throughout 
the modernist perspective. Revelation preached a limited 
and definitive span of history, linked to and purposed by 
the eternal dimension; secular modernism views history as 
open-ended, an end in itself, with man completely autonomous 
to direct its course. And yet it is a curious paradox of 
history that the various doctrines of determinism grew up 
with this sense of human autonomy. The concept of man 
governed by a Divine Plan to which he responds with limited 
freedom was largely abandoned. But after an initial exhila­
rating sense of freedom from the burden of revelation, the 
modernist sensibility increasingly found difficulty in dealing 
with the anguish of time, boredom, and the feeling of ennui. 
The sense of the absolute eternal importance of the single 
human act diminished proportionately. The sundering of the 
ontological tie between time and eternity produces, among 
other effects, two logical extremes. The first is histori- 
cism: the obsession with past-as-past which appears in many
literary forms (Proust, for example), and in many characters 
in Southern fiction as a nostalgic escape. The second effect
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is an opposite extreme: obsession with the present moment
of the type seen in pure existentialism, or in the actions 
of someone like Jason Compson or Rayber, both of whom cannot 
relax their hold on the present, and whose fanaticism is 
defeated again and again by time.
The loss of historical sense, as Eliot noted, is 
part of the larger problem which he described as a "disso­
ciation of sensibility," a dissociation which effects every 
central theme of the Christian view of history. For disso­
ciation means "dis-incarnation," a movement away from the 
kind of ontological unity exemplified perfectly in Christ 
and to which man naturally aspires. There is the dissoci­
ation of time from eternity, in which time becomes simply 
progression rather than genesis and growth toward consum­
mating a redemptive history; and in which eternity is removed 
"out there" and seen as "after time," not as a dimension of 
the present now which gives value to time so that man can 
immerse in it creatively, not burdensomely. There is the 
dissociation or disincarnation of spirit and matter, where 
the former is viewed abstractly as pure essence, and matter 
as slightly or wholly despiritualized, inert, or in the 
Manichean extreme, evil. There is the dissociation of word 
from act, partly fated since only one perfect incarnation 
has occurred, but gravely aggravated to the point where 
language has become an instrument of manipulation--of power 
for its own sake--rather than as a vehicle for truth. One
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form of the malaise produced searches for lofty essences-- 
for verbal ’’redemption"--by dissociation from the concrete. 
One need only point to Quentin Compson, drowning in a deluge 
of words cut off from concrete value, or Addie Bundren's 
insight that "words rise up, thoughts go along the ground" 
to see Faulkner's awareness of this problem. Indeed it was 
one which he struggled desperately with in his own work, 
sometimes only with limited success. And as we shall see 
later, the degree of dissociation directly affects the degree 
of dramatic "motion"--of revelation through word as act-- 
engendered within the creative process itself.
There is the dissociation of "place"--the phenomena
of displacement already mentioned. Now in the Christian
perspective a certain form of this is natural--the sense of
alienation from God brought by the Fall, and the longing
for paradise and return to the innocent state, as Dante felt
in the Divine Comedy. Yet coupled with that, through the
Redemption, is the belief in the fundamental goodness of
man's free immersion in "this place"--the concrete, limited,
narrow physical world which is the gate through time to
salvific transcendence. In the modernist dissociation of
place, however, there is the sense of m a n ’s fundamental
alienation from his own being in the world--cut off in time
and space from the eternal. This displacement also induces
an anxious striving to conquer "infinite space" (inner and
outer), a sense of rootlessness and wandering, and an ina­
bility to accept "here" with its roots pushing downward
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through the concrete to the eternal. Theologically, this 
sense of rootless striving is directly linked to a rejection 
of the Pall, of limitation and connection, and of the kind 
of redemptive freedom which holds that one can effect 
action within an eternal framework without moving an inch, 
through various forms of prayer. As Miss O'Connor and Eudora 
Welty and others have pointed out, rootless questing (for 
the novelist also) is indeed a way of refusing to feel, of 
remaining in place long enough to experience the real sense 
of loss that brings with it a truly redeeming sense of human 
community.
Finally, there is the form of dissociation which is 
opposite to the Christian concept of community— the drive 
toward immunity. This term signifies any motion or movement 
away from recognition of the Fall, of personal communal 
responsibility (again, the total mystical body including the 
dead), or refusal of grace. The term "motion" is appropriate 
because theologically it constitutes a counter-movement to 
the unifying agency of grace, which as we saw, was bound up 
with acceptance of time-place in "the moment." Frequently 
in characters (Hazel Motes, for example), the drive toward
I
immunity is an attempt to preserve a false state of inno-
. »cence, which if admitted as lost would incur the responsi­
bility of redemptive freedom. So the character chooses to 
extricate himself from the web of concrete duplicity-- 
escaping in space like Hazel Motes, or in time like the
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Grandmother and Mrs. Compson, to recapture another place 
which seems better to live in, even as in the case of Quentin 
where it is a "hell" where he and Caddie can live immune 
from the fact of her "fall." The effect is to place the 
character outside "history" in the concrete, present fluid 
situation--the exact axiological point where grace can only 
be operative--and generative of growth. Or sometimes immunity 
takes the form of a retreat behind language itself, behind 
verbosity or rhetoric or cliche or self-justificative palaver, 
a kind of "self-redeeming" mechanism, as in Jason Compson or 
his father. In any of these cases, immunity is "achieved" 
only at a terrific price to the individual, usually a loss 
of freedom. It often requires the action of grace working 
through violence to wrench the character from their fixed 
(innocent) obsession, forcing them to "be" within this moment 
with all its terrifying possibilities, as in the case of 
Rev. Hightower when he tries desperately to save Joe Christmas 
by insisting Joe was with him on the night of the murder.
In fact, it is the prevalence of the smug imperturbability 
of the modernist temper which forces much of the "holy" 
violence in Faulkner and O'Connor.
I have tried to sketch the above historical perspec­
tives to give some philosophical and theological dimension 
to the historical sense operating in Faulkner and O'Connor, 
and to try to demonstrate the ramifying issues at stake for 
a writer choosing to reveal in fiction a historical vision
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of experience close at hand. Now it is necessary to sketch 
in more detail the particularly close-at-hand history through 
which the biblical historical vision is transmuted--the 
American framework and the South's relation to it.
CHAPTER TWO
I have tried without much reference to the history 
of institutionalized Christianity to sketch some basic themes 
and counterthemes which emanate from an authentically 
Christian historical vision. This seemed the best approach 
because it is precisely that "spirit" of the Christian vision 
which the writer responds to; the historical sense is a felt 
psychic condition rather than a conscious intellectual stance 
taken. The fact of the matter, of course, is that institu­
tionalized Christianity has shown itself again and again 
throughout history to be marked with innumerable human dis- 
tortions--with perversity and self-deception perpetrated in 
the name of the highest "moral" goals, with exploitation and 
debasement of man, with self-righteous provincialism and 
despicable folk worship, and always with a strain of Phari­
saical religiosity that works to diminish human freedom and 
responsibility. But the distortions are human, not Christian. 
Writers like Faulkner frequently exposed these perversions, 
and did so I think in the name of that true spirit which 
they saw adulterated to the point that the only conscionable 
alternative was to depict this so-called "Christian" ethos 
in all its stultifying negativity and to identify
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sympathetically with its victims. For to the novelist the 
victim's situation is like that of the whore vindicated by 
Jesus before her pharisaical accusers; it is a situation 
which cries out for a witness to the true spirit in the 
face of the deformed, sterile de-humanized imitation of it 
offered by self-righteous moralists.
All this is to say that manifestations of authentic 
Christian historical vision are hardly confined to the 
institutionalized forms which the world has knoivn. Aware of 
this, some critics, John Edward Hardy for example, argue 
that Faulkner's spiritual foundation is actually "ahistori- 
cal," that he takes his stand on the side of certain uni­
versal "eternal verities" and against a narrow and debased 
institutionalized Christianity.^ This is to a certain extent 
true, but to call his position "ahistorical" is to accept a 
misapprehension about the authentic Christian historical 
vision, one that frequently occurs. It is to identify 
universal Christianity exclusively with the West, to narrow 
its history only to Europe and America, and to judge its 
ebb and flow only within that limited framework. In a 
recent discussion of the concept of a "post-Christian" world, 
Fr. Walter O n g , S.J. has convincingly exposed the cultural 
provincialism of those who judge Christianity only in terms
1John Edward Hardy, "Faulkner: The Legend Behind the
Legend," in Man in the Modern Novel (Seattle: Univ. of Wash.
Press, 1964). Mr. Hardy's essay offers a provocative inter­
pretation of Faulkner's use of Christian materials, one which 
shows clearly the theological analogues in Faulkner's writings
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of its history in Western culture, and ignore both its uni­
versal character and the factual history of its continuing
global growth--in Africa, the Far East and all areas outside 
2the West. Faulkner constantly identified with this uni- 
versalist "spirit," as evidenced by his insistence that he 
wrote as a "member of the human race" or one of the "family
of mankind." This historical sense of the total, single
;
race was a constant verity which enabled him to penetrate 
the facade of debased forms of "Christianity" in the South 
that were in fact elitist and exclusionist, religiously pre­
tentious, and antithetical to the true redemptive spirit.
It is this universalist Christian historical sense,
1 would argue, which imbued the vision of Faulkner and 
O'Connor when they interpreted the history of American 
experience, the specific '"foreground" linked analogically to 
classical and redemption history. What constitutes this 
"foreground" wherein the historical sense operates? Spe­
cifically, what particular Christian and secular strains 
can be found in the American vision of its experience, where 
contending views of history and ultimate values take shape? 
Here again, we shall try to probe beneath the complicated 
nexus of political, social, economic and religious forces 
that go to make up the "American experience" in order to 
distinguish certain vital and opposing differences in the
^Walter Ong, S.J. , In the Human Grain (New York:
MacMillan Co., I967).
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ontological sense of "our situation," differences which 
shape the view of man and direction of history in this 
country.
It is common among cultural historians to point out 
similarities between post-colonial New England and the South 
as fertile grounds for their respective literary flowerings. 
There is common to both a distinctive regional cohesiveness; 
a sense of regional historical self-consciousness; a spirit 
of individualism and ethical sensitivity; a vital rhetorical 
tradition; diversified ethnic, social, and religious groups 
yet all cognizant of a certain regional identity; and 
finally, a kind of inner tension of warring values that spurs 
vital creative activity. Looked at in this light the two 
cultures share a great many similarities, as well as many 
obvious differences. However, when we begin to examine 
historical sense as a felt, psychic condition, there is such 
a radical difference between the two that, for all their 
intellectual similarities, they are in fact worlds apart.
This radical difference can be accounted for primarily by 
one historical fact--the Civil War and its aftermath in the 
South. Broadly speaking, the New England culture from its 
inception possessed ideologically the same basic Christian 
tradition that existed in the South, but with certain excep­
tions, this belief has not been experientially confirmed in 
American experience outside the South, a fact borne out by 
the gradual declension of the rigorous, theological-centered
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Puritan culture that occurred in the face of optimistic 
progressivism.
The Providential conception of history, as an avowed 
"policy," was of course the motivating power behind the 
Puritan settlement in America in both its inception and 
institutionalized government. William Bradford, John 
Winthrop, William Hooker, the Mathers, and the successive 
waves of Puritan settlers ventured to America specifically 
to erect "a city on a hill," charged with the conviction 
that Divine Providence guided their efforts to build a "New 
Jerusalem" in the new world. Heirs of both the classical 
and Hebraic intellectual traditions, disciples of revelation 
but also imbued with rationalism, the early Puritans set 
about fervidly to fulfill their appointed role in the evolu­
tion of Christianity in America. It is important to recall 
here the Puritan idea of its own "providential" history, 
for oddly enough it contained the seed of the gradual declen­
sion of the vital faith which sustained the early settlers 
amid the distresses of the early decades, as well as the 
seed of justification for the kind of secular progressivism 
and moral benevolence that evolved. Puritan theocracy was 
based upon a rationalistic and legalistic "covenant of 
grace," whereby God deliberately bound Himself to a con­
tractual agreement of salvation if the elected saints ful­
filled His laws on earth. One effect of this doctrine was 
to radically diminish, both individually and in terms of the
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whole society, the concept of supernatural mystery as it 
existed at the center of the Hebraic tradition. It is no 
accident, for example, that slightly more than a hundred 
years later, Benjamin Franklin read the story of Job, one 
of whose central theses is J o b ’s renewed sense of divine 
mystery, and found the following moral: "Remember Job, who
suffered, and was afterwards rewarded !" (italics mine). 
Secondly, the Puritan providential conception of its history 
was in fact built upon an act of separation from the Past, 
from history, if not literally then at least psychically, 
an act of dissociation which on the one hand allowed them to 
identify analogically with the exodus of the "chosen people" 
of the Old Testament, but which also tended to diminish any 
universalist sense of redemption by exalting their unique 
moral destiny above the Past they left behind.
Perry Miller has thoroughly documented the subtle 
transformation and declension that occurred in the Puritan 
theocracy when placed paradoxically amidst the bountiful 
prospects offered in the new continent. The "covenant of 
grace" reinforced the sense of moral rectitude, yet the 
injunction upon each saint to labor in God's vineyard--this 
world— coincided perfectly with the opportunities for progress 
and wealth offered in the frontier colonies. With increasing 
alarm religious elders issued jeremiads against worldliness 
and secularism, reminding men of the God of wrath and damna­
tion, but everywhere the rigorous Puritan view suffered
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gradual attrition. Even while attacking the effects of
3progress, these elders rarely attacked progress itself.
It was not that men were abandoning the providential view
in wholesale numbers; rather, they felt themselves to be.
interpreting and designing and fulfilling it in a continent
whose resources were direct evidence of God's abundant
blessing upon their works. Miller records how in the course
of a century the wrathful God of the Puritans was slowly
translated into a benevolent and rewarding Deity, whose
material benefices implicitly testified to His approval of
the secular aspects of the covenant alliance. As the decades
wore on, the federal theology of New England covenanters
was diluted into a kind of buoyant nationalism that saw God
as a co-architect of American aspiration. Even Jonathan
Edwards, for all his desperate attempts in the 1740's to
revive the Puritan spirit, finally acknowledged a God who
disposed His providence in this world with disinterested
benevolence. By the time of the Revolution, the theology
of biblical revelation was intellectually and experientially
largely discredited, replaced by a doctrine of prosperity
and secularized moral idealism.
Bit by bit, almost imperceptibly, the benevolent God 
who led the Americans to independence was interpreted 
as a Being who shepherded this whole community into a
3Perry Miller, Nature's Nation (Cambridge: The
Belkamp Press, I967), p. 33. See also the last chapter of 
Perry Miller's The New En glan d Mind : The Seventeenth Cen­
tury (Cambridge: Howard University Press, 19&4).
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heritage of social prosperity. Sinners might remain, 
but they were no longer in the hands of an angry God; 
they were in the midst of an ebullient America, before 
which extended the prospect of infinite expansion, 
unprecedented wealth. In this reach of vision, no 
creatures, not even spiders, were any longer poisonous
by nature.4
It is not difficult to perceive the variances be­
tween the redemptive view of history and the new progres­
sivism that came to prevail in America. Through attrition 
the biblical sense of sin evolved largely into a new ethic 
of pietistical "do-good-ism” and benevolence, and social 
reform. The sense of limitation and spiritual dependence 
eroded in favor of a doctrine of independent self-reliance, 
more agreeable to the enterprising New Man in America. 
Against the mysterious paradox of Christie time in relation 
to eternity, we can measure Benjamin Franklin's opportun­
istic view of time; and space, as R.W.B. Lewis has pointed 
out, was seen as a limitless frontier against which the New 
Adam projected an identity of infinite potential. This 
"progressive" vision, moving away from the Past, effaced 
its link with the central, factual event in scriptural 
history--Christ and His Redemption--so much so that in the 
"Divinity School Address” Emerson completely absolved Chris­
tianity from its concrete, historical foundation by making 
Christ into an abstract "essence" of the divine in man. 
There were, of course, writers like Hawthorne and Melville
^Nature's Nation, p. 285,
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who argued pessimistically against this progressive meta­
physic, but the audience at large was listening to the 
sound of different drummers, who preached a gospel of ra­
tional or intuitive self-redemption by following the prompt­
ings of one's inner being. Perry Miller found this ethos 
prevailing into the 20th century, a condition he termed the 
crisis of "well-intentioned American benevolence."
This is not to say that the American experience through 
the 19th century was all beer and skittles. Life on the 
frontier was hard; the building of the West cost health 
and lives; many were defeated and turned their faces 
to the wall. Then there was the mighty blood-purge of 
the Civil War, and the anguish of a defeated South. By 
the end of the century there were ominous rumblings in 
the city, strikes and violence, and the Chicago anar­
chists. Still, the generalization may stand, that 
American society subscribed to--and on the whole vindi- 
cated--the benevolent thesis of Revolutionary patriotism. 
Emerson seemed to demonstrate that, even when traditional 
Protestant theology could be dispensed with, the economy 
of the universe was such that traditional morality was 
undisturbed. By trusting himself, Huck Finn comes out 
morally inviolate. Despite the ordeal of rude pioneering 
and civil strife, the steady progression of this society 
toward the goals of benevolence was u n m i s t a k a b l e . 5
Given this progressive view, it is easy to understand 
Henry James' charge that America possessed "no history" vital 
enough for fiction. As much as anything else James implied 
in that observation, he was pointing to a lack of "historical 
sense" in the culture and most of her writers, for what kind 
of ontological links were to be admitted in a culture which 
turned its back upon the Past and clung to the belief in its 
utter uniqueness in global experience? James sensed the
^Ibid., pp. 285-6 ,
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lack of an added dimension, of "thickness" derived from 
struggling with, without trying to level, the paradoxes of 
history and "the moment," and the etiology of guilt and 
atonement. And might we not also add: that James intuited
that such a progressive view was ultimately the enemy of 
that freedom essential to art, its monomyth capable only of 
sterile recapitulation, since it tended to ignore the depth 
and density of being where freedom exists as generative of 
moral awareness in experience.
It is clear from our present standpoint how much 
20th century America has suffered the consequences of the 
gospel of benevolent moral idealism and progress--the rapa­
cious exploitations of environment and natural resources, 
the fact of human displacement in a burgeoning technocracy, 
and the destructive consequences of pursuing our curiously 
provincial "manifest destiny" on a worldwide scale. It is 
not clear, however, whether these "setbacks" have engrained 
in us a sufficiently critical historical awareness to judge 
this progressive ethos in terms of larger, universal patterns 
of human experience. In our recent past the kind of effu­
sive self-righteousness characteristic of the American pro­
gressive vision has frequently made us particularly blind to 
"other" histories than our own, unless they are made over in 
our own image, a feat we also continue to attempt.
In lesser degrees of intensity and success, segments
of the South have shared this progressive vision. Circum­
stances and temperament have at the same time produced vast
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cultural differences: the facts of widespread poverty, a
basically agrarian economy, and the position of the Negro 
have produced problems and responses distinctly "Southern.” 
This regional history alone was no doubt enough to produce 
a distinct historical consciousness, but it is the combined 
facts of the Civil War with its trauma of Reconstruction, 
and the strong biblical tradition, which have implanted and 
reinforced a theological dimension in that historical con­
sciousness that linked it with the universal. These combined 
forces have not of necessity resulted in a univocal "Southern 
sensibility," but they have created a historical situation 
which at every turn reinforced the kind of concrete "Chris­
tian" ontology discussed in the preceding chapter--the 
respect for mystery, for the concrete, for the power of evil, 
for the integrity of place and time, and a healthy suspicion 
of abstract and problematic solutions to human mysteries.
This vastly different "psychic condition" experienced by 
the Southerner in contrast to his non-Southern neighbors 
has been described by historian Richard Weaver as follows:
If we look at the typical American against the back­
ground of his experience, his folklore, and his social 
aspirations, we are forced to admit that he represents, 
more than any other type in the world, victorious man.
He has surpassed the people of every other country in 
amassing wealth, in rearing institutions, and in getting 
his values recognized, for better or worse, throughout 
the world. While he is often chided for his complacent 
belief in progress, it must be confessed that events 
have conspired to encourage that belief, and to make 
progress appear the central theme of his history. In 
all sorts of senses he has never ceased to go forward; 
and to much of the world America has come to symbolize
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that future in which man will be invariably successful 
both in combat with nature and in his struggle with the 
problems of human organization. This adds up to saying 
that in the eyes of the world as well as in his own 
eyes the typical American stands for unlimited success.
But this is the point where the Southerner ceases to 
be classifiable as American. He has had to taste a 
bitter cup which no American is supposed to know anything 
about, the cup of defeat. Thus in a world where the 
American is supposed to be uniformly successful, he 
exists as an anomalous American. Much of the Southerner's 
nonconformity and intransigence results from the real 
difficulty of adjusting a psychology which has been 
nourished upon this experience to the predominating 
national psychology, which has been nourished upon 
uninterrupted success.
The effects of this adverse history upon the South­
ern mentality have never been candidly appraised. For 
example, it cannot be without significance that the 
Southerner today is the only involuntary tenant of the 
American Union. I am not suggesting that there exists 
at present a mass feeling of political independence, as 
there did at one time; but the record of American his­
tory, which he has to read along with his Northern 
brother, says that he is where he is as the result of 
a settlement of force against him. To argue that the 
resulting condition is economically or otherwise to his 
advantage is beside the point; the book continues to 
say that a supreme act of his will was frustrated, and 
that as a consequence of that defeat he had to accommo­
date himself to an unwanted circumstance. And that, of 
course, is the meaning of failure. Therefore in the 
national legend the typical American owes his position 
to a virtuous and effective act of his will; but the 
Southerner owes his to the fact that his will was denied; 
and this leaves a kind of inequality which no amount of 
political blandishment can remove entirely. Although 
there appears today no lively awareness of this frustra­
tion, it none the less lies deep in his psychology, a 
subdued but ingrown reminder that at one time his all 
was not enough--a reminder, furthermore, that Americans 
too can fail. Probably this explains why his presence 
sometimes irks his fellow Americans. He cannot sit in 
conclave with their unspoiled innocence, for he brings, 
along with a certain outward exuberance, these sardonic
memories.G
Richard M. Weaver, "Aspects of the Southern Philoso­
phy," Southern Renaissance, ed. Louis Rubin and Robert Jacobs 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), pp. 24-25-
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Thus as Weaver suggests, the fact of the South's defeat 
strengthened the sense of human limitation as a fundamental 
condition of life. It is a situation which, coupled with 
the biblical tradition, finds strong parallels in Old Testa- 
ment history. This does not mean to suggest that the 
South's defeat necessarily produced a sense of corresponding 
identity with the scriptural tradition. Negative reactions 
are also evident in various impulses toward retrenchment: 
the romantic (and essentially non-Christian) worship of 
Southern "Past" (a kind of cultural necrophilia), bigoted 
provincialism and defensiveness, and "modernizing" the South 
through secular progress. Nevertheless, for the writer of 
deep religious-historical instinct, the defeat situation 
provided an immediate, concrete analogue of the essential 
fallen condition of mankind. To Miss O'Connor this consti­
tutes a vital link between the Southern situation and the 
universal.
When Walker Percy won the National Book Award, newsmen 
asked him why there were so many good Southern writers 
and he said, 'Because we lost the war.' He didn't mean 
by that simply that a lost war makes good subject matter. 
What he was saying was that we have had our Fall. We 
have gone into the modern world with an inburnt knowledge 
of human limitations and with a sense of mystery which 
could not have developed in our first state of innocence--
Faulkner, for example, preferred the Old Testament 
to the New. The latter, he felt, was "about ideas," whereas 
the Old Testament recorded concrete human struggles like 
those he saw around him. However, the fact that he again 
and again returned to New Testament revelation in his fiction 
indicates his fascination with the analogical possibilities 
inherent in that "idea."
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as it has not sufficiently developed in the rest of our 
country.
Not every lost war would have this effect on every 
society, but we were doubly blessed, not only in our 
Fall, but in having the means, to interpret it. Behind 
our own history, deepening it at every point, has been 
another history. Mencken called the South the Bible 
Belt, in scorn and thus in incredible innocence. In 
the South we have, in however attenuated a form, a vi­
sion of Moses' face as he pulverized our idols. This 
knowledge is what makes the Georgia writer different 
from the writer from Hollywood or New York. It is the 
knowledge that the novelist finds in his community.
The striking feature of this historical sense is its 
fundamentally religious base; its very nature is antinomous 
to a secular "progressive" view of man. The latter tends to 
shrink or diminish the ontological depths of being into 
categorizable molds. Paradoxically, the sense of loss, of 
defeat, viewed in the biblical context continually reaffirms 
and widens the mystery of man's being, because this loss and 
sense of limitation brings with it a felt perception of the- 
"wholeness" of being which has been denied man by the Fall.
This is one reason for the preoccupation in much Southern 
literature with grotesque characters and violent actions; it 
is a preoccupation rooted in the metaphysical sense of the 
wholeness of being, and should not be interpreted sentimentally 
as simply the writer's anguished, romantic identification 
with modern man's "plight." Southern preoccupation with the 
freak in literature, as Miss O'Connor noted, is possible
g
Flannery O'Connor, Mystery and Manners, ed. Sally 
and Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
1969), p. 59.
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because of the writer’s felt awareness of "the whole man,"
and the whole man given in revelation is Christ.
Whenever I'm asked why Southern writers particularly 
have a penchant for writing about freaks, I say it is 
because we are still able to recognize one. To be able 
to recognize a freak, you have to have some conception 
of the whole man, and in the South the general concep­
tion of man is still, in the main, theological.... 
approaching the subject from the standpoint of the writer, 
I think it is safe to say that while the South is hardly 
Christ-centered, it is most certainly Christ-haunted.
The Southerner, who is not convinced of it, is very much 
afraid that he may have been formed in the image and 
likeness of God. Ghosts can be very fierce and instruc­
tive. They cast strange shadows, particularly in our 
literature. In any case, it is when the freak can be 
sensed as a figure of our essential displacement that he 
attains some depth in literature.^
The Southern history of defeat, then, provided an 
analogue for the universal Fall, and Bible history gave the 
writer dimensionality for interpreting contemporary experi­
ence in a universal light. This is both a thematic and tech­
nical advantage, because while biblical history provided a 
living record by which to sound and evaluate the depths of 
Southern history, it also provided "distance" from that con­
temporary history, and "distance" is related formally to 
point of view and the question of aesthetic and moral propor­
tionality. Surely one reason for Southern writers' seemingly 
"dispassionate" depiction of violence and grotesquerie is the 
precedent for such treatment in the Bible--in both judgment 
and technical handling of point of view. Moral distance and 
aesthetic distance are finally interdependent, of course.
^Ibid♦ , pp. 44-4$,
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and here aesthetic distance is an evaluative as well as 
representational instrument in fiction. The Bible offers 
the same "perspective"--particular action rendered in proper 
dramatic proportion within a vision of the whole— that one 
finds frequently in the best Southern fiction.
Since the Civil War, and increasingly in the last 
few decades, the South has felt the pressure of the "modern­
ist" spirit in all aspects of its life. "Modernism," here, 
is not equatable with simple change, since obviously the 
South has undergone constructive alterations that have not 
in themselves eroded the religious sensibility of the region. 
Rather, the term implies that progressive secular spirit 
whose basis is the idea of human perfectability, an unquali­
fied projection toward the future and dissociation from the 
past, and the abandonment of "historical sense” in the onto­
logical conception of the term. In short, there are South­
erners everywhere, many of them writers, who are turning 
away from the ambiguous burden of their "history" by an 
immersion in progressivism. Yet because the South is still 
less "modern" and more traditional, the traumatic clash of 
these two opposing philosophies and value systems makes itself 
especially felt in the region's fiction. What will be the 
outcome of this clash, both in terms of belief and culturally 
in terms of fiction, is as yet undecided. It may be that 
the South will be unable to resist the erosion of historical 
sense and the stultifying of independence under the large
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trends toward massification operating in America today. 
Whatever the outcome, Southern literature with its strong 
scriptural base has provided a most penetrating and enduring 
critique of the progressive secular spirit. For one of the 
paradoxical effects of this pervasive spirit in America has 
been to drive Southern fiction writers toward more violent 
and bizarre modes of creation, modes whose freedom, origi­
nality and mystery continually deny the reductive impulse at 
every turn.
CHAPTER THREE
In the introduction to this study I stressed the 
interpenetrative relationship between theme and form in the 
Christian historical vision, arguing that the manner in which 
"history" is realized in the fictional work determines its 
aesthetic and ontological validity. This fundamental problem 
must be approached more closely now: how is "history" made
to live in the created work, so that it is dramatically gen­
erative of values within the work and in relation to the 
history it interprets through fiction? This question cannot 
be answered solely by thematic analysis. Some fictional 
works, as I have noted, intentionally present Christian 
history allegorically as axi evaluative norm for the literal 
action of the story, but it is done in such a way that the 
history is "dead" or static within the work, a kind of con­
stant (I use the term perjoratively) norm to which author 
and reader make mental leaps to discover the significance 
of a particular action. In short, the history evoked is 
actually dissociated from the concrete level of the action, 
imposed like an over-riding schema of values , and not gen­
erated dramatically from within the action itself. In other 
cases we find Christian history evoked in such a way that 
its full complexity and meaning is "shrunken" to fit the
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demands of a particular viewpoint of the writer--who pre­
sents an "allegory" which in the process distorts and 
diminishes that history; one thinks of Carson McCullers'
"The Heart Is a Lonely Hunter" and William Golding's "Lord 
of the Flies" in this respect. To view a work simply in 
terms of the thematic parallels drawn between the literal 
action and the Christian history evoked does not satisfac­
torily explain the aesthetic and ontological value of the 
work. This problem, I have argued, can best be approached 
by an analysis of form: seeing the "history" as an analogi­
cal dimension of the literal action being presented, achieved 
by the historical sense operating within the creative act in 
the manner of the metaphysical doctrine of the analogy of 
being. Through this doctrine of analogy the historical is 
everywhere "present," though it evokes past, and it is dy­
namically created by and in turn creative of the density of 
value carved into the work.
In its popular sense the term "analogy" may denote 
simply the practice of making metaphorical associations, 
drawing likenesses between different objects or actions.
The simple metaphor "my love is a rose" illustrates this, 
pointing implicitly to the beautiful qualities which both 
objects possess. This kind of analogizing, of course, is 
indispensible to the symbolical writer. However, "analogy" 
used in the metaphysical sense conveys a more important type 
of comparison than simply metaphor-making. The latter tends
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to suggest parallels which are extrinsic to the objects or 
actions being linked, whereas in the philosophical sense 
analogy attempts to describe an intrinsic relationship 
between the nature of the objects or actions themselves.
This means that an inherent similarity of form, or struc­
ture of being, exists between two objects or actions, or 
between, say, the actions of the life of a thirty-three- 
year-old idiot named Benjy Compson and a Nazarene carpenter.^ 
Analogy in the sense of metaphor-making, however valuable, 
is simply not adequate to explain the kind of qualitative 
and dynamic relationship that exists between the literal and 
"historical" levels in a created work. Only by an intrinsic, 
analogical identification of the two is the historical truly 
made alive, generating step by step its own vitality and 
that of the action through which it is evoked in a continu­
ous dramatic movement.
The doctrine of the analogy of being is a metaphysi­
cal answer to the problem of how being can be everywhere
2both alike and different. Consequently, it attempts to 
explain the structure of all existence, avoiding the two 
extremes of viewing existence in a univocal way (everywhere
"Analogy," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 
ed. James Hastings (New York: Chas. Scribners Sons) ÏT
Hastings traces this commonly held distinction to Suarez.
2Throughout this discussion I am immeasurably indebted 
to the discussion of the analogical and the Christological 
in chapters from Fr. Lynch's Christ and Apollo.
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the same) or in an equivocal way (everywhere different). 
According to the analogical principle, the act of existence 
descends or is realized "according to a proportion" (ana- 
lagon) in which the degree of existence is always in propor­
tion to the degree of possibility of being inherent in the 
form of the thing receiving it. This proportion is invari­
able throughout all being; it is always "existence according 
to possibility." As a consequence, being is everywhere alike, 
one and the same in its structural principle. However, this 
does not mean that existent things are simply the same (the 
univocal view). Although existence descends and is realized 
analogously, it is never the same act of existence. Each 
thing, idea, action, is new, as existence adapts itself to 
each new possibility of being. So it is not just "chair," 
but it is that "chair," in all its unique specificity. The 
structural, formal proportion remains the same--"existence 
according to possibility"--but the two parts of the propor­
tion change as existence adapts itself to each new possi­
bility, and so the act of existence is always different. In 
other words, every existing thing, formally speaking, is the 
same and different.
Before proceeding to examine the implications of this 
doctrine more fully, let me state that this seems to me 
exactly how a certain "historical" dimension--classical, 
biblical, or otherwise--is "present" in an authentically 
creative way within the literal level of a story. It is
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part of the "act of existence" descending and being realized 
proportionately "according to the possibility" of being 
within the concrete literal action. What is important to 
note here is that the historical analogue is not attached 
to the literal in a simply metaphorical way, though sometimes 
this occurs too. Rather, there is an intrinsic similarity 
of structural form between the two levels, in order for them 
to be properly interpenetrative and mutually illuminating.
When this is not so, the two levels are related in a kind 
of univocal way, similarities being drawn between them which 
are insightful but arbitrarily imposed, and which do not 
develop dramatically from within the concrete. The histori­
cal or moral analogue seems to be "tacked on," and this 
causes a "dis-proportion" between the two levels. Heavily 
didactic works are an example of this situation, where the 
meaning "hangs over" rather than germinates from the concrete 
level. Perhaps the distinction can best be illustrated by 
two examples from Faulkner, one in which the Christian his­
torical level is presented in a rather dissociated, univocal 
way, and the other in which it seems to me to germinate dra­
matically from the literal level. In the first, a "tempta­
tion" scene from ^  Fable, the priest draws an analogy to 
the historical Christ while trying to talk the doomed corporal 
out of his sacrificial gesture.
'The Book,' the priest said. The corporal looked at him.
'You mean you don't even know it?'
'I can't read,' the corporal said.
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'Then I'll cite for you, plead for you,' the priest said. 
'It wasn't He with his humility and pity and sacrifice 
that converted the world; it was pagan and bloody Rome 
which did it with His martyrdom; furious and intractable 
dreamers had been bringing that same dream out of Asia 
Minor for three hundred years until at last one found 
a caesar foolish enough to crucify him. And you are 
right. But then so is he (I don't mean Him now, I mean 
the old man in that white room yonder onto whose shoul­
ders you are trying to slough and shirk your right and 
duty for free will and decision.) Because only Rome 
could have done it, accomplished it, and even He (I do 
mean Him now) knew it, felt and sensed this, furious and 
intractable dreamer though he was. Because He even said 
it Himself: On this Rock found My Church, even while
He didn't--and never would--realize the true signifi­
cance of what He was saying, believing still that he 
was speaking poetic metaphor, synonym, parable--that 
rock meant unstable inconstant heart, and church meant 
airy faith. It wasn't even his first and favored syco­
phant who read that significance, who was also ignorant 
and intractable like Him and even in the end got him­
self also electrocuted by the dreamers intractable fire, 
like Him. It was Paul, who was a Roman first and then 
a man and only then a dreamer and so of all of them was 
able to read the dream correctly and to realize that, 
to endure, it could not be a nebulous and airy faith but 
instead it must be a church, an establishment, a morality 
of behavior inside which man could exercise his right 
and duty for free will and decision, not for a reward 
resembling the bedtime tale which soothes the child into 
darkness, but the reward of being able to cope peace­
fully, to hold his own, with the hard durable world in 
which (whether he would ever know why or not wouldn't 
matter because now he could cope with that too) he found 
himself. Not snared in that frail web of hopes and fears 
and aspirations which man calls his heart, but fixed, 
established, to endure, on that rock whose synonym was 
the seeded capitol of that hard durable enduring earth 
which man must cope with somehow, by some means, or 
perish. So you see, he is right. It wasn't He nor 
Peter, but Paul who, being only one-third dreamer, was 
two-thirds man and half of that a Roman, could cope with 
Rome. Who did more; who, rendering unto Caesar, con­
quered Rome. More: destroyed it, because where is that
Rome now? Until what remains but that rock, that citadel 
Render unto Chaulnesmont. Why should you die?'^
3William Faulkner, A Fable (New York: Random House,
1950), pp. 364-5.
70
This passage, although rhetorically effective and resonant 
with several important themes, does not contain the kind of 
dramatic analogical movement of the literal and historical 
together, interpenetratively, which a fully realized passage 
would achieve. It bears the earmark of added explanation, 
of thematic embellishment which helps "explain" the poten­
tial depth of the a c t , but does so by temporarily drawing 
our eye away from the concrete situation. We sense a dis­
proportion between the two levels. Contrast it with the 
following passage from The Sound and the Fury, in which we 
see a historical level fully embodied in proportion to the 
concrete dramatic movement within the scene. It occurs when 
Dilsey takes Benjy to the Easter church service, and the 
Reverend Shegog begins his sermon.
Then a voice said, 'Brethren.*
The preacher had not moved. His arm lay yet across the 
desk, and he still held that pose while the voice died 
in sonorous echoes between the walls. It was as dif­
ferent as day and dark from his former tone, with a sad 
timbrons quality like an alto horn, sinking into their 
hearts and speaking there again when it had ceased in 
fading and cumulate echoes.
'Brethren and sistern,' it said again. The preacher 
removed his arm and he began to walk back and forth 
before the desk, his hands clasped behind him, a meager 
figure, hunched over upon itself like that of one long 
immured in striving with the implacable earth. 'I got 
the recollection and the Blood of the Lamb!' He tramped 
steadily back and forth beneath the twisted paper and 
the Christmas bell, hunched, his hands clasped behind 
him. He was like a worn small rock whelmed by the suc­
cessive waves of his voice. With his body he seemed to 
feed the voice that, succubus like, had fleshed its 
teeth into him. And the congregation seemed to watch 
with its oifn eyes while the voice consumed him, until 
he was nothing and they were nothing and there was not 
even a voice but instead their hearts were speaking to 
one another in chanting measures beyond the need for
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■words, so that when he came to rest against the reading 
desk, his monkey face lifted and his whole attitude that 
of a serene tortured crucifix that transcended its shab­
biness and insignificance and made it of no moment, a 
long moaning expulsion of breath rose from them, and a 
woman's single soprano: 'Yes, Jesus!'
As the scudding day passed overhead the dingy 
windows glowed and faded in ghostly retrograde. A car 
passed along the road outside, laboring in the sand, 
died away. Dilsey sat bolt upright, her hand on Ben's 
knee. Two tears slid down her fallen cheeks, in and 
out of the myriad coruscations of immolation and abnega­
tion and time.
The reader experiencing this passage senses a deeper degree 
of "realization" than in the passage from A Fable. As the 
scene unfolds the action proceeds with a point-by-point 
interpenetrating correspondence between the literal level 
and the "history" evoked through it without jumping off from 
the concrete. We have a fully concretized dramatic movement 
with the preacher's voice being incarnated with the audience 
in this specific place and moment of communion of spirit, 
and within that same movement, evoked through it analogi­
cally, an image of the historical Christian incarnation--of 
flesh and spirit. Word and Act--signified by the text: the
"recollection and Blood of the Lamb." Moreover, unlike the 
passage from ^  Fable, here the historical analogue seems so 
fully concretized that it both gives greater validity to and 
receives validity from the literal level, in the present. 
There is an active dynamism of reciprocal insight between 
the two levels. One reads the words and the literal is both
^William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York: 
Random House, 1929), pp. 310-11.
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"same" and "different" from the historical analogue, and 
the reader experiences the two levels analogously, because 
of the intrinsic unity of structural form between the two—  
the "spirit" of divinity being realized in Christ's incar­
nation (idea moving into act), and the "spirit" of incarna­
tion being realized in Shegog's physical movements and 
voice--though on a lesser level. Here we have the same 
principle of proportion— existence according to possibility—  
operating both within the historical and literal levels, and 
in relation to each other analogously. When the historical 
is presented in this manner, it seems to achieve Eliot's 
ideal of the proper relationship between "past" and "present," 
creative and vital. In the passage from ^  Fable, however, 
the reader does not experience the same unified, concrete 
dramatic movement of the historical and the literal. Their 
relationship is more extrinsically and univocally rendered.
It might perhaps be objected that the two scenes use differ­
ent fictional techniques: one is primarily dialogue, while
the other is scene depicted by an outside narrator. How­
ever, one can find similar "dis-embodied" historical analogues 
in Faulkner's objective narration also (especially in A 
Fable), just as one can find fully "realized" analogues 
presented by way of monologue or dialogue, as for example, 
Shegog's actual sermon and its subsequent effect on Dilsey.
The question of how the historical dimension is 
realized in an authentically analogical way in a work is a
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mystery within the creative decision-making process, bound 
up with the historical sense, the international sensibility, 
and the nature of the free act itself. Nevertheless, the 
principle of analogy gives several important clues to the 
dynamics of this process. First of all, if "history" is 
realized validly in an analogical manner in a work, there 
can be no question of simply a metaphorical, extrinsic, or 
statis relationship between the historical level and the 
concrete. 'Since analogy of being is based upon a law of 
proportionality between the energy of existence descending 
into act and the possibility inherent in the form it actu­
ates, the same intrinsic relationship must exist between the 
historical and the literal it descends into. The same for­
mal structure must be common to the nature of both parts-- 
though each is really a different thing. It is not a ques­
tion of "fitting" the historical analogue to the concrete, 
nor even of "heightening" the concrete to match the dimen­
sions of the historical analogue. The concrete is narrow, 
limited, and one might think not large enough to "contain" 
the many movements and meanings of the historical which are 
being evoked--or in philosophical terms, to contain the act 
of existence descending into it. But as we shall see in 
discussing the Christological idea, one mystery of analogy 
is that the power of possibility of being within the con­
crete is never exhausted by the act of existence, and that 
paradoxically, it is only through fidelity to the concrete
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literal that complex analogical vision can be fully realized.^ 
Attempts to "fit" the historical to the literal, or to 
heighten the concrete, invariably are ontologically dis­
torting to both, creating a kind of romantic aura through 
the use of language. Faulkner frequently indulged in this, 
of course, and it seems to me that it was his sense of ana­
logical action which often saved him from the abuses of his 
own rhetorical power.
A second important characteristic of the analogical 
observed is that the relationship between the historical and 
the literal levels in a work is not static or passive. The 
heart of analogical movement, as Fr. Lynch notes, is action, 
dynamic and dramatic. That is why, in the Reverend Shegog 
passage quoted, the reader is not just intellectually ob­
serving the passage unfold different levels of meaning (as 
in the passage from A F able), but is actually experiencing 
through the language the same structural movement of incarna­
tion Reverend Shegog embodied in front of the congregation. 
History descends into the literal in all its possibilities, 
the literal in turn "validates" that history because of 
their intrinsic identity of structural form, and the two 
levels interact dynamically. Or to state it differently, 
their relationship is one of mutual and continuing revelation.
Miss O'Connor, discussing the creative process, 
once expressed this idea as follows: "It seems to be a para­
dox that the larger and more complex the personal view, the 
easier it is to compress it into fiction."
75
each incarnating and authenticating the form and meaning of 
the other in a dramatic and ongoing manner. It is important 
to recall, in this respect, the Hebraic-Christian notion of 
creation as a process of continuing genesis cited in Chap­
ter I. This relationship of continuing revelation between 
the literal and the historical levels is, it seems to me, 
the essence of "discovery" within the creative act, and the 
core of an incarnational sensibility. It also helps explain, 
I think, why so many works which invoke a Christian or clas­
sical historical level to the literal action fail to dra­
matically generate the values intended to be created in the 
work by invoking those parallels; the relationship between 
the levels is static and fixed, to the diminishment of both. 
Understandably, it is in these works that the historical 
level tends to exist only as "past," a dated norm used to 
impose value on a work rather than discover it creatively 
through the concrete. Faulkner's ^  F able, for example, 
seems to me aesthetically unsatisfactory for one reason 
because there is a disproportion between the various levels, 
between insight and action, so that it is not realized and 
moving with a simultaneity of revelations on all levels.
The kind of dynamic interaction and mutual revela­
tion in analogy is best exemplified by the practice of four­
fold exegesis common in scriptural analysis. For example, 
in the Old Testament narrative of the Jews' liberation from 
Egypt, there is first of all the literal text which points
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to a historical fact, and the allegorical levels which it 
contains by an intrinsic identity of form.
The Jews of the Old Testament are liberated from 
Egypt and from the waters of the Red Sea. This is more 
than just a word, it is also an historical fact. Yet 
without becoming less of a fact, it is also a sign, a 
type, of another reality to come, the liberation of 
Christ from the dead. Yet it is more than an historical 
metaphor, or an artificial sign implanted in a fact, 
chosen at random to be related to something else. For 
it has the same concrete structure, though on a poorer 
and less important level, as that greater thing toward 
which it points. And the deeper one goes into the whole 
historical concretion of the earlier reality, the more 
insight there is into that which is to come....But the 
reverse is also true. If one brings the Resurrection 
back over against the liberation of this ancient people 
from the waters, that first act of liberation is illumi­
nated as never before. There is a mutuality of forces 
for insight operating between the +wo events. Each is 
borrowing light from the other....®
To these levels may also be added the tropological (moral),
wherein the liberation story is a type of man's being freed
from the bondage of sin, and the analogical, where the story
points to mankind's final resurrection at the Last Judgment.
It should be noted, however, that the four levels of meaning
are not held by scriptural scholars to be operating in every
case in the Bible. Sometimes only one is intended, the
literal, sometimes two or three, and so on, depending upon
the specific text. This also seems to me to be the case in
Faulkner and, to a lesser extent, O'Connor's fiction, where
sometimes only one or two levels can be demonstrated without
unjustifiably overextending the literal text, which is to
^Lynch, Christ and Apollo, p. l84.
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say of adding meanings extrinsically which do not grow 
analogically from the concrete level. But in the best 
symbolical fiction of Faulkner and O'Connor, we have a 
similar process of mutual illumination going on. There is 
the literal level of the story, and presented through it 
analogically is the moral history of the South and American 
society past and present; there is also classical and redemp­
tion history evoked, which themselves possess a literal level 
with allegorical dimensions that evoke the universal life of 
man (past, present, and future)--and all giving and gaining 
insight by their mutual dynamic interaction. Not every 
story contains this many levels; some, like "A Rose for 
Emily," simply do not convey that density of historical 
meaning. But such is the vital functioning of the his­
torical sense in the analogical creative act that all dimen­
sions of possibility should be explored so as not to diminish 
the various levels at which the work can be experienced.
One problem which the doctrine of analogy helps
clarify is that of the relationship between classical, Old
Testament, and New Testament analogues in a particular work.
«
They are history which is "made present" within the action 
as it unfolds sequentially, but this does not mean that they 
need be rigidly arranged in a temporal order, with classical 
analogues first, followed by Old and New Testament. Rather, 
under analogy they exist simultaneously as "levels of being" 
possible of receiving and giving insight, and each level
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has its appropriate intrinsic structure. The classical mold 
can only "contain" so much within its limited ontological 
structure, as illustrated by the quote from Romano Guardini 
in Chapter I, whereas the divine revelation considerably 
widened the possibility of being. In "The Bear," for example, 
ancient pagan ritual illuminates the hunting initiation of 
Ike McCaslin, but then the Christian level of initiation 
into redemptive freedom and historical consciousness is 
added to the concrete action, deepening its meaning in ways 
the pagan mold simply could not. And further, by referring 
the analogues of Revelation in the story back to the pagan 
primitive mold, we illuminate and further clarify the dimen­
sions and possibilities of insight contained in each level.
The problem which now confronts us for considera­
tion is what radical effect on the structure of being, with 
its analogical principle of "existence according to possi­
bility," is caused by the immersion of Christ into human 
history? We have seen that in anaJogy there is a propor­
tionality between the act of existence and the form it actu­
ates, an intrinsic relationship between the two parts. But 
in the case of Christ's Incarnation--divine existence actu­
ating human forin--the proportion, or "possibility" of being, 
is radically altered. What new "level of being" is intro­
duced, and what new intrinsic structural identity can be 
seen to exist between the human and the divine nature? 
Furthermore, how does this change in the formal structure
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of being relate to those themes which I have outlined in
Chapter I as central to a Christian historical vision? I
have argued that the two writers under consideration employ
a Christian interpretation of history in their fiction.
Now we shall have to examine what that phrase can mean:
by trying to discover the intrinsic relationship between
the formal and the thematic in the Christian viewpoint, how
the meaning of those themes is created by the way in which
they are presented. Fr. Lynch states the problem of the
Christological dimension in the following manner:
In our chapter on analogy, we saw that it was an act
called existence which was descending deeper and
deeper into the possibilities of the world to take on 
the proportions of these possibilities while retaining 
an identity. Nothing stopped it from remaining the 
same; no difference was lost through being organized by 
it. This is the action of creation, and of the endless 
dynamisms set in motion within the created world....
Yet there has been a second and new creation. And 
now the form which shapes it is no longer an existence 
which becomes different in everything it touches, leaving 
only the proportion the same, the proportion between 
the act of existence and the possibility of the essence. 
Now the action is Christ, rigidly one person, born in 
that place, at that time, with all those specificities, 
with this body. How energetic (and esemplastic) will 
he be, how malleable to him will the world be?...
It is now demanded of a new imagination that it use this 
•hopelessly rigid' form as a new analogical instrument 
with which to enter into the shapes of all things with­
out canceling them out.
....For Christ, we have said, is not another item of the 
first creation, to be used as any other item by the old 
imagination. The real point is ever so much more cru­
cial. For he has subverted the whole order of the old 
imagination. Nor is this said in the sense that he 
replaces or cancels the old; rather, he illuminates it, 
and is a new level, identical in structure with, but
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higher in energy than, every form or possibility of the 
old.7
As Fr. Lynch points out, a new dimension is added to the 
analogical because of the immersion of Christ in human his­
tory. There is still the proportion of "existence according 
to possibility," but because the act of existence descending 
is greater--the divine Christ--the possibilities of being 
are immeasurably increased. No one knows how much. The 
relationship between Christ and human history is an ana­
logical one: he descends as the energy of existence to
fulfill perfectly all the possibilities of being within 
history. With respect to creation and history, he himself 
is an analogical instrument reshaping it and giving it its 
deepest meaning. However, the uniqueness of Christ as an 
analogical instrument is that he is a single, concrete, 
historical person who claims to be the new shape of all 
things, yet he does not change by being realized in dif-g
ferent things in creation, nor are they obliterated. Rather, 
the different elements and acts in creation and history are 
"gathered up" in him and linked together meaningfully. And 
his analogical union with creation is complete; it fulfills 
all the possibilities in existence, such as time, death.
n Ibid., pp. 185-87 passim.
g
This idea is analogous to the Catholic idea of 
transubstantiation in the Mass--the substance of bread and 
wine changed into Christ's body and blood while retaining 
its physical appearances.
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rebirth, mystery, identity, the hypostatic union of spirit 
and matter, etc. This is the mystery of the Incarnation. 
Because of this total analogical identity of a specifically 
historical Christ and specific human history, things and 
acts in creation are raised to a new level of meaning, and 
the precise meaning of the concept of Providence becomes 
clear: that everything in existence "counts," and that in
Christology nothing is to be neglected. We have already 
seen the respect for concrete detail in the Hebraic intel­
lectual tradition. Now the significance of the novelist's 
task of grounding meaning in the specific becomes abundantly 
clear. His creative act is analogically like Christ's in 
"redeeming" the concrete, the importance of which is immea­
surably heightened spiritually by Christ's total union with 
it. This is the "sacredness" of creation, or the "integrity 
of thj^ngs" which I have tried to explain in another context 
in Chapter I. "Thus Christ is water, gold, butter, food, a 
harp, light, medicine, oil, bread, arrow, salt, turtle,
Qrisen sun, way, and many things besides." This is not a 
metaphorical expression; it proclaims the intrinsic meta­
physical identity between Christ and creation brought about 
by his incarnation into history.
A second important point which should be noted here
is that, just as in analogy, the relationship between Christ
as energy descending and the new creation he shapes is not
^Lynch, Christ and Apollo, p. l88.
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static and fixed. The relationship, although rooted in a 
temporally fixed event, is a dynamic and ongoing process, 
so it is possible to speak of the evolution of Christ in 
the world throughout history, directing and shaping its 
course, or of the "Christianization" of matter and con­
sciousness through grace; or contrarily, of a devolution of 
the spirituality of "things" through debasement. We have 
seen that because there is more energy (Christ) descending 
into existence, each existant is charged with more "possi­
bility" of being. In the theologian's terms this increased 
possibility would be called redemptive freedom, or the action 
of grace within nature. But this does not mean that the 
existant simply transcends its limited form; the effect of 
Christ's incarnation is the opposite under analogy. Rather 
than subsume or obliterate the unique identity of existing 
things, it allows them to be deepened more fully in self- 
identification, to be "recovered" from the effects of the 
Fall by gradual process on the concrete historical level. 
Consequently, this new creation within history is charac­
terized by "openness" and "possibility," including as well 
the possibility of rejection of freedom.
We are now in a position to see, I think, the vital 
intrinsic connection between the central themes of a Chris­
tian historical vision and the formal method of their 
"presence" in a work of fiction. I have argued that the 
historical level in Faulkner and O'Connor, when authentically
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realized, is present as an analogical dimension of the con­
crete, mutually illuminating each other in a dramatic, 
unfolding action. In addition, I have also argued that some 
works of both writers embody a specifically Christian inter­
pretation of the historical process. Our discussion of 
analogy showed that there is an intrinsic structural cor­
respondence between the act of existence and the material 
it descends into--in this case the historical and the con­
crete, so that both levels are formally proportionate and 
dynamically interacting. However, now Christ’s Incarnation 
into human history alters the formal proportion of "existence 
according to possibility." His union with history is the 
perfectly realized analogical action--the greatest energy 
producing the greatest "possibility"--and those Christian 
„ themes enumerated (spirit and matter, time and eternity,
mystery, community, ontological place, word and act, history 
"redeemed") are themselves the highest expressions of that 
perfect analogical union. To state it differently, they 
are the fullest "possibilities" opened by Christ’s Incarna­
tion, against which their fractured, diminished reality on 
the human level--dissociated but struggling toward union-- 
can be absolutely identified and measured. Since there is 
an intrinsic structural similarity between the new energy of 
existence (Christ) and actual history, these themes express 
the perfect possibilities of identity between the two as 
form and content. These themes can only be embodied fully
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in fiction through the analogical form of Christ wedded to 
human history, for when they are not implicitly "brought to 
life" in this way, there cannot exist the kind of intrinsic, 
dramatic relationship between the concrete and the histori­
cal which gives mutual illumination. Then the themes are 
not "alive" in the work.
A brief example may help clarify this difficult 
problem. In the Quentin section of The Sound and the Fury
Faulkner has presented us with a compelling portrayal of
dissociation--of word from act, of time, of thought from 
concrete reality--in the life of Quentin before his suicide.
We recognize this as the madness of dissociation as the 
action unfolds, but, and this is the crucial question, how 
do we recognize this for what it is? We recognize this as 
dissociation, it seems to me, because of our consciousness 
as we read of its opposite analogue which informs and il­
luminates it for what it is. Even the most uninitiated
reader says, "He is mad." But we only know this because in
the work dissociation is realized as dissociation, possible 
because Faulkner measures it analogically against the invis­
ible but everywhere "present" possibility of perfect union 
of word and act, thought and the concrete. There is, then, 
a "historical" framework for the action, rooted in the his­
torical analogue of perfectly realized union and action.
He could not do this if he himself as author were indulging 
in an act of dissociation as he wrote (though I think Faulkner
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sometimes did this too). No, the value and meaning of the 
Quentin experience is illuminated for the reader by the fact 
that Faulkner stands implicitly committed here to a per­
fectly realized analogue of those themes , against which he 
dramatizes and measures this particular diminished, flattened 
"history." We see this focus especially clear in Faulkner's 
handling of the concrete world outside, the world which 
Quentin cannot keep a grip on; point by point that world 
illuminates and judges the distortions of his warped inner 
world. The same is true of each of the other counterthemes-- 
dissociation, false innocence, reductivism, immunity, etc.-- 
all are movements away from the Christian analogical, yet 
all are illuminated by it for what they really are--sterile 
and fixed denials of the actual.
The central themes enumerated as the core of a Chris­
tian interpretation of history, then, themselves express and 
embody the maximum "possibility" wrought by Christ's immer­
sion into history. They are the historical actualization of 
which Christ is the form or energy, and there is an intrinsic 
analogical movement, one in which he took on all the "forms" 
of history and fulfilled them ontologically. These "Chris­
tian" themes can be presented in a passive, diminished or 
univocal way in fiction (as in falsely pietistical passages), 
but then the history is not "continuing," realized. In order 
for them to be dramatically generative of values, even if
frequently by showing their negation in contemporary experi­
ence, as in the case of Quentin, there must be the intrinsic
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identity of structure between the act descending (Christ) 
and the concrete literal, and when this analogical action 
occurs, history "lives" in the work and dynamically carves 
out the spiritual value of the concrete.
CHAPTER FOUR
From our discussion of the metaphysics of analogy, 
we see the extreme difficulty of classifying a writer as 
’’Christian" in any meaningful way. Indeed, if the Christian 
metaphysic is nurtured in mystery— the Incarnation— then it 
seems to me we can only finally approximate to what degree 
a single work reveals such a metaphysic. This is certainly 
true of so complex and various a writer as William Faulkner, 
and this chapter merely offers some reflections on Faulkner’s 
historical consciousness at work analogically in several 
important writings.
Faulkner’s own statements about Christianity in essays 
and interviews tended to be casual and misleading. Occasion­
ally he acknowledged traditional Christianity as his inherited 
past— part of the "lumber room" of collective experience he 
used in fiction. He preferred the Old Testament of the New, 
and remarked at least once about Christianity, echoing 
Chesterton, that "we haven’t tried it yet." Nevertheless, I 
believe his major fiction, in both theme and technique, reveals 
history in an incarnational and redemptive way, in creating 
and treating those themes I have tried to define in Chapter i. 
At its best Faulkner’s work realizes those themes analogically,
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so that they simultaneously inform and are informed by the 
literal action of the story. But this is not always the case; 
we can also find works in which some dissociation between 
historical vision and the dramatic concrete occurs, to the 
diminishment of both.
One difficulty in analyzing Faulkner's historical vision 
at work in a novel is the fact that he involves the reader so 
dramatically in a particular character's heroic struggle to 
come to terms with his history— witness, for example, Gail 
Hightower or Quentin Compson or Isaac McCaslin. One apparent 
reason for this strategy lies in Faulkner's ontology of time: 
"...time is a fluid condition which has no existence except 
in the momentary avatars of individual people. There is no 
such thing as w a s , only is. If was existed, there would be 
no grief or sorrow." But the avatars of individual characters 
stretch back into time and history as know and understand it 
at that particular moment of revelation; the avatar is, in 
fact, a revelation of one's place in history. And most impor­
tantly, how the character sees himself in relation to that 
history becomes the touchstone of his moral choices in the 
present, especially in those crucial acts which form identity. 
Much of the struggle for viable identity, then, among Faulkner's 
major characters involves their coming to terms with history 
in a creative, non-destructive way, and this implies both 
understanding and acceptance. In fact, acceptance of one's 
"place" (in history and in being) seems a necessary pre-condition
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for the free act, that gratuitous acceptance of "the moment" 
found in characters like Lena Grove and Dilsey, Contrariwise, 
charaters like Quentin Compson and Hightower show us the tragic 
failure to achieve this identity, and as a consequence the 
burden of their history threatens them with extinction at every 
turn.
There is a natural tendency for the reader to become 
mesmerized by the internal drama of a particular character's 
struggle with his history, partly because of the grandiloquent 
rhetoric used by Faulkner to evoke their situation. Grandilo­
quence itself can become an indulgence, as Faulkner astutely 
perceived in the cases of Rev. Hightower or Ike McCaslin's 
Uncle Hubert Beauchamp, for example. Thus while intensifying 
through language the drama of a character's struggle with 
history, Faulkner himself created the corresponding problem of 
having to somehow balance and evaluate this internal drama he 
immersed the reader in, so that some overall perspective might 
be conveyed. This he achieved partly by the ever-present, 
authorial voice, partly by action external to the character 
which implicitly or explicitly measures that internal struggle. 
In this way Faulkner created a total perspective for the work 
from many limited ones, as for example in Light in August, 
where the final comic chapter with the furniture dealer implic­
itly measures and objectifies the struggle in Hightower's 
consciousness which precedes it. This total perspective in 
Faulkner's major works derives, I believe, from his commitment
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to a metaphysics of analogy, which enabled him to "create” 
history vital and ongoing in the present.
We begin our discussion with "The Bear" because it is 
Faulkner's most explicit treatment of redemption history, 
rendered through Ike McCaslin's growth to manhood. As I 
have already noted in Chapter I, Faulkner created specific 
analogues of classical, Old Testament and New Testament his­
tory within the history of Ike's growth to maturity. There 
is the classical, primitive ritual of the hunt in the wilder­
ness, whose spiritual meaning is amplified by Ike's link with 
the sacrificial Isaac of the Old Testament. This analogue 
is deepened by Ike's identification with the Christ redeemer—  
the Nazarene carpenter whose trade he follows in manhood. 
Furthermore, these analogues are rendered dramatic within 
the moral history of America and the South, so that the total 
effect is a modern retelling— a dramatic revelation— of the 
history of the Fall and the quest for redemption. As the story 
unfolds Ike becomes more and more aware of his position, his 
"place," vis—a—vis history, and the initiation process cul­
minates when, fully aware of his past heritage, he must choose 
what his relationship to it is going to be. It is a crucial 
choice which determines his identity, and in it Faulkner reveals 
the whole history of the redemptive process at work.
In the long debate that runs throughout Part Four, Ike 
and his cousin Cass Edmonds review the McCaslin heritage and 
the history of the South and America in the light of the
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biblical history of the Creation and Fall. Throughout their 
discussion, there is no dispute between them over the moral, 
analogical nature of history; both explicitly reject any 
notion of secular progressivism. Ike identifies the sin and 
guilt in his own past with the universal fallen condition 
of man, and while disavowing that he can ever "repudiate" it, 
he does choose to sever himself from the tainted legacy.
In his experience in the wilderness he has undergone a series 
of temptations which teach him the humility and sacrifice 
necessary for spiritual freedom. And so now he is capable of 
making that free act of renunciation: "Sam Fathers set me free." 
By this act of atonement Ike both divests himself of the 
guilt— stained farm and also sacrifices his marriage and chance 
for a son.
Throughout Part Four Faulkner makes it clear that 
Ike's decisive act of renunciation is inseparable from his 
historical consciousness of his "place" vis-a-vis both his 
heritage and universal history. Pushing beyond the bounds 
of his own personal, immediate situation, Ike chooses finally 
to see his "place" and the root of his identity in the 
Redemption, linking his own decision and freedom to Christ's 
sacrificial act. So although Ike accepts man's fallen condi­
tion, in a way for example that Quentin Compson never can, he 
nevertheless chooses to transform the burden of guilt by an 
act of spiritual freedom. This is the fulfillment of the 
destiny which has prepared him throughout a lifetime to accept
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this role and identity. However, Faulkner obviously brooded 
long over the implications of Ike's decision, and through the 
"voice" of Cass Edmonds, we see him deepening the mystery of 
Ike's moral predicament.
Against Ike's stance his cousin Cass raises the crucial 
question of responisibility— and "escape," He argues that Ike's 
renunciation is in effect a refusal of responsibility, a with­
drawal from the tainted human community on the basis of some 
absolute, idealistic principle, and an "inhuman" grasping for 
innocence. Is not Ike actually trying to absolve himself from 
the fallen human community, in pursuit of some gnostic personal 
perfection? Doesn't his decision place him effectively out­
side the community, so that when we meet him as an old man in 
Delta Autumn he seems an anachronism, caught put of time and 
doomed to relive the now— empty rituals of his youth? In connec­
tion with this, Faulkner implicitly raises the question of 
whether Ike's renunciation might be an act of dissociation 
from humanity which atrophies his moral potential and denies 
him full opportunity to exert some positive spiritual influ­
ence on the community. If so, isn't this a denial of the 
process of redemption in its concrete reality? Faulkner him­
self seemed to suggest such a view in his famous "triun of 
conscience" statement concerning Ike,
Q, Mr, Faulkner, Isaac McCaslin in "The Bear" relinquishes 
his heredity. Do you think he may be in the same pre­
dicament as modern man, under the same conditions that 
he can't find a humanity to fit in with?
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A. Well, there are some people in any time and age that 
cannot face and cope with the problems. There seems 
to be three stages; The first says, This is rotten, I 
don't like it, I will take death first. The second 
says. This is rotten, I don't like it, I can't do any­
thing about it, but at least I will not participate in 
it myself, I will go off into a cave or climb a pillar 
to sit on. The third says. This stinks and I'm going 
to do something about it. McCaslin is in the second.
He says. This is bad, and I will withdraw from it.
What we need are people who will say, This is bad and 
I'm going to do something about it. I'm going to change 
i t , 1
In considering this critical view of Ike's decision, we should 
keep in mind that it was expressed by the "social—minded" 
Faulkner of the later interviews, when often he seems con­
sciously trying to instruct as well as entertain his audiences. 
This criticism of Ike's renunciation stresses only one aspect—  
the humanistic— of his choice, and should be,balanced I think 
by the story itself, where not only the author's emotional 
loyalties but also the spirit of his interpretation of history 
are weighted on the side of the resigning hero.
If we view the story typologically, which I think we 
must, Ike's decision must be placed in relation to Christ and 
redemption history. In this light, rather than dissociating 
himself from humanity, Ike is acting creatively upon his knowl­
edge of history, and in so doing he widens the possible dimen­
sions of humanity, specifically, by demonstrating a new role 
and attitude toward the "Southern" history, and by extension 
all moral history. He chooses not to follow the sterile forms 
of the past by passive acceptance of his heritage, but instead
^Faulkner in the University, ed. Frederick L. Gwynn and 
Joseph L. Blotner (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 24$-6.
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he rises above historical necessity by free choice. On the 
metaphysical level, he introduces a new possibility of being 
and action into the situation, that of the redeemed New Man 
following the form of Christ. He may not be able to change 
the community in a sociological sense, but he exists in its 
midst as an exemplum who has transfigured its history by 
his life, showing forth the possibilities of moral redemp­
tion. Ike's life is an analogue of Christianity because, 
unlike say Jason or Quentin Compson, he can accept history 
and truly act in a free way. In the Christian metaphysic 
freedom and action are, paradoxically, much a matter of 
reception and acceptance--the gratuitous gift of insight-- 
and thus tied to historical consciousness. With this insight 
into history, Ike acts selflessly out of a center of peace 
and contemplation, and so he achieves serenity.
Q. Mr. Faulkner, do ybu look on Ike McCaslin as having 
fulfilled his destiny, the things that he learned 
from Sam Fathers and from the other men as he did-- 
when he was 12 to l6? Do you feel that they stood 
him in good stead all the way through his life?
A. I do, yes. They didn't give him success but they 
gave him something a lot more important, even in 
this country. They gave him serenity, they gave him 
what would pass for wisdom— I mean wisdom as con- 
tradistinct from the schoolman's wisdom of educa­
tion. They gave him that.^
In The Picaresque Saint, R. W. B. Lewis has commented 
brilliantly on the aptness of form in Part Four of "The 
Bear," arguing that "its mode of existence is as important
^Ibid., p. 54.
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as its content.” Lewis points out that Part Four is pre­
sented not so much as a narrative of events, but as "an 
intense, translucent vision of the future,” allowing us to 
suppose that it is "a dream," a "true prophecy" destined to 
occur but presented now as it exists "only in a state of 
possibility." And this is fitting, he argues, because of 
the transcendent, visionary character of Ike's nature and 
decision. In this Lewis sees Faulkner as dangerously close 
to overstepping the line between prophetic vision and liter­
ary credibility.
The transcendence enacted in "The Bear," to put it dif­
ferently, was if anything too successful and complete.
It carried Ike out of the quicksand of history, but at 
the same time it nearly carried him out of the company 
of mortal men. He has moved dangerously close to the 
person of the savior-God, to the person of Jesus; 
dangerously close, at least, for the purposes of fic­
tion. It is worth insisting that the life of Christ 
is not under any circumstances a fit subject for litera­
ture: not because such a subject would be irreverent,
but because within the limits of literature it would be 
impossible; or, what is the same thing, it would be too 
easy. And this is exactly why the quality of the fourth 
section of "The Bear"— its mode of existence— is so 
uncannily appropriate to its content. It was perhaps 
Faulkner's most extraordinary poetic intuition to pre­
sent the affinities between a human being and a divine-- 
a Mississippi hunter and the figure of Christ--nut an 
actuality, but as ^  foggily seen prophetic possibility : 
something longed for and even implicit in the present 
circumstances and character, but something that has 
decidedly never yet happened. "The Bear," Reaching to 
the edge of human limits, does the most that literature 
may with propriety attempt to do. (Italics mine).^
Lewis' remark is not an atypical response to Part 
Four of "The Bear," and it is worth examination. In the
R. W. B. Lewis, The Picaresque Saint (New York: 
J. B. Lippencott Co., I96I ) , p. 209.
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first place, what are we to make of his assertion that 
Faulkner managed to "present the affinities between a human 
being and a divine"? Lewis seems to make a dualistic separa­
tion here, when in the light of the Incarnation Christ is 
the God-Man, and human nature is interpenetrated with and 
transformed by this union with the divine. There is no 
manichean separation; the union of divine and human and the 
mystery of redemptive freedom and grace is the essence of 
the redemption. And it seems to me precisely that mystery 
that Faulkner is struggling to present in "The Bear." 
Furthermore, to argue that these affinities between Ike 
and Christ should not be seen as "actuality, but as a fog­
gily seen prophetic possibility... something that has decidedly 
never yet happened," seems too ingenious a reading. Either 
Ike renounces his legacy or he does not. Either Faulkner 
and Ike present as justification for that decision a redemp­
tive conception of history and spiritual freedom or they do 
not, and to deny their actuality seems to me to deny much of 
the meaning of the whole story itself.
Lewis is correct in pointing to a certain translu­
cent quality in Part Four of the story. But what gives part 
of that section its "visionary" quality, it seems to me, 
is that Faulkner perhaps too directly and explicitly tried 
to yoke together the historical analogues of redemption and 
the literal level of the story. Rather than being satisfied 
to just let the historical analogues work dramatically through
97
the concrete action, Faulkner achieves the "transcendence” 
by heightened rhetorical skill and a dazzling virtuosity of 
language, which tends at times to detach itself from dramatic 
action. Thus the sense of it being "too successful and com­
plete," to use Lewis' phrase. Paradoxically, Faulkner seemed 
to render such a vision more successfully, I think, in 
treating themes and situations which do not directly evoke 
that vision and its redemptive analogues, and which in fact 
are often antinomous to its values. Such themes and situa­
tions demanded more forcibly that the act of fictional cre­
ation itself be a redemptive act implicitly achieved, so 
that the redemptive vision might be the analogical form 
which shines through and illuminates those situations. This 
is the case in Light in August.
In the story of Joe Christmas Faulkner set out to
depict "the most tragic condition a man could find himself
in--not to know what he is and to know that he will never
l̂know." Born possibly a mulatto and orphaned at birth, Joe 
finds it impossible to accept an identity in either the white 
or Negro race, and so chooses to "deliberately evict(ed) 
himself from the human race." He is without any place in 
being, and Faulkner emphasizes that this is an ontological 
rather than just a social condition by the fact that although 
Joe once thinks "even God loves you," he cannot accept it.
Faulkner in the University, p. 72.
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and so becomes a "ghost" and "a phantom" strayed out of a 
lost world. His tragic displacement is manifested overtly 
in his anguished, restless movement in space, always on the 
fringes of society--down "the road that was to run for fif­
teen years." Yet for Joe the road also becomes an image of 
time which circles back on itself, bringing him back in the 
end just before his death to the exact point, metaphysically, 
from which he started his career. Through this image Faulkner 
shows us that, in the deepest sense, Joe has "gone nowhere" 
in trying to solve the paradox of his identity.
Having evicted himself from the human community,
Joe Christmas can define himself--create an identity--only 
by vehement reaction against all those natural forms and 
bonds of humanity signified by the concept of community-- 
an acceptance of limitation and mutual dependence, of time 
and change, and the mystery of human relationships. In 
other words, he is driven on an inhuman quest for innocence, 
for immunity from natural limitations and dependencies, and 
most importantly, driven by a desire for reprieve from the
5mystery and ambiguity of himself and experience. Basically, 
Joe's manner of usurping time and the natural order and
I am using the terms "innocence" and "immunity" 
interchangeably to describe that drive to absolve oneself 
from all the natural limiting realities of the fallen human 
condition. To acknowledge that situation fully is to be 
sensitive to the moral claims of the communal situation, and 
to history. As we shall see, various Faulkner characters 
choose different means to try to escape full acceptance of 
the basic human condition.
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ambiguity, none of which he can rest in, is by violence, 
yet since he has chosen to evict himself from humanity, he 
must repeat violence again and again in order to "guarantee" 
his identity.
Thus throughout the novel patterns of rebellion and
usurpation of the natural order serve as emblems of Joe's
desperate quest for innocence, outside history and community.
These are depicted clearly in his violent reactions to women
(and food and religion when they are associated with women),
particularly in those matters related to sex and the rhythm
of time, all of which he comes to regard as "traps" which he
must repudiate in order to preserve his inviolability and
demonstrate no dependencies on the weakness of human nature.
As a child at the orphanage he vomits on toothpaste while
observing the dietician making love. Although Joe does not
understand what they are doing, the subsequent terrorizing
of him creates a sense of revulsion in connection with the
incident which reoccurs several times throughout the novel,
and is symptomatic of his violent attempts to reject the
natural. Later, while living with the McEacherns, an older
boy explains the menstrual cycle to him, and Joe's "denial"
of this mystery of nature drives him to sodomy as a way of
violently immunizing himself against its ambiguity.
He was not three miles from home when in the later after­
noon he shot a sheep. He found the flock in a hidden 
valley and stalked and killed one with a gun. Then he 
knelt, his hands in the yet warm blood of the dying
100
beast, trembling, dry-mouthed, back-glaring. Then he 
got over i t , recovered. (Italics mine)
Joe tries to repudiate the bonds of nature by acts of vio­
lence which, paradoxically, are intended to assert his own 
inviolable identity and insulate him against involvement in 
ambiguous experience. After the episode with the sheep he 
can now tolerate the knowledge of sexuality, but not accept 
it, as seen when the waitress Bobbi Allen explains the 
menstrual cycle to him.
'I made a mistake tonight. I forgot something.' 
Perhaps she was waiting for him to ask her what it was. 
But he did not. He just stood there, with a still, 
downspeaking voice dying somewhere about his ears. He 
had forgot about the shot sheep. He had lived with the 
fact the older boy had told him too long now. With the 
slain sheep he had bought immunity from it for too long 
now for it to be aJ ive....
She told him, halting, clumsily, using the only 
words which she knew perhaps. But he had heard it 
before. H^ had already fled backward, past the slain 
sheep, the price paid for immunity, to the afternoon 
when, sitting on ^  bank creek, he had not been hurt or 
astonished so much as outraged. (Italics mine)?
Nevertheless, immediately after Bobbi's departure Joe vomits
again, revulsed by the "trap" of nature and human frailty he
despises and fears. A similar reaction occurs with Joanna
Burden, especially when, nearing menopause, she attempts to
trap him into marriage by insisting she is pregnant. Joe's
rejection of food, another ingratiating "kindness" offered
^William Faulkner, Light in August (New York: Random
House, 1932), p. 174.
^Ibid., pp. 176-7 *
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by women, notably Joanna Burden and Mrs. McEachern, is part 
of the same pattern of violence. To Joe it signifies natural 
dependency, and a threatening "soft" relationship with women, 
which he cannot abide. This fear of mystery underlies his 
preference for the strict, simplified, though harsh 
"justice" of Mr. McEachern, and of men in general. Immunity 
sought through violence, violence as a means to assert 
inviolable identity: this paradox amounts to a drive for
self-redemption in Joe that can only end in destruction.
And yet Joe Christmas wishes for peace, some sense
of interior solidity with his own being and with the world
that can only come, Faulkner implies, by an acceptance of
time and place, and the mysterious natural order. Early in
the novel Joe watches a group of white people casually playing
cards on a screened porch, and observes: " ‘That's all 1
wanted,' he thought. 'That don't seem like a whole lot to
ask.'" Such a feeling of peace comes to Joe only once,
during the week of his fugitive running, just before his
return to Mottstown and capture. Significantly, he feels
momentarily at one with himself, accepting time and nature
without violence.
It was just dawn, daylight: that gray and lonely suspen­
sion filled with the peaceful and tentative waking of 
birds. The air, inbreathed, is like spring water. He 
breathes deep and slow, feeling with each breath himself 
diffuse in the neutral grayness, becoming one with 
loneliness and quiet that has never known fury or despair. 
'That was all I wanted,' he thinks, in a quiet and slow 
amazement. 'That was all, for thirty years. That didn't
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seem to be a whole lot to ask in thirty years.'
But Joe cannot abide in the peace of the moment; he is driven 
back onto the "street which ran for thirty years," which has 
now become a circle of the past trapping him in time. "'And 
yet I have been further in these seven days than in all the 
thirty years,' he thinks. 'But I have never got outside 
that circle. I have never broken out of the ring of what I 
have already done and cannot ever undo,' he thinks quietly....'
The immunity sought by Reverend Gail Hightower assumes 
a different form and direction than that of Joe Christmas, 
but it is no less intense and ultimately self-destructive.
Like Joe, Hightower's displacement seems already a fait 
accompli at birth, dooming him to non-identity, "as though 
the seed which his grandfather had transmitted to him had 
been on the horse too that night and had been killed too and 
time had stopped there and then for the seed and nothing had 
happened in time since, not even him.” What has happened 
to Hightower in time, his marriage failure and career as a 
preacher, both of which he used to evoke the memory of his 
"heroic" grandfather, has caused him so much suffering that 
he has willfully evicted himself from the community. Ifhen 
Byron Bunch tries to involve him in the present difficulties 
of Lena Grove and Joe Christmas, Hightower protests: "I
won't! 1 won't! 1 have bought immunity. I have paid. I 
have paid....I paid for it. I didn't quibble about the 
price. No man can say that. X just wanted peace; X paid
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them their price without quibbling." (p. 293) We recognize 
in Hightower the same cry for peace voiced by Joe, but it is 
the "peace" of immunity from time and change, suffering and 
nature--the "death" of anonymity. Hightower's means of cap­
turing this immunity and reprieve from the present is by
escape into time, the past, where his identity is subsumed
9in the image of his grandfather.
Hightower's escape into time, of course, depicts 
the most violent and radical dissociation of past from present 
in Light in August. One result of this is that the past 
which he identifies with is a romantic illusion--his vision 
of his grandfather's heroism in the Civil War so glorified 
in memory that the fact of his ludicrous death--shot from 
behind while stealing chickens--becomes totally obscured.
This distortion of history has profound effects on Hightower's 
identity and sense of the world in the present, for he sees 
it through manichean eyes as a world so saturated with suf­
fering and defeat that action is unredeeming and unredeem­
able. Nevertheless, through his friendship with Byron Bunch 
he is forced out of his shell of immunity and into involvement,
I am arguing here and elsewhere that the desire for 
annihilation, or immolation, of identity is in fact a desire 
for innocence, for reprieve from ambiguity. Joe Christmas 
strives for this through violence, as in a sense Joanna 
Burden finally does. Her extreme dualism causes her to see 
herself and Joe as finally unredeemable, and suicide the 
only "logical" alternative. Similarly, Quentin Compson uses 
alleged incest and finally suicide as a way to immunize him­
self against the fact of Caddie's loss of virginity.
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Against his instincts (he was already once accused of mis­
cegenation and child-murder by the gossiping town for aiding 
a Negro woman in labor), Hightower helps deliver Lena Grove's 
baby, and the effect on him is a resurrection into life 
again.
*I ought to feel worse than I do,' he thinks. But 
he has to admit that he does not. And as he stands, 
tall, misshapen, lonely in his lonely and illkept 
kitchen, holding in his hand an iron skillet in which 
yesterday's old grease is bleakly caked, there goes 
through him a glow, a wave, a surge of something almost 
hot, almost triumphant. 'I showed them,' he thinks.
'Life comes to the old man yet, while they get there 
too late. They get there for his leavings, as Byron 
would say....
He goes to the study. He moves like a man with a pur­
pose now, who for twenty-five years has been doing 
nothing at all between the time to wake and the time to 
sleep again....10
Like Joe Christmas, Hightower has come to a brief acceptance 
of "the moment," of his place and identity in the present, 
through a recognition of his fundamental link with humanity. 
His discovery is like that which Ike McCaslin made; that 
in spite of the past of suffering and evil, history is not 
irrevocably fixed, because he can act in a new way here and 
now. In his creative response to the situation he momen­
tarily becomes the new man. Yet even though Hightower is 
able on one other occasion to creatively "match the moment," 
in his belated attempt to save Joe Christmas by lying to 
Percy Grimm, in the end he sinks back into the past, and in
^^Light in August, pp. 382-3.
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Faulkner's eyes "destroyed himself." When we last see him 
the possibilities of hope and creative action seem to have 
completely atrophied, as he sits helplessly in the twilight 
glow before his window, waiting for the vision of his grand­
father's gallant ride into Jefferson.
In answer to the question whether Light in August 
argues for the acceptance of an inevitably tragic view of 
life, Faulkner once replied: "I wouldn't think so. That the 
only person in that book that accepted a tragic view of life 
was Christmas because he didn't know what he was and so he 
deliberately repudiated man. The others seemed to me to have 
a very fine belief in life, in the basic possibility for 
happiness and goodness--Byron Bunch and Lena Grove, to have 
gone to all that t r o u b l e . P e r h a p s  Faulkner is overlooking 
Hightower here, but the remark does point to the positive 
redemptive forces at work throughout the story in Lena Grove 
and Byron Bunch. Lena, a primitive earth mother linked 
symbolically to the world of antiquity andyeternity (evi­
denced, for example, in Faulkner's opening description of 
her on the road), lives completely at peace with herself and 
the world. She seeks no self-redemption or immunity by 
retreat into the past or by violence, as Hightower and Joe 
do. Instead, she completely accepts her place and acts in 
the present through a simple faith in providence and human­
kind. Early in the novel she assures the world-wise Mrs. 
Armstid that God will see to it that the family is together
llpaulkner in the University, pp. 96-7»
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when "a chap is born," and comically enough, her prophecy is 
fulfilled. Although she is naive, Lena's particular grace 
is her total trust in the present situation, and thus she 
is never "time-haunted" like Joe or Hightower or Miss Burden. 
Faulkner has conveyed this technically bÿ the fact that the 
stories of Lena and Byron are almost completely told in a 
continuous "present," with only necessary brief informational 
excursions into their pasts, in contrast to the fractured 
narratives of Joe and Hightower, shifting back and forth in 
t ime.
In contrast to Joe's lack of identity, Lena's spiri­
tual strength of character comes from her sure sense of 
identity, her acceptance of her place in being. Consequently, 
though like Joe she is traveling and superficially an out­
sider, Lena is actually at home in the human community, no 
matter where she is. Not only does she "fit in," but by her 
situation Lena witnesses to the fact of communal dependence, 
and seems to exercise a redeeming influence on the community, 
drawing out the essential kindness of those she encounters. 
There is no question of isolation in Lena Grove, or displace­
ment, because of her fundamental acceptance of life, a 
quality which itself awakens Byron Bunch to a new life. 
Through his involvement with Lena Grove— through love--Byron 
moves from the backward-looking, isolated world of Hightower, 
his sole friend in Jefferson, to the doubtful but neverthe­
less "creative" world of Lena and the future. In danger
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himself of becoming another Hightower, Byron acts against
reason and prudence in choosing to follow Lena, and Faulkner
makes very clear the significance of that choice when Byron
tries to stop Brown's escape. For Byron, it is a choice
either of anonymity and "death" by retreat into the past,
or of further involvement with Lena, possible failure, but
real existence nonetheless. And Byron acts.
The hill rises, cresting. He has never seen the sea, 
and so he thinks, 'It is like the edge of nothing. Like 
once I passed it I would just ride right off into nothing. 
Where trees would look like and be called by something 
else except trees, and men would look like and be called 
by something else except folks. And Byron Bunch he 
wouldn't even have to be or not be Byron Bunch....
Byron looks back to see Brown escaping again from Lena out
the back door of the cabin.
Then a cold, hard wind seems to blow through him.
It is at once violent and peaceful, blowing hard away 
like chaff or trash or dead leaves all the desire and 
the despair and the hopelessness and the tragic and vain 
imagining too. With the very blast of it he seems to 
feel himself rush back and empty again, without any­
thing in him now which had not been there two weeks ago, 
before he ever saw her. The desire of this moment is 
more than desire: it is conviction quiet and assured;
before he is aware that his brain has telegraphed his 
hand he has turned the mule from the road and is galloping 
along the ridge which parallels the running man's course 
when he entered the woods. He has not even named the 
man's name to himself. He does not speculate at all 
upon where the man is going, and why. It does not enter 
his head that Brown is fleeing again, as he himself had 
predicted. If he thought about it at all, he probably 
believed that Brown was engaged, after his own peculiar 
fashion, in some thoroughly legitimate business having 
to do with his and Lena's departure. But he was not 
thinking about that at all; he was not thinking about
12Light in August, p. 401.
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Lena at all; she was as completely out of his mind as 
if he had never seen her face nor heard her name. He 
is thinking: 'I took care of his woman for him and I
horned his child for him. And now there is one more 
thing I can do for him. I can't marry them, because I 
aint a minister. And I may not can catch him, because 
he's got a start on me. And I may not can whip him if 
I do, because he's bigger than me. But I can try it.
I can try to do it.'^3
Thus, as Cleanth Brooks has illustrated, if there is 
an essential redeeming force in Light in August it lies in 
the condition of community, exemplified by Lena Grove and 
Byron Bunch. For in spite of viciousness, hostility, and 
mob action, in spite of the suffering it inflicts on the 
individual, the community continues to abide, and it heals 
those who accept it. Faulkner's belief in this is demon­
strated by the magnificent comic ending of the novel, where 
life and history are ongoing and full of possibility, while 
the tragic alternatives of isolation and withdrawal seem to 
diminish into memory.
That vision of history which informs the action of 
Light in August is present in a far more complicated and 
oblique way in Absalom, Absalom, mainly because the sheer 
technical virtuosity of the novel exceeds--by demanding 
more--that used to tell the story of Joe, Lena, and Hightower, 
To tell the story of Thomas Sutpen Faulkner elected to use 
four main "voices"--Rosa Coldfield, Mr. Compson, Quentin 
Compson, and Shreve McCannon— all committed in various
l^ibid., pp. 402-3.
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degrees to reconstructing the meaning of Sutpen's history. 
Consequently, the reader must consider not only those themes 
evoked in the story itself, but the fact that Faulkner is 
also primarily concerned with the act of imagination whereby 
history is recreated, or "how we know the past," as Cleanth 
Brooks has s u g g e s t e d . A s  we shall see, there is a compli­
cated and dynamic relationship between those themes created 
within Sutpen's story and the particular "voice" imaginating 
them, but for the moment we can isolate the dominant thematic 
strains before turning to the difficult thematic problems.
"Sutpen’s trouble was innocence," says Mr. Compson, 
and throughout the novel we discover Faulkner's conception 
of this; a sense of immunity from nature and history, a 
blindness to moral ambiguity and complicity, and a belief 
in the limitless, independent assertion of personal will.
Like Joe Christmas, Sutpen is both outsider and usurper of 
the natural order, ruthlessly and innocently pursuing his 
dream of a dynasty without regard for the humanity around 
him. Throughout his career Sutpen is a "foreigner" who 
enters the South and imposes his will upon it, but this in 
turn is an analogue of his fundamental isolation, because of 
his "innocence," from the human community itself. To Faulkner 
this is the same pitiable condition as Joe Christmas's. "He 
(Sutpen) was not a (sic) depraved--he was amoral, he was
^^Cleanth Brooks, William Faulkner : The Yoknapawtapha
County (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19&3).
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ruthless, completely self-centered. To me he is to be 
pitied, as anyone who ignores man is to be pitied, who does 
not believe that he belongs as a member of a human family, 
of the human family, is to be pitied.
Sutpen’s isolation precludes any historical conscious­
ness on his part, since time "stopped" for him during that 
one unendurable moment in the past when he was first turned 
away from the front door of the mansion. In essence, his 
life is an attempt to "correct," rather than accept, that 
moment--his Fall--and so time is inured for him and every­
thing is seen in relation to that m o m e n t . T h u s  he acts in 
a vacuum of immunity without consciousness of place or his­
tory. In creating Sutpen's Hundred, he apes the manners 
of aristocratic respectability without concern for the moral 
and social underpinnings of that order. His marriage and 
begetting of Judith and Henry are necessary, incidental facts 
to the achievement of his "design," as is his outrageous 
suggestion later of a "trial" marriage with Rosa Coldfield. 
Similarly, Sutpen regards the Civil War as an unfortunate
^^Faulkner in the University, p. 80.
^^The same problem of identity is at work here in 
Sutpen as in Christmas, Hightower, and Quentin Compson. 
Rather than accept the fact of the fall, they try to deny 
or correct it by cutting off from its effects, but this 
only leads to a spiritual "freeze" in time. Like many 
Faulkner characters, they become fixed on a moment in the 
past, and hence doomed to recapitulative attempts to escape 
or correct it in some way. As a result, their whole "invio­
lable" identity becomes fragilely dependent on that single 
point of time; they refuse to "fall."
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interruption of his personal plan to establish a dynasty, 
and after the war he returns to begin resurrection of the 
"Hundred” as though the history of 186I-65 had almost never 
occurred. It is as though time itself were meaningless to 
Sutpen; he seems as detached from it as he is impervious to 
"place"--the actual condition of the fallen South at this 
time, which for him holds no more ties of human values than 
his brutal pragmatism chooses to accept in order to achieve 
his dream. Even in old age he continues to usurp the natural 
order, begetting a daughter by Milly Jones, but it is the 
figure of Time itself in the person of Wash Jones with his 
scythe which finally cuts Sutpen down.
Sutpen's ruthless quest for self-redemption, to 
redress the moment of the "fall” in his past he cannot accept, 
causes him also to deny complicity in ambiguous guilt as 
well. We recall in Light in August how Joe Christmas pre­
ferred his relationship with Mr. McEachern--one of hard but 
unequivocal "justice” in reward and punishnient--to the warmth 
and sympathy of Mrs. McEachern. Sutpen holds to a similar 
kind of ”justice”--an exact, pragmatic balance sheet of 
"mistakes" which can be corrected by him, and this impulse 
is seen especially in his attitude toward Bon. Having 
repudiated him and his mother as not fitting into his design, 
Sutpen nevertheless regards the mistake as "paid for" because 
of his support for them, as he tolls Mr. Compson.
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'And yet after more than thirty years, more than thirty 
years after my conscience had finally assured me that if 
I had done an injustice, I had done what I could to 
rectify it--' and grandfather not saying 'Wait' now but 
saying, hollering maybe even: 'Conscience? Conscience?
Good God, man, what else did you expect?....what con­
science to trade with which would have warranted you in 
the belief that you could have bought immunity from her 
for no other coin but justice?'^7
Still, Sutpen admits no complicity in his denial of Charles 
Bon, and though it ultimately destroys him and his design, 
he dies innocent, without self-knowledge, and the meaning 
of his history is only finally discovered through the narra­
tive "voices" who recreate his life.
How do we arrive at the "total" truth about Sutpen's 
story? Faulkner in one stroke both complicated the matter 
and brought it vitally to life by using four narrative 
"voices" who remember and recreate the history from fragments 
of facts. This device allowed him to dramatize, rather than 
simply present by recollection, the relationship of each 
narrator to Sutpen's career. For example, there is the 
"identification" between Henry Sutpen and Quentin, both 
doomed by chivalric codes of honor relating to sisters, and 
at least partially between Shreve and Mr. Compson, for 
although Shreve is a Canadian and outside the history of the 
South, both he and Mr. Compson tend to take a detached, 
somewhat ironic view of Sutpen's history. However, in 
recreating the story each narrator tends to "verify" its
^^William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom (New York: 
Random House, 1936), p. 26$.
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meaning only in terms of his or her own particular reading 
of the events, and while this may help to partially enlighten 
the tale, it also imposes all the limitations of their own 
particular viewpoint. There is a tendency on the part of 
each narrator to try to "contain" the actual mystery of 
Sutpen's history, depending on their degree of involvement 
in that history and the particular sense of values they 
bring to bear when interpreting it. For example, to Rosa 
Coldfield Sutpen is a "demon," while to Shreve he is at times 
a tawdry buffoon and serio-comic opportunist (to some extent 
Mr. Compson holds this view, too), and both are reductive 
views which do not represent the final "tragic" Sutpen 
Faulkner makes the reader see. As Cleanth Brooks suggested, 
Faulkner's concern in Absalom, Absalom may be equally on 
Sutpen and "how we know the past," but regarding the latter 
he shows the single imagination to be limited and subject 
to distortion when "recreating" history, as in the case of 
Gail Hightower's "historizing" imagination in Light in August.
In Hightower Faulkner was concerned with the disso­
ciating historical imagination, one in which the ontological 
balance between past and present, sensibility and action, 
insight and fact had somehow become tipped, and this seems 
true in the case of each of the narrators in Absalom, Absalom 
too. Sutpen's outrageous suggestion to her has become Rosa 
Coldfield's idee fixe ; she cannot "get beyond" that moment 
in her past to see him in any larger perspective of history.
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Quentin Compson’s identification vrith the past (as he 
"imagines" it) is so close and complete that it produces 
romantic distortion similar to Hightower's, a destructive 
obsession which Faulkner described as Quentin's "ophthalmia." 
Mr. Compson and Shreve, both interested in and involved in 
Sutpen's history, tend to "contain" it within their larger 
cosmic viewpoint of sardonic, somewhat world-weary fatalism.
How does Faulkner, then, create perspective in 
Absalom, Absalom which both presents the mysterious truth of 
Sutpen's career and at the same time implicitly measures the 
distortions and limitations of the narrating "voices"? It 
is by his own authorial voice woven in and through the vari­
ous voices of the narrators, a voice which creates Sutpen's 
mystery by revealing its dynamic relationship to the char­
acter "voice" trying to explain and understand it. In each 
case Sutpen's history cannot be "contained" by the single 
narrator voice, and the sense of overflowing, onrushing 
truth is conveyed by the heightened rhetoric and style of 
the novel. In addition, Faulkner uses the explicit analogue 
of Kings II, the story of Absalom, and the classical pattern 
of revenge, the great man brought down by the retributive 
hand of Fate, whose canons he has violated. These analogues 
serve to measure the action of Sutpen's history, as distinct 
from the interpreting narrators, and also serve as a formal 
touchstone to correct the distortions of their particular 
voices. Thus through Faulkner's use of analogical techniques
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and rhetoric, we are finally left with the abiding mystery 
of Sutpen, multifarious, dramatic and "ongoing" because it 
resists the categorizing impulses of its various interpreters.
Absalom, Absalom is perhaps the "darkest" of Faulkner's 
major novels; it is as though in it history were circum­
scribed and turned inward upon itself paralytically, There 
is a certain amount of redeeming action in the novel, as 
Brooks has shown, particularly in the long-suffering humanity 
of Judith, who lives through, understands, and acts compas­
sionately in time and history. But the weight is upon the 
forces of destructive innocence and dissociation throughout 
the novel, and they are intensified by Faulkner's own rhe­
torical flights and immersions. In The Sound and the Fury, 
however, the forces of destruction are more "balanced" by 
positive, redemptive energies at work, in particular the 
spiritual power exerted by Dilsey. Moreover, speaking from 
the standpoint of the analogical aesthetic, it seems to me 
that the historical vision informing The Sound and the Fury 
focuses the positive and negative themes upon one another 
in a more concrete, dramatic, mutually-revealing way. We 
recall that the essence of the analogical involves "incar­
nating" vision dramatically in the concrete, and evolving 
meaning in the concrete through evolving action. Of Faulkner's 
major novels The Sound and the Fury seems to achieve this 
most successfully, and for this reason it actually seems 
more Christian in its rendering of history than the overtly
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allegorized A Fable, whose vision of history suffers, I 
think, in exact proportion to its failure to dramatically • 
embody that vision in the concrete. It is also, curiously, 
more "dated" than The Sound and the Fury, 1 think because 
at times the vital historical sense fails to work in the 
creative act. Thus its over-riding allegorical vision seems 
partly unrealized, whereas The Sound and the Fury possesses 
the fresh dramatic power which enriches its vision again and 
again. In other words, The Sound and the Fury formally 
embodies mystery, whereas A F able is about the mystery of the 
Incarnation in history, and the latter is no guarantee of 
values that must be discovered and created within the work.
The story of the decline of the Compson family, a 
decline epitomized by the tragedies of Caddie and Quentin, 
is an analogue of the fallen condition itself, and Faulkner's 
vision is worked out brilliantly in the way each character 
responds to that condition. The touchstone of their response 
is the idiot Benjy, for in one sense he is the living emblem 
of their decline. At the same time, however, he embodies 
redemptive possibility in the sense that his very presence 
is a demand upon the deepest spiritual caapcities of the 
other characters, and how they "see" and respond to him is 
the gauge of their own humanity. He is the crucible in 
which the meaning of human "being-ness" is tested, and by 
extension, the meaning of human history. For some Benjy 
becomes a medium of grace, of acceptance of the mystery of
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suffering, of time, of the idea of spiritual community 
linking all creatures in the redemptive process. For others, 
he embodies all the irrational absurdity of existence, of 
history, and unable to live with this, they try to deny or 
escape it, but in so doing they relinquish the redemptive 
possibilities as well.
With the exception of Caddie, each of the Compsons 
takes measures to immunize themselves from the fact of their 
fall, centered in Benjy. This is the same quest for inno­
cence and self-redemption seen in Joe Christmas and Hightower 
and Sutpen, the same denial of history and spiritual community,
and it produces much the same forms of dissociation, only
perhaps more intensely extreme. Caddie, the "girl brave 
enough to climb that tree" and look in the forbidden window--
that is, to stare at death— accepts both her individual and
the family's collective fall, and she along with Dilsey are 
the ones most caring for Benjy throughout the novel. But 
the other Compsons try to deny this reality, and to project 
themselves out of this historical "present" and achieve insu­
larity from its suffering. To Mrs. Compson Benjy is a judg­
ment and an affliction, and so she retreats neuresthenically 
into the past, the romantic memory of her high-born family, 
and into complete self-pity. She participates in bringing 
about Benjy's name change, a fact which reveals her denial 
of him, and in a similar impulse, she denies the fallen 
Caddie by refusing to allow mention of her name in the
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Compson household. Having retreated into the past, she has 
relinquished any capacity for action in the present; Jason 
completely runs the family affairs, and Dilsey manages the 
house. Nevertheless, Mrs. Compson talks continually about 
her suffering, but in fact she has cut herself off from even 
that, retreating to her room whenever some crisis is imminent. 
For Mrs. Compson, as well as her husband and sons, time is 
only an emblem of dissolution, and they all remain time- 
obsessed in their inability to accept the "fall" in their 
history gracefully (in the theological sense), and act with 
some degree of effectiveness in the present moment. The 
idea of actually suffering through time, the present "here," 
is largely inconceivable to them, and yet this is where 
redemptive grace is actually operative, as Dilsey demonstrates, 
To the Compsons time is unredeemable, and since they cannot 
escape its flow, time becomes meaningless progression, as 
Mr. Compson informs Quentin with the gift of his father's 
watch.
I give you the mausoleum of all hope and desire; its 
rather excruciatingly apt that you will use it to gain 
the reductio absurdum of all human experience which can 
fit your individual needs no better than it fitted his 
or his father’s. I give it to you not that you may re­
member time, but that you might forget it now and then 
for a moment and not spend all your breath trying to 
conquer it. Because no battle is ever won he said.
They are not even fought. The field only reveals to 
man his oim folly and despair , and victory is an illu­
sion of philosophers and fools.
1 8The Sound and the Fury, p. 95*
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For Mr. Compson, in addition to a retreat into the 
past, the quest for immunity preeminently takes the form of 
a retreat behind language itself. Through talk~-vords— he 
effects his dissociation. Gifted vith eloquence and morbid 
sense of irony, Mr. Compson uses it to construct his own 
despairing, manichean vision of history, and yet this is a 
"safe" Olympian posture which he uses, along with drink, 
to detach himself from the real ambiguities of history, and 
most importantly, from the personal demands and responsibili­
ties it places before him in the present. Since the world 
is totally corrupt to Mr. Compson, he is not called upon to 
act, since action is now largely meaningless. Language 
becomes the act of self-hypnosis by which he convinces him­
self of this. Yet it is language dissociated from fact-- 
the antithesis of the incarnational ideal which implicitly 
informs and judges his dissociating speech--and this condi­
tion similarly haunts Quentin throughout Section 11, where 
we see him actually drowning in a deluge of disembodied 
language and insight he cannot effectively handle.
For Quentin, language, time, and the concrete present 
reality of the fallen Compson state becomes an unbearable 
burden of unremitting suffering and loss. Yet he too unsuc­
cessfully seeks immunity from history, specifically from the 
fact of Caddie's loss of virginity, by trying to project 
himself and Caddie into a state of mock damnation by incest. 
In Quentin's mind, this would, not so much give meaning to
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her affair with Dalton Ames (his father assures him it is 
meaningless), but preserve them together in a state of frozen 
inviolability before her "fall," and thus keep them immune. 
This is the familiar quest for innocence in Faulkner (para­
doxically sought through damnation, like Joe Christmas),
but given the fact of the fall it now becomes the death of
19spiritual fixity that Quentin desires.
It was a while before the last stroke ceased vibrating.
It stayed in the air, more felt than heard, for a long 
time. Like all the bells that ever rang still ringing 
in the long dying light-rays and Jesus and St. Francis 
talking about his sister. Because if it were just to 
hell; if that were all of it. Finished. If things just 
finished themselves. Nobody else but her and m e . If we 
could have just done something so dreadful that they 
would have fled hell except u s . Tltalics mine.) ^  have 
committed incest ^  said Father it was I it was not 
Dalton Ames And when he put Dalton Ames Dalton Ames 
Dalton Ames when he put the pistol in my hands I didn't. 
That's why I didn't. He would be there and she would and 
I would.20
This innocence-by-damnation, the sought-for reprieve from 
suffering, time and change, is the essence of the manichean 
temper, and it leads "logically" to Quentin's suicide.
Yet Quentin's tale of incest is also an attempt to 
give some rational, ethical meaning to human behavior, by 
constructing a personal code of ethics and "justice" with
19 This idea of fixity is the antithesis of the notion 
of grace as "spiritual motion" outlined in Chapter I. This 
spiritual motion, as noted, often takes the form of a new 
insight into the meaning of history, and accepting it, as 
Dilsey does in Part IV.
20The Sound and the Fury, pp. 98-99»
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which to "balance out" action on a clear scale of sin and 
retribution. In this respect it is like Joe Christmas' 
preference for the unambiguous "justice" of Mr. McEachern or 
Hightower's plea for a clear balancing of his relationship 
with the community by saying: "I have paid. I have bought
immunity." But all these attempts at personal ethic are 
doomed to fail, because they are essentially reductive-- 
attempts to eliminate the fundamental mystery of human experi­
ence. To reject that is to attempt to live "outside" that 
mystery (a subtle form of immunity), but the price of this 
isolation from ongoing history is spiritual paralysis and 
inevitable defeat. On the other hand, accepting the mystery 
involves accepting the paradox of inequity, suffering, and 
loss in experience and at the same time responding actively 
to the working of grace within ongoing, changing fallen 
nature. Faulkner's phrase "to endure" implies this kind of 
acceptance and spiritual adaptability, rather than just pas­
sive stoicism. Quentin Compson cannot accept this; charac­
ters like Dilsey, Lena Grove and Judith Sutpen do.
Jason Compson's lust for immunity from history is as 
intense as his parents' and brother Quentin's, only mani­
fested in different ways. There is the same ontological 
dissociation of past from present, but Jason tries to manage 
time and events not by retreat into the past, but by immersing 
himself totally in the present. To Jason history and the 
past are irrelevant except as they relate to his immediate
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pragmatic concerns in the present. That his view of matters 
is strictly functional is evidenced by his readiness to 
commit Benjy to the Jackson asylum. He admits no spiritual, 
or even familial, ties with the idiot, nor that Benjy has 
any identity within the community. And yet ironically,
Jason's desire to repudiate his connection with the Compson 
fall is manifested by his obsessive concern with their 
"place" in the community, and how he appears in the public 
eye. This is of course the real reason for his concern with 
Quentin II's behavior, and Benjy's also.
Jason's relationship with Benjy is symptomatic of 
another destructive trait he shares with Quentin: the attempt
to create a rational personal ethic that will serve as a 
bulwark against forces of mystery, the unpredictable, and 
ambiguity. He regards it as "just" that he steals from 
Quentin II as payment for the bajik position he lost, his 
idee fixe in the past. By this kind of narrow rationalism 
he tries to control events immediately around him, from 
Quentin II's misbehavior to Benjy's desperate howl in the 
final scene of the novel. Jason feels justified in his 
"ethic" and asserts "I can take care of myself," a remark 
which reveals that he sees himself as morally independent, 
immune to history and loss, and thus not in any need of 
redemption outside himself. Yet throughout his section of 
the novel Jason is defeated again and again by those mysteri­
ous forces of life he cannot control; and yet he learns
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nothing from these defeats, remaining "innocent" like Sutpen 
to the end. His logical scheme to rob Caddie's daughter is 
defeated by his own misreading of her daring, capricious 
nature; he can no more control her rationally than he can 
his stock market investments. The image of the breakdown 
of his control is his frenzied inability to keep up with 
time. And it is time without any supernatural construction; 
the providential sparrows of the Quentin section have now 
become the pestering pigeons Jason cannot control or destroy.
It is Dilsey, of course, who embodies most of the 
positive redemptive forces in the novel. Perhaps the most 
important thing that can be said about her initially is 
that she lives through all the anguished moments of the 
Compson history, unlike the members of the family, who 
retreat or escape in the various ways I have indicated.
This is to say, then, that Dilsey accepts the fact of their 
fall, of the fall, accepts time and place realistically, 
and exhibits none of the forms of dissociation so evident 
in the Compsons. Her strong sense of place goes beyond 
social context or immediate historical situation to its 
eternal ontological roots. She knows her name is in "de 
Book," as she tells Caddie, and she intends to answer for 
herself at the Final Judgment. Dilsey's universal and 
eternal sense of community derives from this faith. Her 
sense of community is not drawn in upon itself narcissisti- 
cally and made exclusive, like the Compsons'; her community
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is truly universal, a fact revealed by her view of Benjy 
as one of God's créatures and her inclusion of him in the 
Negro Easter service. The center of her view of history is 
Christ's Redemption, and her faith in it enables her to 
accept and act constructively in and through time, through 
suffering and loss, to bring about some measure of good.
Time does not haunt her as it does the Compsons. The clock 
strikes inaccurately but Dilsey knows what time it is; like­
wise, when the children are curious about Damuddy's death, 
she tells them they will know "in de Lord's own time."
Because her acceptance of time and history is not manichean 
or detached, like Mr. Compson's, she can act "gracefully" in 
the present. Her presence in the Compson midst, analogi­
cally, is a vital, dramatic and informing counterpoint to 
their negative dissociation from history as meaningless, 
redemption-less, and absurd. Her faith in an ongoing spiri­
tual community, centered in Christ, and her actions continu­
ally testify to redemptive possibilities.
Dilsey's acceptance of the redemptive ideal of his­
tory, and of her concrete place in it, is demonstrated most 
clearly in her relationship with the idiot Benjy. Unlike 
the Compsons, she will not leave him out of the human family; 
she is aware of his place--the place of all irrational 
suffering--in a divine plan. She knows intuitively that to 
deny him is to deny "the least" in the kingdom, and so the 
focal point of irrationality and menainglessness for others
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becomes for Dilsey a medium of grace, the "vision" she 
achieves next to Benjy in church. Thus she refuses to par­
ticipate in the various Compson "denials" of him: she will
not refer to him as "the baby," as Mrs. Compson does; she 
opposes his name change from Maury; she organizes his birth­
day party, a fact revealing her total acceptance of their
21condition in time. To Dilsey Benjy is not an "affliction" 
or a non-functional dependent, but a soul, and to him she 
attributes the kind of divine prescience familiarly attributed 
to idiots--"precious" in the sight of the Lord.
Dilsey's acceptance of their condition, then, is 
neither stoical nor passive. The Compsons seem condemned to 
being able only to react dissociatively from their historical 
fall, but she acts creatively and in so doing transforms the 
meaning of their experience. Her ability to do this demon­
strates one of the central paradoxes of redemption history: 
that complete acceptance of the fall, of limitation--of this 
time and this place linked to Christ and eternity--is a 
liberating gift of freedom, and that her spiritual transcen­
dence grows out of fidelity to the present and the limited 
concrete. Thus Dilsey is most free of anyone in the novel, 
not burdened by time, nor deluged by language, nor driven 
by a desire for personal immunity and self-redemption. She 
accepts suffering creatively without desire for reprieve, 
believing that it has already been paid for, already redeemed.
21Similarly, Dilsey refuses to deny Caddie's existence
after she is gone.
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As she stands next to Benjy in church, listening to 
the Reverend Shegog's Easter sermon, she experiences one of 
those spiritual "motions" of grace, and it comes in the form
of a historical insight into their true condition. She
"sees" the connecting link between the historical Christ and 
His living image in the idiot standing next to her, and the
meaning of human suffering. "I've seed de first en de last,"
she tells Frony later. It may likely be a reference to the 
first and the last of the Compsons. But her freshly illu­
minated sense of history stretches beyond that. We recall 
that Reverend Shegog's sermon topic was "the recollection 
and the Blood of the Lamb," and as he incarnated that vision 
into the Negro dialect, Dilsey also experiences that re- 
col lection --the "gathering together" of all the suffering, 
idiocy, and loss in history in the person of Christ. The 
grace of this insight makes history profoundly clear to her, 
so that she can accept it, "endure," and continue to act 
with freedom and faith to justify that perception.
CHAPTER FIVE
I.
The vision of Flannery O'Connor was that of an 
allegorist who saw human history as a commedia divina 
centered in Christ's Redemption, a mystery which she 
accepted as literal truth and then proceeded to explore 
in such a way that the form and meaning of her stories 
evolved inseparably from the fundamental mystery of Christ's 
continuing presence in human affairs. The Christian doc­
trinal interpretation of history which she accepted whole­
heartedly led her to see all things in creation "linked 
together" by the Redemption, and given that vision, she 
set about the task of dramatizing its themes and counter- 
themes as she saw them reflected in contemporary experience. 
Her doctrinal viewpoint, her historical sense, and her 
aesthetic sense were all "of one substance:" a firm 
belief in the analogical nature of reality, a reality 
extended to infinite depth by the "added dimension" of 
supernatural mystery incarnated in Christ. To an audience 
largely indifferent or even hostile to this added dimen­
sion of mystery in human reality, an audience imbued with 
rationalism, the action in Miss O'Connor's stories often
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seems bizarre, grotesque, and absurd. But beneath the 
surface discrepancies lies an awesome wholeness of vision 
and form, an artistic integrity that derives, I believe, 
from the fact that both her vision and the act of writing 
grew from the same source: the analogical mystery of
Christ. Thus, the subject matter of her best fiction and 
her method of penetrating it became indivisible : an "iden­
tity" exists between them which gives the stories the invi­
olable character of living mysteries. They are comedies 
in the deepest sense because, unlike some of her fellow 
contemporary writers who chose to focus upon the absurdity 
of man's condition in itself, she chose to examine the 
"absurd" mystery of the divine incarnating Himself in 
human form, which creates a higher perspective for irra­
tionality, violence, suffering, and death--a perspective 
in which the stakes of human action are ultimate and eter­
nal.
From the outset of her career Miss O ’Connor made 
plain the doctrinal foundation of her vision. "I see 
from the standpoint of Christian orthodoxy. This means 
that for me the meaning of life is centered in our Redemp­
tion by Christ and what I see in the world I see in its 
relation to that. "We lost our innocence in the fall 
of our first parents, and our return to it is through the
Flannery O'Connor, "The Fiction Writer and His 
Country," The Living Novel, ed. Granville Hicks (New York: 
Collier Books, 1962), pp. l6l-2.
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redemption which was brought about by Christ's death and
2by our slow participation in it." All of the central 
themes of her fiction--the Fall, the quest for innocence, 
the acceptance or rejection of redemptive grace, judg- 
ment--are focused by the historical fact of Christ's 
incarnation, death, and resurrection. It is the light 
which shines through the immediate context of the con­
temporary South in her work to link it with the univer­
sal struggle of man for redemption represented in the 
Old and New Testament. To illuminate this meaning through 
fiction posed tremendous problems for her as an artist, 
for she well recognized that her audience--indeed, much 
of the modern western world--possessed attitudes inimical 
to her own beliefs. She recognized that "moral vision" 
was not enough, that for her the artist's spiritual views 
must also coincide with his "dramatic sense" and his 
"vision of what is" in the creative act, else both the 
moral and the dramatic would suffer diminution. To 
achieve this identity of vision and dramatic immediacy 
meant to create a "violent" fiction. Thus, she fused 
together in a radical way (in the manner of a metaphysi­
cal poet, I believe) many different elements: classical
analogues and Biblical history, the allegorical tradition 
of Dante, Hawthorne, and the American romance, the regional
2Flannery O'Connor, "The Church and the Fiction 
Writer," America, XCVI (March 30, 1957), PP* 733-4.
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traditions of the comic and the grotesque, and the 
prophetic tradition of continuing revelation. But what 
makes these elements work dramatically and concretely, 
what fuses them creatively, is her doctrinal belief in 
Christ's redemption, which centers her aesthetic as well 
as theological vision: they are one.
Miss O'Connor insisted upon the identity in the
concrete between theological vision and artistic practice
again and again in her essays, lectures, and interviews.
If you shy away from sense experience, you will not 
be able to read fiction; but you will not be able to 
apprehend anything else in the world either, because 
every mystery that enters the human mind, except in 
the final stages of contemplative prayer, does so by 
way of the senses. Christ didn't redeem us by a 
direct intellectual act, but became incarnate in 
human form, and He speaks to us now through the medi­
ation of a visible Church. All this may seem a long 
way from the subject of fiction, but it is not, for 
the main concern of the fiction writer is with mys­
tery as it is incarnated in human life.3
The Manicheans separated spirit and matter. To them 
all material things were evil. They sought pure 
spirit and tried to approach it without any media­
tion of matter. This is pretty much the modern 
spirit, and for the sensibility infected with it, 
fiction is hard if not impossible to write because 
fiction is so very much an incarnational art.^
For Miss O'Connor, the incarnational aesthetic and the
revelation of mystery through the concrete in fiction was
linked to the Incarnation of Christ in history. We recall
3Flannery O'Connor, "Catholic Novelists and their 
Readers," Mystery and Manners (New York: Farrar, Straus,
& Giroux, 1909J, p. 17^
LFlannery O'Connor, "The Nature and Aim of Fiction," 
Mystery and Manners (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux,
19&9), p% 58.
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from Chapters One and Three that in the Christian view of 
history, Christ's Incarnation is an analogical action 
•which continues to occur through the mysterious opera­
tion of grace in nature. Miss O'Connor believed in this 
ongoing process, its concrete "possibility," both as a 
person and as an artist. It accounts for the peculiar 
intensity of her stories. Critic Robert Drake has said 
that Christ is the hero of all her stories, and this is 
profoundly true, because all her fiction embodies one cen­
tral theme; the encounter with Christ and the "possibil­
ity" of grace, a violent encounter which is often brought 
about paradoxically through the agency of the devil. And 
at its best, her fiction is not only about the mysterious 
encounter with Christ; rather, it is that shocking encounter 
which the reader experiences, because of the identity that 
exists between form and vision in her work. Only by this 
unity could she avoid what for her was the greatest danger 
in "religious" writing; that the moral sense of the artist 
become detached from the dramatic in the act of creation.
She knew that when dissociation occurred it produced a 
Manichean and un-incarnated fiction: falsely pietistic
on the one hand, or falsely demeaning of physical reality 
on the other.
Like Joseph Conrad, she believed the highest task 
of the writer was to render justice to the created uni­
verse , and for her this included mystery and the "added
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dimension" of the supernatural. The question then became; 
how to render justice to mystery. Miss O ’Connor recalled 
with admiration Henry James' way of dealing with unsolicited, 
inferior manuscripts. James would return them with the 
remark that the writer had chosen a good subject and had 
treated it in a direct, straightforward way. While this 
perhaps flattered the author, the truth, as Miss O'Connor 
noted, was that it was probably the worst thing James could 
have said about the manuscript, since a direct, straight­
forward approach was the least capable of revealing the 
mysteries of concrete reality. What she understood, then, 
was the need for indirection as a means of creating density 
and depth in her fiction, of rendering justice to mystery.
But this was not to be a strategy for looking beyond or 
around the concrete; rather, one of penetrating through 
it to the larger, invisible realities it embodied. Ground­
ing the vision of mystery in the concrete was ultimately 
a matter of trust and faith, made possible by her belief 
that physical creation is redeemed, good in itself and 
revelatory of something of the absolute and the eternal, 
like Blake's infinitesimal grain of sand. Metaphysically, 
this belief is grounded in the analogical principle of 
being, through which the widest possible vision can be 
contained in a concrete, narrow, limited reality. Belief 
in the analogical nature of reality led her naturally to 
typological vision in fiction as a way of dramatizing
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"history” and the universal through the concrete present.
The kind of vision the writer needs to have, or to 
develop, in order to increase the meaning of his 
story is called anagogical vision, and that is the 
kind of vision that is able to see different levels 
of reality in one image or one situation. The medi­
eval commentators on Scripture found three kinds of 
meaning in the literal level of the sacred text: one
they called allegorical, in which one fact pointed to 
another; one they called tropological, or moral, 
which had to do with what should be done; and one 
they called anagogical, which had to do with the 
Divine life and our participation in it. Although 
this was a method applied to biblical exegesis, it 
also was an attitude toward all of creation, and a 
way of reading nature that included most possibili­
ties, and I think it is this enlarged view of the 
human scene that the fiction writer has to cultivate 
if he is ever going to write stories that have any 
chance of becoming a permanent part of our literature. 
It seems to be a paradox that the larger and more com­
plex the personal view, the easier it is to compress 
into fiction.5
Following the manner of the typological, prophetic crea­
tor, Miss O'Connor made her stories abound with scriptural 
and literary allusions, classical motifs, and the alle­
gorical structuring of actions--to "compress" the larger 
and more complex personal vision of history. She recog­
nized early in her career that these devices could not be 
used merely to serve as extrinsic points of reference 
for illuminating meaning in the story. To work truly 
within and through the literal level--to be truly typologi- 
cal--there had to be an intrinsic identity of form between 
the various levels of the story, which is the essence of
^Flannery O'Connor, "The Nature and Aim of Fiction," 




Because her stories center in the encounter with 
Christ, the acceptance or rejection of supernatural grace 
working in nature, they necessarily presuppose violence.
As a technical means she used violence as a means--not 
as an end in itself--to shock an audience which she felt 
was impervious to the deepest mysteries of the religious 
experience.
The novelist with Christian concerns will find in 
modern life distortions which are repugnant to him, 
and his problem will be to make them appear as dis­
tortions to an audience which is used to accepting 
them as natural; and he may well be forced to take 
even more violent means to get his vision across to 
this hostile audience. When you can assume that your, 
audience holds the same beliefs that you do, you can 
relax a little and use more normal ways of talking to 
it; when you have to assume that it does not, then 
you have to make your vision apparent by shock--to 
the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost 
blind you draw large and startling pictures.&
The most important justification for her use of violence,
however— the theological one--lay in the very nature of
the incarnational vision itself. Due to the intractability
of human nature, the presence of grace is forced to make
itself known in bizarre and "grotesque" ways (grotesque,
that is, to non-believers). Violence occurs often as a
prelude to the shock of confrontation with the Divine in
human experience, burning away pride and self-will, as
in the case of Mr. Head in "The Artificial Nigger," On
^Flannery O'Connor, "The Fiction Writer and His
Country," pp. l62-3.
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the other hand, there is also the violence produced by 
a rejection of grace, such as Rayber's violent, self­
destructive rationalism and refusal to love. Thus the 
mystery of violence is part of the mystery of Christ 
Himself: it could lead creatively to an acceptance of
grace as in Tarwater’s final acceptance of his vocation 
as a prophet, or contrarily, it could be the destructive 
violence of the Misfit's refusal of redemption when he 
shoots the Grandmother.
The critic Marion Montgomery has suggested that 
one fundamental identifying point of true Southern fic­
tion is a "sense of violâtion"--an ingrained metaphysical
nawareness of incompleteness and limitation. Miss O'Con­
nor's Christian perspective would attribute this to all 
creation--the mystery that, on the one hand, persons and 
things ("precious objects"X^in creation are sacramental 
and redeemed, and on the other hand, marked with incom­
pleteness by the radical violation that occurred in the 
Fall, the initial "violence" done to true spiritual char­
acter. But what if, like many of Miss O'Connor's charac­
ters, one chooses to deny this reality of metaphysical 
limitation and incompleteness? What if one presumes to 
personal "wholeness," a spiritual self-sufficiency without 
the need for outside "help" (i.e., grace), or if one
7Marion Montgomery, "A Sense of Violation: Notes
Toward a Definition of Southern Fiction," Georgia Review
XIX (1965), pp. 278-87.
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cHiooses to see physical creation as strictly material, 
wzLtbiout sacramental value? Then what occurs again and 
a:gaà.ti in her stories is the "holy violence" of Christ 
p*en«trating the false sense of wholeness and self-suf- 
ficdency, grace violently pulverizing the false sanctu- 
a:ri«s, exposing man's radical limitation and need for 
redemption. The ambiguous agents of violence in her fic­
tion also bring with them paradoxically, the possibilities 
O'lf grace. Christ then is the violator-redeemer, shatter­
ing the illusions of Natural Man, who thinks he is whole 
i*mt 0 himself and at one with his world. In this violent 
esaic ounter, man is made to see the divine potentiality won 
fT'or̂  him by Christ and his true place in the eternal king- 
<a oirm.
Taking the Christian conception of history as her 
■ftou»chstone, then, and the analogical mode of bringing it 
'''to life" in her work, Miss O'Connor used classical, Old 
Testament, and New Testament analogues to depict the uni- 
■veirsa 1 struggle over the Fall and Redemption. Like Faulk- 
■netr, she saw the modern South as a battleground for con- 
"tending philosophies of history, the one essentially 
•Clijristian and redemptive, the other secular and anti- 
ttheoLogical. She shared with Faulkner and other Southern­
ers the same spiritual "temper" about their immediate his- 
tozry and its universal implications. Speaking of the role 
oof the Catholic novelist in the Protestant South, she
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remarked :
I think that Catholic novelists in the future will be 
able to reinforce the vital strength of Southern lit­
erature, for they will know that what has given the 
South her identity are those beliefs and qualities 
which she has absorbed from the Scriptures and from 
her own historv of defeat and violation: a distrust
of the abstract, a sense of human dependence upon the 
grace of God, and a knowledge that evil is not simply 
a problem to be solved, but a mystery to be endured.®
She chose, however, to represent the Southern situation 
from a different artistic perspective than that of Faulk­
ner, informed as hers was by the doctrinal acceptance of 
Christian orthodoxy. Her perspective is that of a con­
scious and deliberate ordering of allegorical patterns 
in the manner of Dante and Hawthorne, though certainly 
with more attention to surface realism than the latter 
romancer. Consequently, in her stories the South appears 
as the concrete historical ’’place," whose extensions 
stretch into the "true country" of the eternal and the 
divine which man is destined for. All humanity suffers 
displacement from it. Faulkner's South is similarly 
rooted in the eternal, his characters are likewise dis­
placed and dispossessed, but the focal point each writer 
uses to present that vision is different.
One reason for the difference in perspective has 
been suggested, correctly I think, by Marion Montgomery, 
who has pointed out that Faulkner’s affinities were
oFlannery O'Connor, "The Catholic Novelist in the 
Protestant South," Mystery and Manners, p. 209.
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essentially with the Old Testament, whereas Miss O'Connor's
9were rooted in the gospels of Christ. In Faulkner's 
works, the Christian analogues seem to be "present" as 
an invisible spiritual form which envelopes and illumi­
nates the action, but more as an aspiration he strives 
to concretize rather than an accomplished fact. This may 
partially account for this straining the limits of language 
and rhetorical form to plumb meaning from the concrete 
action. His stance as a writer is with man, on "the 
inside," struggling with tragicomic dignity. Miss 
O'Connor's starting point, however, is the accomplished 
fact of Christ's Redemption, and her perspective is the 
"comic-divine" one which illuminates human folly with 
harsh clarity, unsentimentally, but with mercy too.
There is no straining of language or rhetorical form in 
her fiction. This is due, I think, to her belief in the 
Incarnation and Redemption, which prompted her as an 
artist to try to approximate that mysterious union of 
Word and Act of which Christ is the most perfect analogue. 
Hence there is little rhetorical embellishment in her 
fiction, but there is concern for the mysteries language 
can evoke; her prose possesses the fierce lucidity of a 
metaphysical poem. Her theology made her fearful of 
manipulating the word (she expressed strong distaste for
9Marion Montgomery, "Flannery O'Connor and the 
Natural Man," Mississ ippi Quarterly, XXI (Fall, I968), 
pp. 235-42.
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"experimental" fiction), knowing full well the dangers 
of its separation from concrete act. Consequently, her 
emphasis is totally upon the action--the spiritual motion-- 
within the piece, achieved through concrete language, 
bringing the reader into encounter with mystery. She 
knew that without this proper analogical action no amount 
of rhetorical skill could make the story work.
It is not surprising, then, given her vision, that 
the theme of the "Word" is a central one in her fiction. 
Language was the concrete instrument for revealing mys­
tery, and fidelity to it constituted a theological as well 
as an artistic principle. The Bible and the Hebraic intel­
lectual tradition of revelation through concrete language 
were for her a central source of vision and technique.
In a similar vein, she was preoccupied with the theme of 
silence as a mystery co-equal with the mystery of language, 
especially in The Violent Bear It Away. Silence mysteri­
ously suggested both the invisible, divine Presence and 
the void wherein spiritual choice must be struggled over 
and created. It becomes the shadowy "emptiness" which 
Hazel Motes and young Tarwater try to fill up with their 
loud denials. The test of commitment is the word united 
in the a c t , and Motes and Tarwater must a c t , at the risk 
of their souls.
The task which Miss O ’Connor set for herself as 
an artist, then, was the creation of the mystery of human
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experience. She wanted her fiction to illuminate contempo­
rary history with perspective and depth both spiritually 
and artistically. In other words, she wished her fiction 
to be "prophetic"--and in her sense of the term this meant 
fiction which revealed "things close at hand" with all their 
mysterious "extensions" of meaning, through time and history 
to their ultimate source in the eternal dimension.
II.
Miss O'Connor's first novel. Wise Blood, bristles 
with all of the major motifs of the redemptive conception of 
history, and though successfully comic, it nevertheless 
suffers from a certain straining for effects. In the story 
of Hazel Motes she presented the quest of a "Christian maigre 
lui" for innocence and immunity from the past, guilt, and 
history, but the quest leads ironically to his final accep­
tance of the Fall and the need for redemption. The central 
action, then, is Hazel's constant encounters with the para­
dox of Christ, the "shadow" he tries with great integrity to 
escape, but this action is not always rendered with complete 
dramatic success. The action is at times episodic and trun­
cated, especially regarding minor characters like Enoch 
Emery and the false preacher Asa Hawks, and the story of 
Hazel Motes is told with such relentless persistence that 
it produces a single, rather strident tone throughout the 
novel. It is almost as though Miss O'Connor were pursuing 
her subject too directly, generating an overabundance of
I4l
dramatic energy which is not artistically measured and paced 
throughout the story. Furthermore, the language does not 
always create mystery !in the concrete in Wise Blood, a 
skill that was to become a mark of her maturer writings.
Hazel Motes begins his quest by repudiating his past 
history of sin, Christ, and redemption--the legacy of his 
believing mother and grandfather, a circuit preacher. His 
repudiation takes the form of a denial of "place," both 
physical and ontological. While in the army Hazel insists 
that he will return home after his discharge and mind his 
own business, but upon returning he finds his home abandoned; 
there is to be no safe retreat from the spiritual struggle 
with his destiny. As he rides the train to Taulkingham 
Hazel informs the Negro porter that "you can't go back" to 
a former place and condition. In his oifn case. Hazel's denial 
of his past place is a crucial part of his self-redemptive 
agnosticism, since to admit that past would be to acknowledge 
a link with the redemption preached by his mother and grand­
father. To avoid this he adopts a pure existentialism that 
in effect tries to deny history.
'Nothing outside you can give you any place,' he said.
'You needn't to look at the sky because its not going to 
open up and show no place behind it. You needn't to 
search for any hole in the ground to look through into 
somewhere else. You can't go neither forward nor back­
wards into your daddy's time nor your children's if you 
got them. In yourself right now is all the place you've
got. If there was any Fall, look there, if there was
any Redemption, look there, and if you expect any 
Judgment, look there, because they all three will have 
to be in your time and your body and where in your time
and your body can they be?
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'Where in your time and your body has Jesus redeemed 
you?' he cried. 'Show me where because I don't see the 
place. If there was a place where Jesus had redeemed 
you that would be the place for you to be, but which of 
you can find it?'^®
There is an important truth couched in Hazel's words, though 
at this point he is unaware of it. Hazel is reacting against 
those tepid, nominal "believers" who accept Christ's Redemp­
tion as only a historical event in the past and then ignore 
its immediate relevance in their present lives, characters
like the Mrs. Hitchcock he meets on the train. For Hazel,
the Fall and the Redemption must have concrete meaning in 
the present, and since he denies this, he goes to the oppo­
site extreme of denying connection with any historical- 
ontological "place" outside the present self. He is a modern 
"doubting Thomas," a pure existentialist who believes in 
"creating" his own identity through freedom of action in a 
present situation, but in fact he is haunted by the past at 
every turn of the road in his quest.
Hazel's goal is to escape the moral history of the
Fall and redeem himself by absolute fidelity to his own
personal integrity. Thus he denies the existence of the
soul and sin, for to admit the latter would be to acknowledge
implicitly the need for the grace of redemption.
'Listen, you people, I'm going to take the truth with 
me wherever I go,' Haze called. 'I'm going to preach 
it to whoever'11 listen at whatever place. I'm going
^^Flannery O'Connor, Wise Blood, in Three by Flannery 
0'Connor (New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 90.
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to preach there was no Fall because there was nothing 
to fall from and no Redemption because there was no 
Fall and no Judgment because there w asn’t the first two. 
Nothing matters but that Jesus was a liar.'^^
When his quest for self-redemption begins to falter in con­
tradiction, Hazel shifts to total nihilism, only to discover, 
ironically, that even to hold this stance with integrity 
requires the existence of an opposite belief to give validity 
to his denial. This is the reason for his obsession with 
the "blind" preacher Asa Hawks, and when Haze discovers that 
Hawks has not blinded himself in testimony to Jesus, his 
own non-belief--the "innocence" of his nihilism--is under­
mined as well.
Haze's integrity, then, derives from his desire for 
meaningful commitment to whatever position he takes--prefer- 
ably disbelief. The integrity of his fierce commitment is 
focused, significantly, in the union of word and act, even 
in his denial of Christianity. Throughout his progress 
Haze continually meets people whose verbal commitment to 
Christianity is separated from action: Mrs. Hitchcock, Asa
and Sabbath Lily Hawks, his landlady Mrs. Flood. His own 
"Church Without Christ" is based upon living out his denial, 
as opposed to the parody of belief he recognizes in Onnie 
Jay Holy's "Church of Christ Without Christ," which grafts 
the husk of nominal Christianity onto a false doctrine of 
salvation by "natural sweetness" (i.e. a belief in the
^^Ibid., p. 6 0.
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personal, innocence of "natural” man). Haze sees that the 
Prophet of Onnie Jay Holy's church, Solace Layfield, "ain't 
true," that his words do not match his actions; in fact, 
only after being run over by Haze's Essex does Layfield 
admit personal guilt and the falsity of his doctrine of 
innocence, and he dies asking God for forgiveness. For Hazel 
Motes, commitment must be totally consummated in action, a 
belief which leads ultimately to his own act of blinding.
Hazel Motes' attempted denial of the Fall and Redemp­
tion also includes a complete rejection of mystery. His self- 
proclaimed Church Without Christ is to be one in which all 
belief is "clear," where no one is obliged to accept what 
he "can't see." "He said it was not right to believe any­
thing you couldn't see or hold in your hands or test with 
your teeth. He said he only a few days ago believed in 
blasphemy as the way to salvation, but that you couldn't 
even believe in that because then you were believing in 
something to blaspheme." His denial of mystery is part of 
his attempt to repudiate the history of "unnamed guilt" he 
has inherited, for to admit that would be to acknowledge that 
he suffers the effects of a condition he inherited and which 
are therefore beyond his control--that is, the condition of 
original sin. Haze will not accept the mystery of the redemp­
tive process going on beyond him in time and space, with 
himself as part of it. Nevertheless, he is constantly faced 
with the presence of Christ in oblique ways throughout his
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progress: in the used car lot boy's habitual swearing
"Christ nailed," in Asa Hawks, and in the irreconcilable 
contradictions of his own agnosticism. Hints of the uni­
versal redemptive process at work mysteriously confront Haze 
wherever he goes. When he first arrives in Taulkingham, 
however, he is impervious to it. "His second night in 
Taulkingham, Hazel Motes walked along downtown close to the 
store fronts but not looking in them. The black sky was 
underpinned with long silver streaks that looked like scaf­
folding and depth on depth behind it were thousands of stars 
that all seemed to be moving slowlt as if they were about 
some vast construction work that involved the whole order of 
the universe and would take all time to complete." (Italics 
mine) Haze ignores this now, as he does the familiar "Jesus 
Saves" roadsigns he passes while trying to escape in the 
out-moded Essex, but by the end of the novel he has accepted 
his "place" in this cosmic process, and he dies, signifi­
cantly, near a construction site.
Throughout Wise Blood, the antithesis of the doc­
trine of the Fall and the need for Redemption is the idea 
of "natural man"; that is, of man being good in his "natural" 
state, and consequently without the need of supernatural 
grace. This idea is best depicted in Onnie Jay Holy's 
sentimental doctrine of "natural sweetness"--man originally 
innocent in childhood and "corrupted" by maturity (in direct 
opposition to the Christian doctrine of original sin, of
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course). "Natural" man is parodied throughout the novel in 
the pervasive animal imagery and especially in the moronic 
Enoch Emery, who acts mindlessly according to "his blood" 
and finally reverts to the natural state by donning the 
ape-suit. The concept of "blood knowledge," the instinctive 
"wisdom" which Enoch follows without thinking in his actions, 
is opposed to the higher, supernatural mystery of Christ's 
redemptive sacrifice of blood--a source of grace which acts 
as enlightenment and enables man to transcend the natural 
order and participate in the divine life. Though Haze can 
not accept this throughout most of the novel, he is wise 
enough to reject the reversion to the "natural" state sig­
nified by the shrunken "new-jesus" ape-man which Enoch wor­
ships. And finally, when Haze does come to accept the blood 
of Christ's Redemption and begin his oivn life of purifying 
penance, he informs Mrs. Flood that this is "natural" and 
"normal," the true condition of man.
The primary symbol of Haze Motes' unsuccessful quest 
for moral immunity is his outmoded Essex, and only when this 
means of physical locomotion is destroyed does he accept the 
inescapability of personal guilt. "No one with a good car 
needs to be justified," he has proclaimed, but when the Essex 
is demolished, the authentic "spiritual motion" of grace 
begins to operate. Paradoxically, the grace and "insight" 
Haze gains of personal evil and his place in redemption 
history leads to his act of physical blinding. Miss O'Connor
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invokes the classical analogue of Oedipus, but with a new
and greater meaning, since Haze's act of blinding is linked
12to the mysterious process of supernatural redemption. The
classical analogue is thus widened by the Christian, just as 
the natural concept of "blood knowledge" is widened by the 
mystery of Christ's redemplive blood. In blinding himself. 
Haze externally acknowledges (in the manner of a sacramental 
sign) his own "fall." "You have to pay," he tells the 
unseeing Mrs. Flood, whose "reasonable" mind cannot grasp the 
mystery of his penance. Thus in the end Haze comes to accept 
the very history preached by his grandfather and mother which 
he set out to repudiate at the beginning of the novel. He 
now sees and accepts his place in the eternal, beyond the 
immediate physical world, and it is this journey (which 
Mrs. Flood imagines as a journey to Bethlehem) that Haze is 
beginning when he is finally killed.
In most of the stories in her first collection, ^
Good Man Is Hard To Find, "nine stories about original sin" 
she called them, Miss O'Connor displayed a deeper and more 
subtle art of dramatic typology than in Wise Blood. The 
analogical dimensions of reality she was pursuing are rendered 
more skillfully; there is an increased use of classical 
mythology and Biblical analogues, literary and philosophical
12 In his introduction to Everything That Rises Must 
Converge, Robert Fitzgerald has indicated her reading of the 
Sophocles trilogy at this time.
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motifs. The short story form allowed for greater concen­
tration and impact; at the same time, she was developing 
greater precision in grounding the mysterious dimensions of 
meaning more organically in the concrete action. Thus while 
her essential vision of history remained unchanged, her art 
in representing it developed consistently. As she remarked 
to Robert Fitzgerald, ”I keep going deeper"--deeper, that 
is, into the mystery of her art and the faith that illuminated 
it.
In ”A Good Man Is Hard To Find," the Misfit resembles 
Hazel Motes in that he too cannot accept either the histori­
cal Christ or redemption outside himself. He is burdened 
by a consciousness of guilt which he cannot eradicate, but 
since he cannot accept Christ, the Incarnate Mystery who has 
"thown (sic) everything off balance," the Misfit tries to 
live by a rationalistic code of human "justice" (much like 
Thomas Sutpen and Jason Compson), where he can hold up the 
crime to the punishment and "balance out" his actions. But 
he is nevertheless aware of personal guilt beyond this, and 
since he refuses Jesus' "hep," he is forced to adopt the 
manichean position of unredeemable evil. "Ain't no pleasure 
but meanness." The Misfit accepts the Fall, but he cannot 
accept Redemption. "Jesus was the only One that ever raised 
the dead," the Misfit continued, "and He shouldn't have done 
it. He thown everything off balance." When the Grandmother 
suggests that perhaps Christ didn't raise the dead, the
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Misfit becomes the doubting Thomas who will not accept the 
historical fact of the redemption without proof, devoid of 
mystery. "I wasn't there so I can't say He didn't," the 
Misfit said. wisht I had of been there,' he said, hitting
the ground with his fist. 'It ain't right I wasn't there 
because if I had of been there I would of known.'"
The real mysterious action incarnated in the story,
however, is centered in the Grandmother. A nominal Christian,
/
she actually believes in a sentimental innocence ("goodness") 
which she identifies with the romantic past and gentility. 
History for her is the happy illusion of a time and place 
where people were "good," and by dissociation she tries to 
retreat into a glorified past through memory, away from moral 
involvement in the present. The "mistake" in her memory 
about the plantation brings about their fall. Her encounter 
with the Misfit shockingly returns her to her true place in 
the present, where she comes to acknowledge her complicity 
with a fallen humanity. Though the Grandmother's historical 
sense is warped, she nevertheless does possess "conscience." 
In contrast , her son Bailey and his family are modern secu­
larists who are impervious to time, history, the past, and 
the mysteries of the spiritual; they die without ever com­
prehending the meaning of their encounter with the Misfit.
The meeting with the Misfit immediately destroys the 
Grandmother's false innocence, a necessary prelude to her 
acceptance of her true identity in the present fallen world.
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This acceptance constitutes the central action of the story-- 
the motion of grace within her that erupts in the insight:
"Why you're one of my own babies!" The price she pays for 
this acknowledgment is life itself, for the Misfit, still 
violently refusing the bond of human complicity outside him­
self, reacts instantaneously by shooting her. Even in this 
violent renunciation, however, there is the glimmer of hope 
that a troubled conscience may ultimately lead him to admit 
the need for outside "hep." He concludes the episode with 
sour dissatisfaction and the abiding moral insight that "She 
would have been a good woman if it had been somebody there 
to shoot her every minute of her life."
While "A Good Man Is Hard To Find" depicts the 
state of false innocence and immunity largely in terms of 
the dissociation of time, "The Life You Save May Be Your 
Own" treats the same theme in terms of the dissociation of 
spirit and matter, the Manichean dichotomy. Mrs. Crater, 
the farm wife of the story, is a completely pragmatic mate­
rialist who sees her "place," her idiot daughter Lucynell, 
and the one-armed carpenter Mr. Shiftlet only as objects to 
be manipulated. She disavows any spiritual element in crea­
tion; when Shiftlet marvels at the glorious sunset, she 
remarks laconically that it "does it ever evening." Shiftlet, 
on the other hand, asserts the existence of mystery, particu­
larly the mystery of the incarnation of matter and spirit.
He tells her that an Atlanta physician who has operated on
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the human heart "don't know more about it that you or me." 
Shiftlet thus proclaims the ambiguity of good and evil in 
the human heart, hinting at his own mysterious character, 
which "shifts" as the story progresses from that of a poten­
tial Christ-figure--resurrecting the automobile, replenishing 
the farm, teaching the idiot to say "bird"— to that of a 
Satanic agent who undermines Mrs. Crater's haven of materi­
alistic "innocence."
Though he acknowledges the existence of mystery, 
Shiftlet does not really have faith in the actual, long- 
suffering incarnational process, in which matter and spirit 
interpenetrate. Faced with Mrs. Crater's intractable mate­
rialism, he reveals himself to be a Manichean questing for 
uncontaminated spirit, pure innocence dissociated from matter. 
When Mrs. Crater continually denies spirit by her scheming 
manipulations, Shiftlet turns to evil in revenge. He informs 
Mrs. Crater that he wants an "innocent" wife, but his mar­
riage to the idiot daughter Lucynell does not satisfy his 
desire for pure essence. He expresses the Manichean dichotomy 
succinctly: "The body, lady, is like a house: it don't go
anywhere; but the spirit, lady, is like a automobile: always
13on the mo v e , always."
^^The opposite theme— the incarnation of spirit and 
matter--is conveyed in "A Temple of the Holy Ghost," where 
the carnival hermaphrodite symbolizes the "grotesque" union 
of the physical and the divine. The freak proclaims that 
God has made him that way, and he honors God by accepting his 
condition without "dispute," an analogue of the Incarnation 
which the young girl in the story recognizes in the image of 
the sun as a blood-drenched Host at the end of the story.
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Shiftlet's ’’faith," then, is a sentimental, abstractly 
vague desire for innocence which does not suffer incarnation 
in a concrete situation. Its prime symbol is his nostalgic 
view of his "dear old mother" as an "angel of Gawd," an 
illusion which is rudely shattered by the mean, realistic 
hitchhiker who calls his mother a "stiniing pole cat." This
violent denial of "pure spirit" finally leads Shiftlet to the
)
manichean rejection of mattfer as evil. In the end he attempts 
to escape it by spatial movement in the car, like Hazel Motes. 
As he races toward Mobile under a threatening sky he asks 
God to break forth and wash the slime \from the "evil" world, 
a plea which presumes his own innocent detachment from it, 
of course. His position is much like that of Young Goodman 
Brown at the end of Hawthorne's tale; his token faith has 
been pulverized by concrete evil, and so he retreats to the 
opposite hardened extreme of viewing all the world as cor­
rupt .
That Miss O'Connor was concerned about false perspec­
tives on history, particularly the tendency toward romantic 
idealizing of the Southern past, and that she regarded this 
as a form of escapist search for moral immunity is evident 
from the comedies "A Late Encounter with the Enemy" and "The 
Partridge Festival." "A Late Encounter..." was perhaps 
partly intended to correct the inflated glorification of 
Southern past created by "Gone with the Wind" (particularly 
in the story's satire of the movie premiere), with its
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grandiose history of the Civil War packaged by Hollywood 
image-makers. But beneath that level, there is a deeper 
concern with the spiritual malaise of the dissociation of 
past from present,, and how it affects the ontological rela­
tionship between time, history, suffering, and true identity. 
Once again, it is human pride which causes man to detach 
himself in an idealized way from the harsh, limiting reali­
ties of time and concrete historical process.
General Poker Sash, a one-hundred-and-four year old 
Civil War veteran, does not "have any use for history because 
he never expected to meet it again." He ignores the past of 
suffering and personal guilt in favor of a timeless, adoles­
cent basking in the present. "The past and the future were 
the same thing to him, one forgotten and the other not remem­
bered; he had no more notion of dying than a cat." He pre­
fers movie premieres with "pretty guls" to processions 
because the latter are connected with history and the past. 
But the price of his detachment (his "dead" feet do not 
touch ground) from history is a loss of a sense of reality, 
of true identity and place: he cannot remember any of his
actual career in the Civil War, he cannot recall anything 
concrete about his family, and he allows himself to be "made" 
into a General by his granddaughter, though in fact he was 
only an infantryman in the war. His granddaughter Sally 
Poker is herself draivn toward romanticizing an idealized 
past against a crass modern world; General Sash is the
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abstract symbol of "what was behind her." She manipulates 
him to feed "her own prideful illusion. Ironically, it is 
her plan to use him at her graduation as evidence of her 
"heritage" which brings about General Sash's harrowing 
encounter with the realities of time and history he has 
avoided.
General Sash's attempted escape from the "dead past,"
from history and the ontological relationship between past and
present, is destroyed when the graduation speaker begins.
History rises up to assert its living reality in the present,
and it is through the mysterious power of language that
General Sash is forced to acknowledge it.
The words began to come toward him and he said. Dammit!
1 ain't going to have it! and he started edging backward 
to get out of the way...He couldn't protect himself from 
the words and attend to the procession too and the words 
were coming at him fast. He felt that he was running 
backwards and the words were coming at him like musket 
fire, just escaping him but getting nearer and nearer.
He turned around and began to run as fast as he could 
but he found himself running toward the words. He was 
running into a regular volley of them and meeting them 
with quick curses. As the music swelled toward him, the 
entire past opened up on him out of nowhere and he felt 
his body riddled in a hundred places with sharp stabs of 
pain and he fell do^vn, returning a curse for every hit.
He saw his wife's narrow face looking at him critically 
through her round gold-rimmed glasses; he saw one of his 
squinting bald-headed sons ; and his mother ran toward 
him with an anxious look; then a succession of places-- 
Chickamauga, Shiloh, Marthasville--rushed at him as if 
the past were the only future now and he had to endure 
it. Then suddenly he saw that the black procession was 
almost on him. He recognized it, for it had been dogging 
all his days. He made such a desperate effort to see 
over it and find out what comes after the past that his 
hand clenched the sword until the blade touched bone.^4
^^Three by Flannery 0'Connor, p . 241.
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In short, all of the concrete realities of history he has 
e’5caped--suffering, memory of the past, his true identity, 
place, death, and language as a "living" incarnation of truth 
--rise up to make their claim upon General Sash, and he is 
overwhelmed and dies in a final desperate attempt to escape 
history.
Miss O'Connor's treatment of history in "A Late 
Encounter with the Enemy" places the Southern experience 
directly in the foreground. This is not the case in "A 
Circle in the Fire," which in many ways can be seen as a 
prototype of her complex typological vision of the modern 
situation. The story is based upon the Old Testament analogue 
of the three prophets cast into the pit of fire by King 
Nebuchadnezzar, but this analogue is widened to the point 
of mystery by her Christian, post-Redemption point of view.
As a result, the story becomes a true "continuing revela­
tion": modern experience is "informed" by analogical ties
that link together Old Testament history, the redemption by 
Christ, and at the .ame time point anagogically forward to 
the apocalypse of death and final judgment.
As in many O'Connor stories, the protagonist Mrs. Cope 
is a typical modernist who has created a private, self-enclosed 
"kingdom" on her farm. Like Nebuchadnezzar she is idolatrously 
materialistic; she wages a constant battle to obliterate evil 
from experience, and to immunize herself and her daughter 
from the universal history of suffering, represented by
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experience outside the farm. She speaks often with pietis- 
tic fervor of the poor, suffering Europeans, but that this 
is only a sentimental verbal gesture is borne out by her 
actual self-exclusion from the larger human community out­
side. Her "wall" against the ambiguous world outside, 
against the process of history and the threatening knowledge 
that she is not morally self-sufficient, is her fortress 
line of trees. Typologically, the story depicts the neces­
sary destruction of this false, protective "kingdom" of 
innocence which she has created before Mrs. Cope can truly 
feel the human condition of derpivation and limitation.
When this illusion of self-sufficiency is destroyed, she is 
implicitly united to universal humanity in its need for 
redemption. Loss of innocence through violence is the spiri­
tual motion of the story that provides her with this beginning 
"grace" of knowledge.
Mrs. Cope's farm, then, is a physical embodiment of 
a false ontological place— an isolated Eden— and her belief 
in innocence is reflected also in her protective attitude 
toward her daughter Sally Virginia. She does not want the 
child to "confront" the three destroyers from the outside 
world--the city, yet it is through Sally Virginia's eyes 
that the final insight of the story is presented, suggesting 
her moral initiation. The three boys--Powell, Garfield, and 
Harper--have also come back to the farm in search of the 
lost "state of innocence," seen particularly in Powell's
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nostalgia about his earlier life there. Initially, the farm 
represents for them that longed-for time and place before 
the Fall; yet they are also conscious of the Fall and its 
irrevocable effects. Powell has experienced evil in the 
outside world, the "development," and with this knowledge 
burnt into him, he sees now that a return to innocence is 
impossible, that Mrs. Cope's evil-excluding "kingdom" is 
false and unhuman, and that it must be destroyed. "If 
this place was not here anymore," he said, "you would never 
have to think of it anymore." The false lust for innocence 
must be shattered to attain more "balanced" moral vision and 
make moral growth possible.
Through the analogical action, then, the story actu­
ally creates the mystery of the role of evil in the divine
plan of redemption. Powell and his two friends are agents
of destruction, but at the same time divine scourges who, 
like the prophets, bring wrathful vengeance against the 
Nebuchadnezzer-like Mrs. Cope, idolatrously fixated in her 
belief that she owns and rules the material world ("her 
woods"). And of course her belief implies her own power of 
self-redemption and ability to "cope" with evil without 
divine grace. In disrupting her kingdom, then, the three
boys also destroy her false sense of moral immunity from
fallen mankind, and she is forced to see her true place in 
the larger community of universal suffering humanity, dis­
possessed of Eden and longing for redemption. The "grace"
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of violence, paradoxically, brings about a purging of her 
belief in self-salvation. When her woods burn at the end 
of the story, Mrs. Cope is rudely united with the reality 
of history she has desperately tried to escape. "The child 
came to a stop beside her mother and stared up at her face 
as if she had never seen it before. It was the face of the 
new misery she felt, but on her mother it looked old and it 
looked as if it might have belonged to anybody, a Negro or 
a European or to Powell himself."
The theme of displacement is the focal point of one 
of Miss O'Connor's most complex typological allegories of 
history— "The Displaced Person." Literally a story of the 
modern South, the tale brilliantly telescopes classical 
pagan and Christian redemptive analogues to depict a com­
pelling drama of the universal struggle of the fall and 
redemption. As in "A Circle in the Fire," the farm run by 
Mrs, McIntyre and her employee Mrs. Shortley is an idolatrous 
kingdom of materialism, a false Eden which is self-enclosed 
against the ambiguity and guilt of history and the true human 
condition. The authentic human condition--falien yet re­
deemed— is identified in the story with Europe (as opposed 
to their American innocence), which Mrs. Shortley sees as 
"evil," "the devil's experiment station," a view epitomized 
by her vision of a war newsreel showing European bodies 
heaped in piles. Mrs. Shortley's view, of course, implies 
her own self-righteous innocence; indeed, she sees herself
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as a hovering "angel" chosen to save the Negroes from the 
corruption of the Polish family. Only in death is this 
false vision of herself apocalyptically destroyed, when her 
true identity and place is revealed to her.
Viewed ontologically, then, Mrs. McIntyre's farm is 
a haven of immunity from history, one in which she is the 
ruling deity who controls matters by the rigorous efforts 
of her own will. She is practical and apparently self- 
sufficient— in short, a "self-redeemer." Her true condition, 
however, like Mrs. Shortley's, is one of sterile fixity and 
moral blindness to history, and the arrival of the displaced 
person Mr. Guizac brings the possibility of a new openness, 
growth, and redemptive grace, of acknowledging their link 
with history— in other words, of Clirist. But this can only 
occur after a disruption of their self-sufficient kingdom, 
and when faced with this possibility, Mrs. McIntyre reacts 
with violence to "preserve" her ordered place.
In Part I of the story, centered on Mrs. Shortley,
Miss O'Connor develops the typological structure that makes 
the story a universal vision of human history. In the 
opening scene Mrs. Shortley is identified with the pagan 
goddess Hera, the "giant wife of the countryside," who, we 
recall, was outwitted by Europa for the love of Zeus. The 
"outwitting" suggests the Guizac's displacement of the 
Shortleys as workers on the farm, and perhaps typologically 
the partial or temporary "displacement" of pagan idolatry 
by redemptive Christianity. At any rate, they are established
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as antagonistic, contending visions of history. Mrs. Shortley 
is also stalked throughout the story by a peacock, a complex 
symbol which to Mrs. McIntyre and Mrs. Shortley’s material­
istic eyes represents just another "peachicken" to be fed, 
but which to the priest is a symbol of Christ and the Trans­
figuration of the material world by the spiritual, and thus 
linked to the transforming "presence" of Mr. Guizac. The 
farm, then, is an analogue of classical paganism, but in 
its modernist form of secular materialism, denying the need 
for Christas redemption. Mrs. McIntyre speaks of the dis­
placed person Guizac as her "salvation," but she is referring 
only to his practical economic value. Part I of the story 
depicts the gradual displacement of Mrs. Shortley from her 
illusions of personal innocence and self-sufficiency (she 
feels that religion is necessary for those people not smart 
enough to avoid evil), and with that displacement her bond 
with fallen humanity is revealed to her. This is the "true 
country" whose frontiers she sees only at the moment of 
death, after being symbolically "linked" with the heaped 
bodies in the newsreel of European history. She achieves 
this moment of grace--and the insight is a perception of 
her place in history--when she begins to violently disrupt 
the car during their departure, "clutching everything she 
could get her hands on and hugging it to herself, Mr. 
Shortley's head, Sarah Mae's leg, the cat, a wad of white 
bedding, her own big moon-like knee...." Displaced from
I6l
the farm by the Guizacs, Mrs. Shortley in death sees that 
she is not "above" history goddess-like, but one of all 
mankind, suffering the essential displacement from that 
spiritual kingdom that can only be gained through faith in 
Christ’s redemption.
As Part I of the story depicts Mrs. Shortley's recog­
nition of her true place. Part II shows a contrary analogi­
cal movement--the violent and sacrificial "displacement" of 
Christ-Guizac from Mrs. McIntyre's secular world, where he 
is "extra," a "DP" who has upset her order and control.
The Guizacs' arrival from "guilty" Europe links Mrs. McIntyre 
with true universal history; he brings with him the redemp­
tive possibility for destruction of false, self-enclosed 
innocence. She has hired him for strictly material benefits, 
and unlike the Shortleys he is an "advanced" worker with 
technical proficiency. However, like Christ, Guizac upsets 
the order of "her" place by planning a marriage between a 
cousin in Poland and one of the Negroes. This act is so 
"advanced" it threatens to undermine her control of the 
Negroes, and ironically, it is an act which suggests a 
truly universal Christian concept of the community of men, 
one that might possibly advance the redemptive process. But 
Mrs. McIntyre cannot abide this threatening "opening" in
A similar displacement occurs in "A Temple of the 
Holy Ghost," when at the end of the story the hermaphrodite- 
Christ figure is driven out of town by the "righteous" com­
munity.
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her kingdom; instead, she chooses moral retrenchment by- 
trying to withdraw into immunity behind her self-willed 
"order."
Guizac*s crucifixion by death under the tractor 
ostensibly restores Mrs. McIntyre's control of her ordered 
kingdom, but in fact, her complicity in his death destroys 
forever her false sense of innocence by placing her in the 
condition of guilt, her true condition. Now she is person­
ally and irrevocably linked to history, just as Mrs. Shortley 
was just before her death, for in the moment of Guizac's 
death her eyes and Mr. Shortley's and the Negro's "come 
together in one look that froze them in collusion together..." 
She too is united with the poor, the suffering, and the dis­
placed in history, and the ravages of guilt Mrs. McIntyre 
now experiences are seen in the gradual demise of her "king­
dom" and in her oim declining health. She has been displaced 
from her material Eden, but still she does not acknowledge 
the need for redemption. Yet the possibility of repentance 
and acceptance of grace remains in her demolished world, for 
in the end there is still the beautiful peacock and Fr. Flynn, 
who comes every week to explain the doctrines of Christianity 
to her.
In what Miss O'Connor considered her best story,
"The Artificial Nigger," the pride of self-redemption ex­
hibited in Mrs. McIntyre takes the form of intellectual 
rationalism and the attempt to deny mystery in Mr. Head.
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But unlike Mrs. McIntyre, Mr. Head completely accepts his 
"fall” and the grace of mercy that is finally bestowed upon 
him. He has come to the big city confident that he is 
morally capable of directing his grandson Nelson's initiation 
into the knowledge of evil, but the experience becomes an 
initiation for Mr. Head himself, one that destroys his ration­
alistic pride. This "development" is treated in such a way 
by Miss O'Connor as to suggest the universal spiritual life 
of man. At every step the action is linked to the Old 
Testament analogue of the story of Tobias--who cured his 
father's blindness after a trip to the city of Rages, much 
as Mr. Head's blindness is cured; and most importantly, 
linked to the complex analogue of Dante's Divine Comedy.
Thus Mr. Head and Nelson's trip is a journey through the 
Inferno and Purgatorio toward the Earthly Paradise, and as 
in the Divine Comedy, the figure of natural man reliant only 
on natural wisdom (Vergil-Mr. Head) must finally be led by 
divine direction--grace (Dante-Nelson, and the "artificial 
nigger") in order to transcend the natural state and arrive 
at spiritual salvation. Miss O'Connor's working out of the 
allegory is not this schematic; these analogical dimensions 
nevertheless serve to deepen the mystery of the redemptive 
process.
At the beginning of the story Mr. Head thinks himself 
"equal to" the task of the' journey; in short, he suffers 
from the prideful rationalism (suggested by his name) that
l6k
denies mystery, particularly the concrete mystery of evil 
and suffering in redemption, a condition he comes to accept 
as a mystery in the presence of the "artificial nigger.”
The truth of the matter is that Mr. Head suffers spiritually 
from manichean dissociation, suggested in several ways 
throughout the story. First of all, his existence in the 
country topologically suggests a state of moral self- 
righteousness , blind belief in personal innocence, and 
immunity; in contrast, the city represents the actual fallen 
condition (Nelson wisely asserts that he was born there), 
that state which Mr. Head has spiritually denied for himself. 
Secondly, Mr. Head dissociates from the real, concrete mys­
teries of existence by intellectual abstracting: seen par­
ticularly in his fearful "arms-length" approach to the city 
and the Negro, as on the train when he remarks righteously 
concerning Negroes that "they rope them off." Thirdly,
Mr. Head suffers the dissociation of intellect from instinct 
and the concrete physical, revealed in his shock at seeing 
the half-dressed woman in the apartment window, and espe­
cially in his refusal to encounter the large black woman who 
gives Nelson directions when they are lost. In addition,
Mr. Head's manicheanism is evidenced by his view of the city 
as Hell, whereas Nelson views it as Purgatory, a painful 
place, but one where a person is not doomed to failure if he 
seeks help (grace), as he does in asking the Negro woman
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for directions.
The slow, painful process of the journey--their 
getting lost, their "fall" due to mutual pride--brings both 
Mr. Head and Nelson to a recognition and acceptance of their 
mutual dependence, not simply upon each other, but upon the 
mysterious forces of redemptive grace which covers all human 
suffering and loss. Mr. Head and Nelson are united as uni­
versal man in his fallen, real condition, a condition they 
recognize in the symbol of mystery in the story— the artifi­
cial nigger. The "artificial: statue in the all-white suburb 
is like Mr. Head's abstracting and "roping off" of the Negroes 
earlier on the train, but now he and Nelson recognize their 
true link with the condition of misery and limitation, which 
their recent experience of betrayal brought home to them.
With this recognition, Mr. Head now can accept the "grace" 
of insight of seeing his true identity in an eternal perspec­
tive, one that fully illuminates the fall and redemption 
and divine mercy.
Mr. Head stood very still and felt the action of 
mercy touch him again but this time he knew that there 
were no words in the world that could name it. He 
understood that it grew out of agony, which is not denied 
to any man and which is given in strange ways to chil­
dren. He understood it was all a man could carry into 
death to give his Maker and he suddenly burned with shame
Similar forms of Manichean dissociation are evident 
in Mr. Shiftlet in "The Life You Save May Be Your Own" and 
Hulga in "Good Country People." It indicates, of course,
Mr. Head's attempt to "preserve" what he envisions as a 
state of personal innocence.
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that he had so little of it to take with him. He stood 
appalled, judging himself with the thoroughness of God, 
while the action of mercy covered his pride like a 
flame and consumed it. He had never thought himself a 
great sinner before but he saw now that his true depravity 
had been hidden from him lest it cause him despair. He 
realized that he was forgiven for sins from the beginning 
of time, when he had conceived in his own heart the sin 
of Adam, until the present, when he had denied poor 
Nelson. He saw that no sin was too monstrous for him 
to claim as his own, and since God loved in proportion 
as He forgave, he felt ready at that instant to enter 
Paradise. 7
Miss O'Connor's increasing skill in using the ana­
logical method to create a complicated vision of redemption 
history is perhaps best exemplified in "Greenleaf." In this 
story the analogue of redemption is set in opposition to 
that of secular materialism and insular moral "innocence," 
as in "The Displaced Person," but here the framework of 
Christian and classical typology is dramatized in a unique 
way. The Mrs. May of "Greenleaf" is at once recognized as 
the modernist who struggles to keep her insular domain--her 
place— intact against the forces which threaten to disrupt 
it. Typologically, she is linked with the pagan goddess 
Hera, with her herd of "sacred" cows, now being threatened 
by the Greenleafs "scrub" bull. In addition, she exhibits 
the appolonian traits of rigid order and control by force 
of will; in contrast, the bull and the Greenleafs, as their 
name suggests , represent those dionysian forces of vegeta­
tion, fertility, change and creativity which finally defeat
^^Three by Flannery 0'Connor, pp. 213-14.
167
her. Like the displaced person--like Christ--the Greenleafs 
bull makes everything "off balance"— upsetting the "old 
order" as the Redeemer did by His Incarnation. The classi­
cal analogues of Hera and dionysianism are deepened by 
Christian typology, the redemptive vision of thd New Testa­
ment. Initially the uncontrollable bull is associated with 
Zeus, with a possible parallel of his "seduction" of Mrs.
May to Zeus' seduction of Europa, disguised as a bull. But 
as a "suitor" the bull is also clearly linked to Christ, with 
his "wreathed" horns in the opening scene, so that the 
classical analogue is transformed to the redemptive one of 
Christ the "lover" trying to violently upset and penetrate 
Mrs. May's false order and idolatrous control.
The fact that the bull belongs to the Greenleafs, 
and the subsequent action of the story, presents analogically 
a profound universal vision of history. The Greenleafs in 
microcosm show the "rise" of those who openly involve them­
selves creatively in the process of history, the forces of 
change and true progress, which Mrs. May is trying to pre­
serve her farm from. Mrs. Greenleaf indulges in what seem 
to be pagan, vegetal prayer-healings in the woods, but she 
has redemptive vision in recognizing the power of evil and 
asking for "Jesus, Jesus." Mrs. May, on the other hand, 
rejects this vital religion in Mrs. Greenleaf as being 
"unreasonable" and unrespectable, but as she encounters her 
in the woods, the connection between the erupting forces
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represented by the bull and Christ is clearly made, for 
Mrs. May feels "as if some violent unleashed force had 
broken out of the ground and was charging toward her."
In contrast to Mrs. May's stagnant attempts to hold 
the line against the decay of her farm, the Greenleafs have 
"advanced" by their immersion in history. Both boys served 
in Europe during World War II, both have married French 
women, both have profited by change and "openness" so that 
their farm is more progressive than Mrs. May's. In con­
trast, her two sons, who have not "gone outside" their local 
world, are unmarried and spiritually sterile, cynically 
detached from their mother's affairs. What we are clearly 
presented with, then, typologically, is an opposition of 
historical views--the one self-enclosed, spiritually sterile, 
and auguring of false innocence (Mrs. May attempts to keep 
her place "pure" of scrub bulls and Greenleafs), the other 
open and creative, subject to violent forces of change, yet 
associated with Christ in the universal process of communal 
redemption. It is this force of genuine union which Mrs.
May attempts to stifle and deny, but in death she is vio­
lently brought to recognize it. The bull, like Christ, has 
"upset the balance" of nature— the natural order of the 
world. This is the mystery of change (including the mystery 
of violence and "evil") which Mrs. May repudiates by trying 
to "control" it willfully, until her death. Then, after the
bull has gored her "like a wild tormented lover," she "con­
tinued to stare straight ahead but the entire scene in front
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of her had changed--the tree line was a dark wound in a 
world that was nothing but sky--and she had the look of a 
person whose sight has been suddenly restored but who finds 
the light unbearable."
In her introduction to ^  Memory of Mary Ann, Miss 
O'Connor explicitly attacked the "Aylmers" of the modern 
world--characters like Mrs. May, Mrs. McIntyre, and Rayber-- 
who in trying to "contain" or eliminate evil are guilty of 
attempting to reduce spiritual mystery. To "eliminate" 
evil, she affirmed, is to cut down on the possibility of 
redemption and moral growth, the "good under construction" 
in the divine plan, and this impulse tends to lead, para­
doxically, only to further evil and destruction. Such is 
the case in "A View of the Woods," where the modernist old 
Mr. Fortune identifies himself with "progress" in an attempt 
to order the good of the future by cutting down the forces 
of mystery. Specifically, he intends to sell the lot in 
front of his son-in-law Pitts' house as a site for a future 
gas station, which would obscure their "view of the woods"-- 
the symbol of the mysterious ambiguity of good and evil and 
growth, seen particularly in the final death scene in the 
woods. To Mr. Fortune, however, "a pine trunk is a pine 
trunk"; that is, his view of reality is purely materialistic, 
something to be manipulated without concern for its spiritual
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18significance,
The conflict between the mysterious vision of reality 
and the pragmatic-reductionist centers in Mr. Fortune's grand­
daughter Mary Fortune Pitts. To the old man she is a "for­
tune," a "perfect" child, and an "angel"; that is, he believes 
in and sees only her innocence. Her supposed innocence, of 
course, is simply a projection of his own, and the sentimental- 
nostalgic basis for this belief is revealed by the fact that 
he identifies "innocence" with his mother, like another dual­
ist, Shiftlet. Mr. Fortune intends to guarantee the future 
by leaving his money and lands to his granddaughter, and 
the "future" he tries to order really betokens his own 
desire for childhood innocence, without ambiguity, since he 
is determined to reduce his granddaughter to "pure" Fortune. 
However, she is also a "Pitts"--marked with imperfection.
The essential mystery of her character is demonstrated by 
the fact that she submits naturally to her father's whippings 
in the woods, which are punishment for her pride (the "for­
tune" in her). However, since he sees only her "pure" 
goodness, her submission to her father is inexplicable to 
old Mr. Fortune, an "ugly mystery," the "one flaw" in her 
character. Consequently, when he tries to punish her in
l8His view is opposed to the sacramental view of 
reality, the view that matter is spiritualized. Thus the 
pragmatic materialists are also spiritual reductionists, 
trying to reduce things and acts to a strictly practical 
level, denying mystery.
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the woods, after her defiance against him for selling the
"view of the woods," she resists violently. Since he has
believed, dualistically, only in her as "pure” Fortune,
denying the mystery of evil, she now asserts herself as
"pure" Pitts— the eruption of evil caused, paradoxically,
by his attempt to reduce and deny it. And it is also the
evil in himself, long denied, which he now confronts, for
he sees "his own image" in the kicking, screaming child.
Ironically, in killing the child he has also destroyed the
future, for though he declares "There's not an ounce of
Pitts in me," he is now faced with his o\m. evil act, his
19heart failing— alone in the woods.
Though old Mr. Fortune is destructive, he neverthe­
less can and does act. In many of Miss O'Connor's stories, 
the particular malaise of dissociation characterized by 
rationalism and intellectualisin brings with it an inability 
to act meaningfully "in the world." It is exemplified by 
characters like Hulga in "Good Country People," Tom in "The 
Comforts of Home," Rayber, the son Julian in "Everything 
That Rises Must Converge," and Asbury Fox in "The Enduring 
Chill." Male characters seem to suffer from it especially. 
For these characters the mind is a separated "place" they
19The murder of the child here--of ambiguity--like 
Tarwater's drowning of Bishop or Joe Christmas' violence, 
is of course an attempt to absolve oneself from mystery, 
from lived ambiguity. This Aylmer-impulse implies personal 
innocence and self-redemption.
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have constructed from which to view the world abstractly, 
a shell of "innocence" which is as real for them as the 
physical shell of innocence that Mrs. McIntyre and Mrs. Cope 
try to build on their farms. "Mind" for them is a private 
kingdom of immunity, a condition of idealized isolation from 
the concrete community; intellectualism is their way of 
self-redemption. But in fact their condition constitutes 
another and more subtle type of manicheanism--of "mind" 
separated from the world, of idea separated from factuality, 
and of intellectual formula set up in opposition to living, 
concrete mystery. And it is a condition of spiritual sterility 
and impotence; these characters find it difficult to break 
out of the circle of abstraction to act with a totally unified 
being "in the world." There is an inner division of self, 
of mind separated from will, a kind of interior displacement 
in which they are cut off from their own roots of active, 
creative existence in the world. \fhat each must undergo is 
"the fall," a destruction of the wall of rationalism, some­
thing which can reunite them with themselves and with the 
concrete world. The "fall" involves a violent destruction 
of their abstract, isolated mental "world"--Hulga's loss of 
her wooden leg, her "crutch" of intellectual nihilism--but 
it also opens them to grace if they will accept it, which in 
most of these cases means to accept their true "place" in the 
world as a fallen creature. Some, like Rayber, refuse to 
fall, and though for others the loss of their intellectual
173
innocence is painful, they are redeemed from their own 
divisive, destructive rationalism and restored to their own 
true roots of being, cleansed of illusion. This movement of 
grace is perhaps best represented by "The Enduring Chill."
Asbury Fox, a failure intellectual aesthete, has 
returned home, he believes, "to die," having relinquished a 
life in New York where he has unsuccessfully tried to become 
a writer. Physically ill, he is also stricken with despair 
over his failures, but in fact he is romantically enamored 
with both his spiritual despair and the death he believes 
will soon overtake him. His concept of his condition-- 
physical and spiritual--is the abstract mental "shell" into 
which he self-indulgently and innocently retreats from the 
concrete and common levels of human existence. The "common" 
in the story is identified with his mother, whom he blames 
for his own failure and whom he now plans to "enlighten" with 
a vicious post-mortem letter (his only act of "creative" 
writing) blaming her; the "common" is also represented by 
the persistent Dr. Block, whom Asbury regards as a simple- 
minded country fool. Asbury also detests the mundane 
affairs of his mother's farm, and the comic irony of his 
"fall" is underscored in the fact that he suffers from undu- 
lant fever, "like Bangs in a cow." Asbury's abstract intel- 
lectualisni is particularly demonstrated by his "cultivated" 
spiritual interests: he asks to speak to a Jesuit while
bedridden because he desires an intellectual priest with
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whom he can discuss abstract concepts like the "New Man" 
and "the myth of the dying God." What he gets, ironically, 
is the gruff, blunt, earthy Fr, Finn, who scolds him for 
laziness, for self-pity, and for neglecting his prayers, 
and who informs him that he must ask God humbly to send the 
Holy Ghost. The final shattering of Asbury*s intellectual 
innocence comes with Dr. Block's discovery of the fact and 
the mystery of his malady--a fever recurrent but not fatal-- 
for now the romantic illusion of his own "death" is destroyed. 
With this discovery Asbury is "brought down" to reality, 
and forced to see his own self-inflated egotism. His is to 
be the common lot of lingering imperfection, an "enduring 
chill," not escape or release from mystery through a self­
glorified death. The "grace" of this shattering insight comes 
in the descent of the Holy Ghost, a true intellectual illumina­
tion that reveals his condition to him. In accepting this 
common human lot, Asbury sees with terrifying clarity the 
"new life" opening to him.
The old life in him was exhausted. He awaited the coming 
of the new. It was then that he felt the beginning of 
a chill, a chill so peculiar, so light, that it was like 
a warm ripple across a deeper sea of cold. His breath 
came short. The fierce bird which through the years of 
his childhood and the days of his illness had been poised 
over his head, waiting mysteriously, appeared all at 
once to be in motion. Asbury blanched and the last film 
of illusion was borne as if by a worldwind from his eyes.
He saw that for the rest of his days, frail, racked, but 
enduring, he would live in the face of a purifying terror.
A feeble cry, a last impossible protest escaped him.
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But the Holy Ghost, emblazoned in ice instead of fire, 
continued, implacably, to descend.
In Miss O'Connor's second novel, The Violent Bear It
Away, the contending visions of history--Christian and
secular modernist-~are dramatically embodied as opposing
forces in the spiritual growth of young Francis Marion Tar- 
21water. The legacy left by his great-uncle Mason Tarwater, 
a backwoods prophet, is belief in the Fall and the redemp­
tion by Christ, belief in the mystery of personality, human 
freedom, and grace, and the strong sense that he must answer 
God's call to his personal mission as a prophet, to begin 
with the baptism of the idiot Bishop. In contrast to old 
Tarwater, the schoolteacher Rayber embodies rational secu­
larism. He rejects Christ's redemption in favor of self­
redemption by intellectual control of "compulsions" (violent, 
irrational love); he regards baptism as a meaningless act 
in a world whose "irrationality" can only be transcended by 
intellect; he is the enemy of mystery, freedom, and grace, 
for as old Tarwater says, "He don't know its anything he can't 
know." Rayber's animosity to living mystery is seen espe­
cially in his attempt to reduce old Tarwater to a "type" by 
psychological analysis, to "correct" young Tarwater's
^®Flannery O'Connor, Everything That Rises Must Con­
verge (New York; Signet Books~j 196? ) , p. 110. Miss O'Connor's 
story is obviously indebted to Flaubert's "A Simple Heart."
21similar opposing visions operate in "The Lame Shall 
Enter First." Sheppard is the apostle of secularism, while 
Johnson (son of John) believes only Jesus can redeem him.
Unlike Tarwater, however, Johnson freely acknowledges "the 
devil" in himself, and will not permit his "evil"--lameness-- 
to be "straightened" by the modernist Sheppard.
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aberrant personality traits (i.e. to eliminate "evil" in 
him), and to rationally control the spontaneous movements 
of the spirit both within himself and young Tarwater. For 
Rayber himself loves both old Tarwater and Bishop, a love 
which to him is the "seed" of irrationality he struggles 
desperately to control. Thus as in The Sound and the Fury, 
the touchstone of spiritual vision in the novel becomes the 
idiot, Bishop. To Rayber he is "an X signifying the general 
hideousness of Fate," a living exemplum of the irrational 
mystery of existence, with its implicit demands of love and 
faith, forces he must control against violent outbreak. To 
Mason Tarwater Bishop is a divine soul, "precious in the 
sight of the Lord," one who embodies the mystery of irra­
tionality in God's divine plan and who therefore "counts"—  
in need of redeeming baptism like any other creature. The 
baptism of Bishop, then, is the focal point for young 
Tarwater's struggle between the contending "visions" of 
Rayber and old Tarwater, a struggle which dramatizes the 
real mystery of his spiritual growth.
Each of the major themes of the Christian historical 
vision— and their refracted counterthemes— is present in 
The Violent Bear It Away, but the heart of the novel's drama, 
depicted brilliantly, is the mystery of the Word and the 
Act. And fittingly so, since this is the heart of Christ's 
Incarnation. Young Tarwater's vocation, transmitted by his 
great-uncle, is to become a Christian prophet, and this
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identity is the mysterious union of word and act which he 
finally comes to accept as part of his own struggle with 
redemptive freedom. Old Mason Tarwater has both the word 
of divine truth and the power to "act," whereas Rayber, 
whom old Tarwater accuses of trying to reduce him to the 
"dead words" of a magazine article, continually fails to 
"take action" throughout the novel. Frozen in spiritual 
impotency, Rayber failed to rescue young Tarwater from his 
great-uncle, and again failed in his attempt to drown Bishop; 
in contrast, old Tarwater always has the strength to "carry 
out" his vision with deeds. In effect, old Tarwater is the 
analogue of the concrete, mysterious union of word and act, 
whereas Rayber shows the opposite condition of dissociation, 
filled with the "dead words" of analysis, but severed from 
any spiritual source of action.
This form of dissociation also plagues young Tarwater 
throughout the novel, a condition that is concretely sug­
gested by the "stranger's voice" which begins within him 
after old Tarwater's death, a voice of "reason" linked with 
Rayber and the homosexual seducer of Tarwater later in the 
novel. The conflict of "voices" within him— old Tarwater's 
and the rational--underscores the divisiveness in young 
Tarwater's identity early in the novel, nxs wavering in the 
struggle to resolve the tension of word and act. Before the 
death of his great-uncle he did want to become a prophet, 
but his notion of this role was "dis-incarnated," abstract.
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romantic, and idealized. He wants the power of miracles,
but not "the sweat and stink of the cross." His manicheanism
at this point is reflected by a word-spirit "split."
He tried when possible to pass over these thoughts, to 
keep his vision located on an even level, to see no more 
than what was in front of his face and to let his eyes 
stop at the surface of that. It was as if he were afraid 
that if he let his eye rest for an instant longer than 
was needed to place something--a spade, a hoe, the mule's 
hind quarters before his plow, the red furrow under him-- 
that the thing would suddenly stand before him, strange 
and terrifying, demanding that he name it and name it 
justly and be judged for the name he gave it. He did 
all he could to avoid this threatened intimacy of crea­
tion. When the Lord's call came, he wished it to be a 
voice from out of a clear and empty sky, the trumpet of 
the Lord God Almighty, untouched by any fleshy hand or 
breath. (Italics mine ) 2"2 ~
Tarwater's romantic vision of the prophet's role, seen here,
is destroyed forever when he first meets the idiot Bishop;
he is given the revelation of his mission to baptize the
idiot, and then sees "his own stricken image of himself,
trudging into the distance in the bleeding stinking mad
shadow of Jesus, until at last he received his reward, a
broken fish, a multiplied loaf."
Throughout much of the novel, Tarwater tries to 
silence the voice of true conscience within him by denying 
the "Word" of his great-uncle's legacy. In reaction against 
this, he decides to test and find out for himself, through 
action, "how much of it is true." This is a necessary step 
in his spiritual growth, for he is to be no blind follower
22Three by Flannery O 'Connor, pp. 315-6.
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of old Tarwater--he must knowingly experience his own "fall" 
before accepting his true vocation. However, in denying 
the "word" of his great-uncle and his true conscience Tar­
water falls to the opposite extreme of trying to destroy 
conscience and his link with the "word" of the past, of 
history, through decisive action. In effect, he adopts the 
pure existentialism of action seen in Hazel Motes— action 
used as a means to immunize oneself from history, to "redeem" 
oneself from mystery with one decisive, severing action. 
Rayber can "think" and "talk" in abstract intellectual formu­
lae, but he is impotent to act. Young Tarwater, on the other 
hand, can "act"; he insists that: "You can't just say NO....
You got to do NO. You got to show it. You got to show you 
mean it by doing it. You got to show you're not going to 
do one thing by doing another. You got to make an end of it. 
One way or another." But to "make an end of it" means to 
act as a means of escaping the threatening burden of the 
mystery of the Word in Act, and Tarwater here suffers dis­
sociation in trying to absolve himself from "the word"—  
from reflective conscience and moral ambiguity.
The critical action in Tarwater's attempt to exorcize 
the mystery of the inherited "Word" is the drowning-baptism 
of Bishop. By drowning the idiot he employs violent action, 
like Joe Christmas, as a way to immunize himself from moral 
ambiguity, but though Tarwater sees it as a way to "free" 
himself from the past, the truth is that it only deepens the 
mystery of redemptive freedom. For in the act of drowning
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Bishop he is not freed from the Word--the words of baptism 
mysteriously pour forth from him. Hoping to redeem himself 
by this act and "keep himself inviolate," Tarwater has in 
fact steeped himself in guilt and further separation from 
his true identity. After the murder, he intends to return 
to Powderhead and "mind his bidnis" (that is, withdraw into 
an Edenic haven and protect his "innocent" inviolability, 
from history), but his inability to escape the consequences 
of the past is made apparent at once by his condition of 
dissociation. His first ride is with a truckdriver who, 
ironically, insists that Tarwater "talk" to keep him awake, 
and the youth's troubled conscience begins to assert itself 
immediately as he tries to deny that the words of baptism 
have any meaning. He protests his innocence, but his own 
words belie him, especially when he meets a familiar Negro 
woman along the road and uncontrollably utters obscenities 
at her. Tarwater is now "possessed" demoniacally by words 
he cannot control, just as he cannot refrain from trying to 
"justify" his act of drowning Bishop by words, a desperate 
attempt to "balance" word and act meaningfully.
Tarwater's condition of dissociation can only be 
"resolved" by recognition and acceptance of his own fallen 
state, the human condition of violation, and this occurs 
dramatically in his seduction by the homosexual, when his 
illusion of personal inviolability is destroyed. Following 
this act of violation, Tarwater now recognizes that a return
l8l
to Powderhead— to immunity— is impossible. The knowledge
of personal contamination is burned into him, but he also
acknowledges the cleansing divine fire of grace that burned
away his romantic illusions of escape and innocence. Seeing
this, Tarwater's spirit is reunited with the Word, for he
now accepts the mystery of his identity in the prophetic
calling. ■ In a vision he sees beyond Powderhead to the "true"
country where the Word is perfectly incarnated in Christ--
"that violent country where the silence is never broken
except to shout the truth." Chastened, he turns back to the
city to preach his vision— "GO WARN THE CHILDREN OF GOD OF
THE TERRIBLE SPEED OF MERCY"--and thus accepts his true place
in history, in the long line of prophets whose redemptive
23mission he now assumes.
The cost of refusing this struggle by the denial of 
mystery, and by attempting to save oneself through "reason," 
is witnessed in the spiritual death Rayber undergoes in the 
novel. Rejecting Christ's Redemption, Rayber believes in 
"natural" man. "There are certain laws that determine every 
man's conduct," he tells young Tarwater, and he believes
23Throughout the novel patters of imagery suggest 
the living mystery of experience. All major symbols are 
two-edged: there is the water which cleanses and that
which drowns, the fire which purifies and that which destroys, 
the Word which is Truth and that which falsely tries to "con­
tain" and limit mystery, the hunger and food of the body and 
unquenchable spiritual hunger, the violence which is "holy" 
and that which is perverse, the silence which is divine 
presence and that which is the void.
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that humanity's greatest dignity lies in his intelligent 
struggle to control the irrational, the mysterious, to face 
the "compulsive" forces of love and hate in order to "balance" 
one's life. He preaches a gospel of moderation, of avoiding 
extremes, but this balanced ethic is "upset" by Tarwater's 
violence and his failure to control his own mysterious drives. 
Like Tarwater, Rayber tries to sever his link with the past-- 
old Mason Tarwater--but he is continually brought back to it 
"irrationally"--by reverie and memory, by reflection, and 
by uncontrollable outbursts of love or vehement hate. These 
undeniable: spiritual links with history are conveyed bril­
liantly by the technical structure of the novel, with 
"scenes" modulating between past and present, so that the 
structure points thematically to the ontological balance 
between past and present, history and conscious action in 
"the moment," which has become disjointed in Rayber. In 
short, Rayber suffers from every manifested form of disso­
ciation: he tries to abstract himself from an "irrational"
world and from history; his words are frequently disconnected 
from his thoughts and actions ("I'm not always myself," he 
mutters). He comes to see himself as divided into a "ra­
tional" and a "violent" self, and willfully forces control 
over the violent self by centering it in the idiot Bishop.
The little boy was part of a simple equation that 
required no further solution, except at the moments 
when with little or no warning he would feel himself 
overwhelmed by the horrifying love. Anything he looked 
at too long could bring it on. Bishop did not have to 
be around. It could be a stick or a stone, the line of
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a shadow, the absurd old man's walk of a starling 
crossing the sidewalk. If, without thinking, he lent 
himself to it, he would feel suddenly a morbid surge 
of the love that terrified him--powerful enough to throw 
him to the ground in an act of idiot praise. It was 
completely irrational and abnormal.
He was not afraid of love in general. He knew the 
value of it and how it could be used. He had seen it 
transform in cases where nothing else had worked, such 
as with his poor sister. None of this had the least 
bearing on his situation. The love that would overcome 
him was of a different order entirely. It was not the 
kind that could be used for the child's improvement or 
his own. It was love without reason, love for something 
futureless, love that appeared to exist only to be 
itself, imperious and all-demanding, the kind that would 
cause him to make a fool of himself in an instant. And 
it only began with Bishop. It began with Bishop and 
then like an avalanche covered everything his reason 
hated. He always felt with it a rush of longing to have 
the old man's eyes--insane, fish-colored, violent with 
their impossible vision of a world transfigured--turned 
on him once again. The longing was like an undertow in 
his blood dragging him backwards to what he knew to be 
madness.
Rayber sees his rational control of these impulses as a 
"heroic" life, yet in fact it is a parody of that authentic 
human struggle with mystery and redemptive freedom, a struggle 
he ruthlessly denied. In the process of denial he has com­
mitted a worse "violence" to human being-ness and personal 
identity. The "logical" result of his immunization from 
concrete mystery is spiritual suicide, and it comes to him 
at the moment his vessel of "containment," the idiot, is 
destroyed by Tarwater.
All he would be was an observer. He waited with 
serenity. Life had never been good enough to him for 
him to wince at its destruction. He told himself that
2kThree by Flannery O 'Connor, pp. 372-3
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he was indifferent even to his own dissolution....To 
feel nothing was peace.
The quiet was broken by an unmistakable bellow.<..He 
did not move. He remained absolutely still, wooden, 
expressionless, as the machine picked up the sounds of 
some fierce sustained struggle in the distance....He 
set his jaw. No cry must escape him....
He stood waiting for the raging pain, the intolerable 
hurt that was his due, to begin, so that he could ignore 
it, but he continued to feel nothing. He stood light­
headed at the window and it was not until he realized 
that there would be no pain that he collapsed.^5
In the stories published by Miss O'Connor after The 
Violent Bear It Away, her stress is upon the process of 
redemption in history as a process of "convergence," signi­
fied by the title of her second collection. Everything That 
Rises Must Converge. "Convergence" means the universal 
drive toward spiritual union among men, through love. How­
ever, Miss O'Connor shows this drive as one which is every­
where resisted, by characters who choose various forms of 
isolation and "innocent" immunity— retreat into abstract 
intellectualism or into a romanticized past--to escape the 
demands of concrete union and growth. For redemption 
includes the total, corporate community of humankind, and 
through pride these characters implicitly and explicitly try 
to deny their place in this process. Consequently, they 
resist "convergence," and because of this the initial action 
which must occur is the destruction of their false, illusory, 
detached "place" of immunity. Because of their hardened
25Ibid., pp. 421-23, passim.
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isolation, it takes an apocalyptic-like violence to pene­
trate their "shell," but this violent encounter can, though 
not necessarily, work mysteriously to "open" the character 
to see and accept his true place and identity in redemption 
history. Some retreat from this terrible knowledge, but 
even these are chastened so that they cannot go back to their 
former self-serving "innocent" state.
In "Everything That Rises Must Converge," the violent 
convergence occurs between a stout Negress and an aristo­
cratically-inclined white woman, whose son Julian witnesses 
the impact. The title of the story (taken from the Catholic 
evolutionist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin), the name "Julian," 
and the remark uttered by his mother in defense of his lazi­
ness: "Well, Rome wasn't built in a day"--all suggest that
the action typologically dramatizes the struggle in the uni­
versal redemptive p r o c e s s . T h e  son Julian is an "apostate" 
modernist who lives in a "mental bubble," a pseudo-liberal 
intellectual who dissociates himself from the concrete world 
and its demands for redemptive action. He appears to be an 
advanced "progressive" of social change, but his real dis­
sociating impulse is evident in the fact that he desires to 
live in the country, at least "three miles" from any people.
Julian the Apostate, Roman emperor whose mother died 
shortly after his birth, tried to return the kingdom from 
Christianity to the old pagan culture. He issued edicts of 
universal "toleration", using this as a guise to spread 
paganism through sympathetic philosophers and teachers.
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Moreover, he ostensibly has liberated himself from his 
mother's outmoded, regressive social views, but in fact his 
own theoretic progressivism is akin to her aristocratic, 
elitist pretensions. This true condition is made clear at 
the end of the story, when Julian must face the "void" 
caused by her detah.
Julian's mother's dissociation from concrete history 
takes the form of nostalgia for an idealized past, the aristo­
cratic South of her youth. Formerly a "Godhigh," she now 
lives in the "reduced" circumstances of a decaying city neigh­
borhood. She believes the world is now in "a mess," and her 
view of social progress--human convergence through integra- 
tion--is one of retrenchment and isolation. "It's simply 
not realistic. They should rise, yes, but on their own side 
of the fence." This view is also shared implicitly by the 
Negro woman on the bus; their mutual prideful isolation is 
symbolized by the identical purple and green hats they wear.
• It is this pride, linked with sentimental nostalgia for the 
past, which moves Julian's mother to her patronizing gesture 
of offering the Negro child a penny, and the Negro woman's 
violent, answering blow shatters the mother's exalted posi­
tion of aristocratic condescension. The effect of this real 
"convergence," however, is to drive her further into the 
past, for as she wanders stunned down the street, she mutters 
"Tell Grandpa to come get me," "Tell Caroline (her childhood 
Negro maid) to come get me." The apocalypse is complete
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when she falls dead of a heart attack. In addition, her fall 
is as much an apocalypse for her son Julian. In one of the 
masterful ironies of the story, we discover that this "pro­
gressive," allegedly liberated from his mother's archaic 
social views, actually has used her as an abstract symbol of 
all he supposedly repudiates, one which his own theoretic 
progressivism depended upon as a foil. His identity as a 
liberal has been merely a reactionary posture. Mother and 
son shared the same prideful impulse of idealizing, which 
both have used to immunize themselves from real convergence, 
and in her death his true dependence upon her is revealed to 
Julian. "The tide of darkness seemed to sweep him back to 
her, postponing from moment to moment his entry into the 
world of guilt and sorrow."
Whereas violent convergence destroys Julian's isola­
tion with a terrifying revelation of false identity, con­
vergence with the real mystery of love leads to an acceptance 
of true identity and place in "Parker's Back." Obadiah 
Elihue Parker is linked by name and by his marriage to Sarah 
Ruth to Old Testament history, but it is an identity he has 
attempted to escape throughout all the years of his life.
He will not use the biblical names , and in his wandering 
travels he has covered his body with tattoos, emblems of his 
own self-idolatry and profane love. However, he is unable 
to "seduce" Sarah Ruth to this profane love; she rejects his 
tattoos as "vanity of vanities," "idolatry," and warns him
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that he must answer for his deeds at the Last Judgment.
Sarah Ruth embodies responsible moral action in the present, 
and the concrete, unromanticized demands of love, the "spiri­
tualization" of their relationship which Parker adolescently 
spurns. His search for a tattoo which will "bring Sarah 
Ruth to heel," and the fact that he chooses a Byzantine 
Christ tattoo indicates both his retreat into a past he 
romanticizes and his idolatrous love of the emblem as a 
pictorial representation of himself. Parker's act betokens 
the prideful self-redemption of Adam. "A man can't save his 
self from whatever it is don't deserve none of my sympathy," 
he tells the tattooist, and later in the pool hall a friend 
says admiringly of the work: "An o-riginal way to do it if
I ever saw one." However, the tattoo fails to "seduce"
Sarah Ruth; she will not admit him to the house until he 
uses his complete biblical name. "'Idolatry!' Sarah Ruth 
screamed. 'Idolatry! Explaining yourself with idols under 
every green tree! I can put up with lies and vanities but 
I don't want no idolator in this house!'" Defeated, Parker 
is driven from the house at the end of the story, driven 
"back" to the real, childish moral adolescence he has chosen 
by his deeds. "There he was--who called himself Obadiah 
Elihue— leaning against the tree, crying like'a baby."
In "Revelation," the mystery of grace operating 
through human imperfection brings the self-righteous 
Mrs. Turpin to accept her true place in the universal
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redemptive process of history. Though she is surrounded 
by evidence of a flawed humanity--sitting in a doctor's 
waiting room--Mrs. Turpin reveals herself in conversation to 
be a blind, proud, self-satisfying believer in her own 
inherent goodness. She hypocritically "thanks Jesus" for 
her well-being, at the same time gloating over her "superi­
ority" to the Negroes and the "white trash" in the office.
In her false innocence, "good" means cleansed of imperfec­
tion, evidenced by her conversation with the "white trash" 
woman when she reveals that she has built a concrete "pig- 
parlor" for her hogs and cleans them daily. What Mrs. Turpin 
is blind to is the mysterious workings of grace through 
human imperfection. This mystery "hits" her in the form of 
a violent convergence with Mary Grace, an ugly girl who first 
strikes Mrs. Turpin with a book entitled Human Development, 
and then assaults her, screaming, "Go back to Hell where you 
came from, you old wart hog." The attack is a severe blow 
to Mrs. Turpin's isolated pride and moral self-assurance, 
but one which finally leads her to a vision of her true 
identity. Unable to rid herself of the memory of the obnoxious 
girl, she "questions" God that evening while cleaning her 
hogs. "Occasionally she raised her fist and made a small 
stabbing motion over her chest as if she was defending her 
innocence to invisible guests who were like the comforters 
of Job, reasonable-seeming but wrong." Finally she harangues 
God with Satanic insistence: "Who do you think you are."
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The "answer” returns in the grace of a chastening vision,
one which shows Mrs. Turpin her own true "diminished" place,
as well as the role of imperfection in the divine plan for
redeeming the universal community.
A visionary light settled in her eyes. She saw the 
streak as a vast swinging bridge extending upward from 
the earth through a field of living fire. Upon it a 
vast horde of souls were rumbling toward heaven. There 
were whole companies of white-trash, clean for the first 
time in their lives, and bands of black niggers in white 
robes, and battalions of freaks and lunatics shouting 
and clapping and leaping like frogs. And bringing up 
the end of the procession was a tribe of people whom she 
recognized at once as those who, like herself and Claud, 
had always had a little of everything and the God-given 
wit to use it right. She leaned forward to observe them 
closer. They were marching behind the others with great 
dignity, accountable as they had always been for good 
order and common sense and respectable behavior. They 
alone were on key. Yet she could see by their shocked 
and altered faces that even their virtues were being 
burned away.
27Everything That Rises Must Converge, p. l86.
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